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Sleep deprivation alters choice strategy without altering uncertainty or loss aversion preferences

Mullette-Gillman, O'Dhaniel A., Kurnianingsih, Yoanna A., Liu, Jean C. J.·2015·Frontiers in Neuroscience
DOI 10.3389/fnins.2015.00352PMC PMC4593856
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Figure 1 Experimental design. (A) Participants attended 3 sessions, 1 preliminary session followed by 2 main sessions, which were each ~1 week apart. The order of the RW and TSD session was counterbalanced across participants. (B) Example trials for the gains choice task and the losses choice task. (C) Example trial for loss aversion task. For all the monetary decision making tasks, resolution of one trial was given at the end of the experiment to determine participants' payment. No outcome resolutions were given during any tasks until completion of the final experimental session.
Figure 1 Experimental design. (A) Participants attended 3 sessions, 1 preliminary session followed by 2 main sessions, which were each ~1 week apart. The order of the RW and TSD session was counterbalanced across participants. (B) Example trials for the gains choice task and the losses choice task. (C) Example trial for loss aversion task. For all the monetary decision making tasks, resolution of one trial was given at the end of the experiment to determine participants' payment. No outcome resolutions were given during any tasks until completion of the final experimental session.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Examples choice functions for individual participants. Each subplot shows the choice behavior for 1 participant across the trials where they chose between a risky gamble and a certain monetary option one task. The y-axis indicates the percent at which they selected the gamble option, across 15 trials for each point. The x-axis is the ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option (rEV). (A) In the gains choice task, for 135 risk trials across 9 examined rEV values. (B) In the losses choice task, for 150 risk trials across 10 examined rEV values. Participants' choice functions for the risk trials from each domain-specific task were plotted to show the percent at which they selected the gamble for each examined rEV value. The indifference point of each participant was determined as the projected rEV for where their choice function indicated 50% selection of the gamble (as indicated with an inverted red triangle for these participants). We defined the risk premium value for each participant as their indifference point −1 (to make zero be risk neutral).
Figure 2 Examples choice functions for individual participants. Each subplot shows the choice behavior for 1 participant across the trials where they chose between a risky gamble and a certain monetary option one task. The y-axis indicates the percent at which they selected the gamble option, across 15 trials for each point. The x-axis is the ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option (rEV). (A) In the gains choice task, for 135 risk trials across 9 examined rEV values. (B) In the losses choice task, for 150 risk trials across 10 examined rEV values. Participants' choice functions for the risk trials from each domain-specific task were plotted to show the percent at which they selected the gamble for each examined rEV value. The indifference point of each participant was determined as the projected rEV for where their choice function indicated 50% selection of the gamble (as indicated with an inverted red triangle for these participants). We defined the risk premium value for each participant as their indifference point −1 (to make zero be risk neutral).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Uncertainty preferences. Relationship between subjects' preferences across RW and TSD conditions for (A) Gains risk premium, (B) Losses risk premium, (C) Gains ambiguity premium, and (D) Losses ambiguity premium.
Figure 3 Uncertainty preferences. Relationship between subjects' preferences across RW and TSD conditions for (A) Gains risk premium, (B) Losses risk premium, (C) Gains ambiguity premium, and (D) Losses ambiguity premium.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Choice strategy metric—utilization of trial information. Relationship between trial variances explained (R-squared) by the rEV and pWIN information for (A) RW gains domain, (B) TSD gains domain, (C) RW losses domain, and (D) TSD losses domain. Distribution of choice strategy values (difference between rEV R-squared minus pWIN R-squared) for (E) RW gains domain, (F) TSD gains domain, (G) RW losses domain, and (H) TSD losses domain. The “*” indicates the mean of each distribution.
Figure 4 Choice strategy metric—utilization of trial information. Relationship between trial variances explained (R-squared) by the rEV and pWIN information for (A) RW gains domain, (B) TSD gains domain, (C) RW losses domain, and (D) TSD losses domain. Distribution of choice strategy values (difference between rEV R-squared minus pWIN R-squared) for (E) RW gains domain, (F) TSD gains domain, (G) RW losses domain, and (H) TSD losses domain. The “*” indicates the mean of each distribution.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Choice strategies. Relationship between subjects' choice strategy across rested wakefulness (RW) and total sleep deprivation (TSD) conditions for (A) Gains choice strategy, and (B) Losses choice strategy. Distribution of differences in choice strategy (TSD minus RW) for the (C) Gains domain and the (D) Losses domain. The “*” indicates the mean of each distribution.
Figure 5 Choice strategies. Relationship between subjects' choice strategy across rested wakefulness (RW) and total sleep deprivation (TSD) conditions for (A) Gains choice strategy, and (B) Losses choice strategy. Distribution of differences in choice strategy (TSD minus RW) for the (C) Gains domain and the (D) Losses domain. The “*” indicates the mean of each distribution.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Mullette-Gillman, O. A., Kurnianingsih, Y. A., & Liu, J. C. J.
Venue
Frontiers in Neuroscience
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2015-10-06
Volume
9
ISSN
1662-453X
DOI
10.3389/fnins.2015.00352
PMC
PMC4593856
Cited by
20
References
7

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