On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper elaborates on a proposal for mapping a configuration space for selector circuits (SCs), defined as the subset of neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) responsible for evoking particular qualia, to its experiential counterpart, experience-space (E-space), as part of an investigation into the nature of conscious experience as it first emerged in evolution. The dimensionality of E-space, meaning the degrees of freedom required to specify the properties of related sets of qualia, is at least two, but the utility of E-space as a hypothetical construct is much enhanced by assuming it is a large dimensional space, with at least several times as many dimensions as there are categories of qualia to occupy them. Phenomenal consciousness can then be represented as having originated as one or more multidimensional ur-experiences that combined multiple forms of experience together. Taking this as a starting point, questions concerning evolutionary sequence can be addressed, including how the quale best suited to a given sensory modality would have been extracted by evolution from a larger set of possibilities, a process referred to here as dimensional sorting, and how phenomenal consciousness would have been experienced in its earliest manifestations. There is a further question as to whether the E-space formulation is meaningful in analytical terms or simply a descriptive device in graphical form, but in either case it provides a more systematic way of thinking about early stages in the evolution of consciousness than relying on narrative and conjecture alone.
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Citations
Cites
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“That is, even for higher order theories that take a representational view of consciousness, that it resides in the algorithmic processing of neural input in and of itself (Van Gulick, 2018; Lycan, 2019; Seth and Bayne, 2022), there will necessarily be components of brain circuitry, whether localized or distributed dif…”
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“There is first the problem of separating the quality of an experience from its intensity, for example, in the case of affect (see Cabanac, 2002), whether a strongly felt emotion is one that is more narrowly focused in a pitch-like sense, or simply more intense.”
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“This would include scenarios where emotional feelings (positive and negative affect) are crucial to the narrative (e.g., Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Solms, 2019), and modalities associated with the organs of Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 07 frontiersin.org FIGURE 4 As in Figure 3, but a second…”
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“I examined this issue in a preliminary way in an earlier paper (Lacalli, 2020) that explored how Alan Turing’s ideas about the emergence of pattern during development might be applied to explain the emergence of consciousness during evolution.”
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“…equivalent to asking whether, with reference to SC-space, we are dealing with a “puddle” scenario described in the paper just cited (see figure 3 in Lacalli, 2021), of an ur-quale that combines multiple forms of experience that later came to be experienced separately, or the “tree” scenario,…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Consciousness and its hard problems: Separating the ontological from the evolutionary.
Lacalli, T. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576 · Cited by 4
Self-citationWhat current theories of consciousness are missing.
Department of Biological Sciences, U. O. T. A. E. P., & Irwin, L. N. (2023) · Neurology and Neuroscience · doi:10.33425/2692-7918.1059 · Cited by 4
Lacalli, T. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1648930 · Cited by 1
“…might, for example, have comprised a set of ur-experiences, each incorporating some combination of sensations that to us would be distinguishable, but where the evolutionary process responsible for making them distinguishable (dimensional sorting, see Lacalli, 2022) had not yet occurred.”
Self-citationLacalli, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
“…well-differentiated than they are in our consciousness, so that experiences that for us represent separate sensory modalities could have been experienced together, as a combination of subcomponents not yet rendered fully distinguishable by natural selection (see Lacalli, 2022 for the full argument).”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lacalli, T.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2022-08-10
- Volume
- 16
- Pages
- 945722-945722
- ISSN
- 1662-5137 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4290988341
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 1.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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