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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 40 of the 132 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition

Open access

Abstract

Telecommunication infrastructures rely on cryptographic protocols designed for long-term confidentiality, yet data exchanged today faces future exposure when adversaries acquire quantum or large-scale computational capabilities. This harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat transforms persistent communication records into time-dependent vulnerabilities. We model HNDL as a temporal cybersecurity risk, formalizing the adversarial process of deferred decryption and quantifying its impact across sectors with varying confidentiality requirements. Our framework evaluates how delayed post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration amplifies exposure and how hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms mitigate it. Results show that high-retention sectors such as satellite and health networks face exposure windows extending decades under delayed PQC adoption, while hybrid and forward-secure approaches reduce this risk horizon by over two-thirds. We demonstrate that temporal exposure is a measurable function of data longevity and migration readiness, introducing a network-centric model linking quantum vulnerability to communication performance and governance. Our findings underscore the urgent need for crypto-agile infrastructures that maintain confidentiality as a continuous assurance process throughout the quantum transition.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper formalizes harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) as a temporal cybersecurity risk for telecommunications, where ciphertext harvested today may become readable once quantum or other advanced computation matures. Using a modeled 19-year adversarial decryption horizon, it shows that long-retention sectors like health and intelligence face years-to-decades of residual exposure, while hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms can reduce that risk.

## Key findings

  • The paper models a conservative adversarial decryption horizon of 19 years and uses this to classify sector exposure by data lifetime.
  • In Table 4, Finance with Ld = 1 year has W = 0.0 and R = 0.0, while Health with Ld = 25 years has W = 6.0, R = 1.0, and Intelligence with Ld = 35 years has W = 16.0, R = 1.0.
  • The paper reports that hybrid protection reduces effective exposure probability by approximately 65%, yielding R_hyb = 0.35 for the Health and Intelligence examples.
  • With annual key rotation (τ_rot = 1 year), forward-secure mechanisms cap retrospective exposure at 1.0 year per compromised epoch; the table reports W_FSEcap = 1.0 for Health and Intelligence.

## Methods

  • The study proposes a formal threat model for an HNDL adversary with three resources: collection capability, decryption capability, and temporal horizon, and defines confidentiality failure as a time-dependent condition.
  • It performs a sectoral analysis mapping confidentiality lifetimes to exposure categories using representative lifetimes for finance, health, intelligence, satellite communications, cloud archives, blockchain, IoT telemetry, and others.
  • The main quantitative analysis computes residual exposure windows as \(W = \max(0, L_d - H_a(t_{mig}))\), and then evaluates risk indicators, hybrid risk reduction, and forward-secure exposure caps.

## Limitations

  • The paper explicitly states that the current framework is deterministic and that the authors recommend probabilistic extensions because the quantum timeline has high variance; it also says future work will add Monte Carlo sampling and scenario weighting.
  • It states the model focuses on cryptographic algorithm strength and does not fully model side-channel vulnerabilities, key management failures, protocol downgrade attacks, or hybrid implementation flaws.
  • Evident from the text: the quantitative results are based on representative but simplified parameter estimates and a single baseline horizon of 19 years, so the sectoral numbers are model-based projections rather than empirical measurements.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/telecom6040100

Cites

28 of 28 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

28 Valid · 19 Not valid · 38 Not checked · 62 Own results and interpretations

60 more claims · 14 with their cited sources checked

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Peter, 2025, Future-Proofing Data: Assessing the Feasibility of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms to Mitigate ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ Attacks, Asian J. Comput. Inf. Syst. (ACRI), 25, 60
  2. Gidney, C., Ekerå, M., and Fowler, A.G. (2025). How to Factor 2048-bit RSA with Less Than One Million Noisy Qubits. arXiv.
  3. Sankalp, M.R., Lokapal, G., Mohan, B.A., and Basavaraj, G.N. (2025, January 21–22). Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges in 6G Networks Through AI-Driven Adaptive Defense Mechanisms and Quantum-Resilient Protocols. Proceedings of the 2025 International Conference on Computing for Sustainability and Intelligent Future (COMP-SIF), Bangalore, India.
  4. Dina, 2024, Cryptographic Standards for a Post-Quantum World, IEEE Spectr., 61, 5

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Kagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., & Allen, R.
Affiliations
Swinburne University of Technology (AU)
Corresponding author
Branch, Philip
Venue
Telecom
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2025-12-18
Volume
6
Issue
4
Pages
100
ISSN
2673-4001 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4417454511
Cited by
15
References
22
Citations by year
2026: 15
FWCI
6.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Telecom (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
SmartSat Cooperative Research Center
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
Keywords
harvest now decrypt later, post-quantum cryptography, quantum computing threats, hybrid key exchange, forward secrecy, cryptographic agility, telecommunications infrastructure, data retention, exposure windows, satellite networks, health networks

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.