The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Open accessAbstract
A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants.
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Cites
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Cited by
Items 101–110 of 110
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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, B., & Liebman, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1997-10
- OpenAlex
- W3122028926
- Cited by
- 1,291
- References
- 27
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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