Cited by 361Embodied and Extended CognitionAction Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning Development

A duet for one.

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Friston, Karl, Frith, Christopher·2015·Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent - who is modelling you - can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency - and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.concog.2014.12.003

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  • Using the same models to explain our own behavior and the observed consequences of another's behavior brings an extra inference problem: the attribution of agency.

    “This brings with it an extra inference problem; namely, the attribution of agency. In other words, if we use the same models to explain our own behavior and the observed consequences of another’s behavior, then we also have to carefully infer agency (in order to appropriately attenuate proprioceptive precision and preclude echopraxia, Friston and Frith, 2015).”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Friston and Frith, 2015

    The Conclusion says the same generative models can be used to infer one’s own behaviour and another’s, while the Summary treats agency as a contextual factor determined by sensory attenuation and proprioceptive precision. This supports the claimed need to distinguish the source of behaviour. The cited paper does not, in the passages found, connect that inference to preventing echopraxia; its Conclusion also says the orchestration of precision in communication was not dealt with there. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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1 of the 82 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Clark A. The many faces of precision Frontiers in Psychology 4 2013 270 23734133 PMC3659294
  2. Hunt B. Ott E. Yorke J. Differentiable synchronisation of chaos Physical Review E 55 1997 4029 4034
  3. Mumford D. On the computational architecture of the neocortex. II Biological Cybernetics 66 1992 241 251 1540675

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Authors
Friston, K., & Frith, C.
Affiliations
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
Corresponding author
Friston, Karl
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2015-11
Volume
36
Pages
390-405
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2024149692
Cited by
359
References
82
Citations by year
2026: 44 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 5
FWCI
16.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (091593, 088130)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
communication, joint action, shared narratives, Bayesian inference, infinite regress, shared models, sensory prediction, attention, attenuation, bird song, social cognition
MeSH terms
Animals, Attention, Communication, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Perception, Sensation, Thinking, Theory of Mind

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