Freedom, choice, and the sense of agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The sense of agency is an intriguing aspect of human consciousness and is commonly defined as the sense that one is the author of their own actions and their consequences. In the current study, we varied the number of action alternatives (one, three, seven) that participants could select from and determined the effects on intentional binding which is believed to index the low-level sense of agency. Participants made self-paced button presses while viewing a conventional Libet clock and reported the perceived onset time of either the button presses or consequent auditory tones. We found that the binding effect was strongest when participants had the maximum number of alternatives, intermediate when they had medium level of action choice and lowest when they had no choice. We interpret our results in relation to the potential link between agency and the freedom to choose one's actions.
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Cites
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Voluntary action and conscious awareness
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The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will
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Does Choice Mean Freedom and Well-Being?
Markus, H. R., & Schwartz, B. (2010) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/651242 · Cited by 381
The self in action: lessons from delusions of control
Frith, C. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.002 · Cited by 315
Automation technology and sense of control: A window on human agency
Berberian, B., Sarrazin, J.-C., Le Blaye, P., & Haggard, P. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034075 · Cited by 190
The Natural Philosophy of Agency
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00067.x · Cited by 171 · cited 1×
“The predictive account underlines the role of intrinsic and sensorimotor cues, whereas the inferential account posits the contribution of extrinsic cues and high level inferences (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; Wegner, 2002, 2003; Frith, 2005; Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Gallagher, 2…”
BackgroundWas it me or was it you? How the sense of agency originates from ideomotor learning revealed by fMRI
Spengler, S., von Cramon, D. Y., & Brass, M. (2009) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.01.047 · Cited by 145
Obhi, S. S., & Haggard, P. (2004) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-004-1911-4 · Cited by 68
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Cited by
Sense of agency in the human brain
Haggard, P. (2017) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.14 · Cited by 1,107
Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain
Caspar, E. A., Christensen, J. F., Cleeremans, A., & Haggard, P. (2016) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.067 · Cited by 292
The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition.
Haggard, P. (2019) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103348 · Cited by 126
Having control over the external world increases the implicit sense of agency
Beck, B., Di Costa, S., & Haggard, P. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.002 · Cited by 104
“Another found that intentional binding increased with the number of alternative actions producing the same outcome (Barlas & Obhi, 2013).”
Khalighinejad, N., Di Costa, S., & Haggard, P. (2016) · Brain Stimulation · doi:10.1016/j.brs.2016.01.005 · Cited by 58
“One previous behavioural study noted a relation between action selection and intentional binding [43], but the underlying neural basis remained unclear.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Barlas, Z., & Obhi, S. S.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 514-514
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132646910
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 1.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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