The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 40 of the 132 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition
Open accessAbstract
Telecommunication infrastructures rely on cryptographic protocols designed for long-term confidentiality, yet data exchanged today faces future exposure when adversaries acquire quantum or large-scale computational capabilities. This harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat transforms persistent communication records into time-dependent vulnerabilities. We model HNDL as a temporal cybersecurity risk, formalizing the adversarial process of deferred decryption and quantifying its impact across sectors with varying confidentiality requirements. Our framework evaluates how delayed post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration amplifies exposure and how hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms mitigate it. Results show that high-retention sectors such as satellite and health networks face exposure windows extending decades under delayed PQC adoption, while hybrid and forward-secure approaches reduce this risk horizon by over two-thirds. We demonstrate that temporal exposure is a measurable function of data longevity and migration readiness, introducing a network-centric model linking quantum vulnerability to communication performance and governance. Our findings underscore the urgent need for crypto-agile infrastructures that maintain confidentiality as a continuous assurance process throughout the quantum transition.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper formalizes harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) as a temporal cybersecurity risk for telecommunications, where ciphertext harvested today may become readable once quantum or other advanced computation matures. Using a modeled 19-year adversarial decryption horizon, it shows that long-retention sectors like health and intelligence face years-to-decades of residual exposure, while hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms can reduce that risk.
## Key findings
- The paper models a conservative adversarial decryption horizon of 19 years and uses this to classify sector exposure by data lifetime.
- In Table 4, Finance with Ld = 1 year has W = 0.0 and R = 0.0, while Health with Ld = 25 years has W = 6.0, R = 1.0, and Intelligence with Ld = 35 years has W = 16.0, R = 1.0.
- The paper reports that hybrid protection reduces effective exposure probability by approximately 65%, yielding R_hyb = 0.35 for the Health and Intelligence examples.
- With annual key rotation (τ_rot = 1 year), forward-secure mechanisms cap retrospective exposure at 1.0 year per compromised epoch; the table reports W_FSEcap = 1.0 for Health and Intelligence.
## Methods
- The study proposes a formal threat model for an HNDL adversary with three resources: collection capability, decryption capability, and temporal horizon, and defines confidentiality failure as a time-dependent condition.
- It performs a sectoral analysis mapping confidentiality lifetimes to exposure categories using representative lifetimes for finance, health, intelligence, satellite communications, cloud archives, blockchain, IoT telemetry, and others.
- The main quantitative analysis computes residual exposure windows as \(W = \max(0, L_d - H_a(t_{mig}))\), and then evaluates risk indicators, hybrid risk reduction, and forward-secure exposure caps.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that the current framework is deterministic and that the authors recommend probabilistic extensions because the quantum timeline has high variance; it also says future work will add Monte Carlo sampling and scenario weighting.
- It states the model focuses on cryptographic algorithm strength and does not fully model side-channel vulnerabilities, key management failures, protocol downgrade attacks, or hybrid implementation flaws.
- Evident from the text: the quantitative results are based on representative but simplified parameter estimates and a single baseline horizon of 19 years, so the sectoral numbers are model-based projections rather than empirical measurements.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
28 Valid · 19 Not valid · 38 Not checked · 62 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“They represent adversarial quantum capability as a stochastic process with optimistic, median, and pessimistic scenarios, which allows financial institutions to estimate HNDL exposure across multiple timelines instead of relying on point predictions [27].”
What the sources say
- Disputedcites [27] Grigaliūnas, Š., and Brūzgienė, R. (2025). Towards a Unified Quantum Risk Assessment. Electronics, 14. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5.1 describes financial-services models as using categorical scores, not stochastic estimates of adversarial capability. Section 5.2 says stochastic quantum-timeline simulations are a possible future extension of the authors’ QARS model. The paper does not attribute optimistic, median, and pessimistic HNDL timelines to FS-ISAC. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Disputed
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Classical public-key cryptography faces an existential threat from quantum algorithms [9].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [9] You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I.W.A.J., and Ko, Y. (2024). Mitigating security vulnerabilities in 6g networks: A comprehensive analysis of the dmrn protocol using svo logic and proverif. Appl. Sci., 14. source
Section 5.1.6 (Quantum-Safe; page not provided) says quantum computers can break traditional algorithms such as RSA and ECIES. This supports the claim that classical public-key cryptography faces a serious threat from quantum computing. (LLM, conf=0.91)
states a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This 'harvest-now, decrypt-later' (HNDL) strategy converts long-lived ciphertext into a temporal cyberweapon, threatening not only cryptographic primitives but also the infrastructures and archives that depend on them [3,4].”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [3] Dustin, M., Ray, P., Andrew, R., Angela, R., and David, C. (2024). Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, National Institute of Technology and Standards. NIST Internal Report (IR) NIST IR 8547 ipd.h.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites [4] Beullens, W., D’Anvers, J.P., Hülsing, A.T., Lange, T., Panny, L., de Saint Guilhem, C., and Smart, N.P. (2021). Post-Quantum Cryptography: Current State and Quantum Mitigation, ENISA. doi:10.2824/92307
The Introduction describes attackers storing encrypted traffic today for retrospective decryption once they have a large quantum computer. Section 6, Quantum Mitigation, warns that data needing confidentiality for more than ten years is at risk, and the protective-measures discussion says quantum computing endangers infrastructure. The claim’s ‘temporal cyberweapon’ wording is figurative; the paper’s stated risk concerns ciphertext protected by current public-key systems. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“As telecommunication infrastructures evolve toward quantum-era connectivity, the assumption that encryption ensures perpetual secrecy is no longer valid [9,10].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [9] You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I.W.A.J., and Ko, Y. (2024). Mitigating security vulnerabilities in 6g networks: A comprehensive analysis of the dmrn protocol using svo logic and proverif. Appl. Sci., 14. source
The introductory passage says quantum computers pose a significant threat to traditional encryption used in optical communications. Section 5.1.6 adds that quantum computers can break traditional algorithms such as RSA and ECIES. Together, these support the claim that encryption alone cannot be assumed to ensure lasting secrecy as telecommunications move toward quantum-era connectivity; page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked yetcites [10] Carlos, B., Antonio, S., and Luis Enrique, S. (2024). QISS: Quantum-enhanced sustainable security incident handling in the IoT. Information, 15. source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Literature consistently notes that data requiring confidentiality beyond roughly ten years should already be considered at risk under plausible quantum progress scenarios [27].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [27] Grigaliūnas, Š., and Brūzgienė, R. (2025). Towards a Unified Quantum Risk Assessment. Electronics, 14. source
The Introduction says confidentiality cannot be assured when the required secrecy period plus migration time exceeds the anticipated time to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. In its policy-alignment example (section labelled “2.”), the paper considers data requiring more than 10 years of confidentiality with an eight-year quantum threat horizon as a configuration that should receive a high risk score. The claim appropriately frames this as a scenario, not a certain arrival date. (LLM, conf=0.85)
boostedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
60 more claims · 14 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 147 claims and to verify the 12 references still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 38
- It may state two separate claims as one. 58
- Borderline: one of the tests for a substantial claim is unclear. 1
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ 4.2. Exposure Classification Methodology
“- Medium Exposure: Sectors with 1 < Ld ≤ 7 years (e.g., corporate IP, cloud archives) where data lifetimes exceed short-term protection but remain within optimistic migration timelines.”
§ 4. Sectoral Exposure and Countermeasures
“| Cloud archives | 5-15 yrs | Medium |”
Citations
Cites
A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search
Grover, L. K. (1996) · Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96 · doi:10.1145/237814.237866 · Cited by 8,830 · cited 5×
“Comparable security margins can be restored by doubling key sizes (for example, AES-128 to AES-256) [13].”
InfluentialAlgorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring
Shor, P. W. (2002) · Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.1994.365700 · Cited by 8,713
Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer
Shor, P. W. (1999) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/s0036144598347011 · Cited by 3,904
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
Bellare, M., & Rogaway, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48329-2_21 · Cited by 1,752
Realization of a scalable Shor algorithm
Monz, T., Nigg, D., Martinez, E. A., Brandl, M. F., Schindler, P., Rines, R., Wang, S. X., Chuang, I. L., & Blatt, R. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aad9480 · Cited by 486 · cited 2×
“…sector-specific forms L d , s or L ( s ) From a systems perspective, large-scale factoring of RSA-2048 on a fault-tolerant quantum computer requires deep logical circuits and extensive error correction, demanding millions of physical qubits and prolonged error-free operation [1,2,31,32].”
Exponential suppression of bit or phase errors with cyclic error correction
Google Quantum, A. I., Chen, Z., Satzinger, K. J., Atalaya, J., Korotkov, A. N., Dunsworth, A., Sank, D., Quintana, C., McEwen, M., Barends, R., et al. (2021) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-021-03588-y · Cited by 393 · cited 2×
“Recent analyses estimate feasible RSA-2048 factoring anywhere between fifteen and thirty-five years depending on hardware error rates and algorithmic progress, implying wide confidence bounds on the temporal risk curves [45,46].”
Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Bros, M., Ciadoux, P., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., et al. (2025) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8545 · Cited by 211 · cited 2×
“NIST SP 800-208 provides operational guidance for stateful hash-based signatures—crucial for secure software signing in the post-quantum era—while IETF drafts define composite certificate and hybrid key-exchange formats to streamline PQC rollouts [20,24].”
Quantum Cryptography in 5G Networks: A Comprehensive Overview
Mehić, M., Michálek, L., Dervisevic, E., Burdiak, P., Plakalovic, M., Rozhon, J., Mahovac, N., Richter, F., Kaljić, E., Lauterbach, F., et al. (2023) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2023.3309051 · Cited by 152
Quantum Cryptography for Future Networks Security: A Systematic Review
Durr-E-Shahwar, Imran, M., Altamimi, A. B., Khan, W., Hussain, S., & Alsaffar, M. S. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3504815 · Cited by 113 · cited 1×
“Existing studies are piecemeal: for example, recent studies forecasts the feasibility of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption under HNDL assumptions, quantifying cost curves and transition dynamics [6–8].”
Post-Quantum Era Privacy Protection for Intelligent Infrastructures
Malina, L., Dzurenda, P., Ricci, S., Hajny, J., Srivastava, G., Matulevicius, R., Affia, A.-A. O., Laurent, M., Sultan, N. H., & Tang, Q. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3062201 · Cited by 111 · cited 1×
“Regulatory Mandates: Health sector lifetimes (10–30 years) align with HIPAA (U.S.) and GDPR requirements mandating retention of medical records for extended periods [34,35].”
Canto, A. C., Kaur, J., Kermani, M. M., & Azarderakhsh, R. (2023) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.23071079.v1 · Cited by 86
Quantum Key Distribution Networks - Key Management: A Survey
Dervisevic, E., Tankovic, A., Fazel, E., Kompella, R., Fazio, P., Voznak, M., & Mehic, M. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3730575 · Cited by 74 · cited 1×
“Forward-secure encryption schemes and proactive key rotation can constrain the damage window: periodically re-encrypting archives with new keys and securely erasing obsolete material ensures that even a future quantum break affects only limited epochs [26,29].”
Towards European standards for quantum technologies
van Deventer, O., Spethmann, N., Loeffler, M., Amoretti, M., van den Brink, R., Bruno, N., Comi, P., Farrugia, N., Gramegna, M., Jenet, A., et al. (2022) · EPJ Quantum Technology · doi:10.1140/epjqt/s40507-022-00150-1 · Cited by 52
Rapidly Deployable Satellite-Based Emergency Communications Infrastructure
Kagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., Allen, R., & Rice, M. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3465512 · Cited by 49 · cited 2×
“State intelligence holdings and satellite communications amplify national-security stakes due to strategic persistence and cross-border exposure [16,27,30].”
Self-citationAn Efficient Quantum Factoring Algorithm
Regev, O. (2025) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3708471 · Cited by 42
Quantum Error Correction For Dummies
Chatterjee, A., Phalak, K., & Ghosh, S. (2023) · 2023 IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE) · doi:10.1109/qce57702.2023.00017 · Cited by 35 · cited 2×
“Recent analyses estimate feasible RSA-2048 factoring anywhere between fifteen and thirty-five years depending on hardware error rates and algorithmic progress, implying wide confidence bounds on the temporal risk curves [45,46].”
Post-Quantum Cryptography: Current state and quantum mitigation
(2021) · TU/e Research Portal · doi:10.2824/92307 · Cited by 30
Cyber-physical defense in the quantum Era
Barbeau, M., & Garcia-Alfaro, J. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-05690-1 · Cited by 22 · cited 4×
“This reframing aligns cryptographic assurance with realistic temporal threat models, ensuring that confidentiality guarantees remain credible for decades to come [18,23].”
InfluentialRisk management frameworks for financial institutions in a rapidly changing economic landscape
Oko-Odion, C., & Angela, O. (2025) · International Journal of Science and Research Archive · doi:10.30574/ijsra.2025.14.1.0155 · Cited by 21 · cited 1×
“This refinement aligns with financial and operational risk assessment practices where uncertainty in threat evolution is explicitly modeled [27,47].”
Mascelli, J., & Rodden, M. (2025) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.2025.093 · Cited by 18
A Comprehensive Review of Encryption and Protection Techniques for Healthcare Data
Nedunoori, V. (2025) · Information Systems Engineering and Management · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-84404-1_8 · Cited by 13
Towards a Unified Quantum Risk Assessment
Grigaliūnas, Š., & Brūzgienė, R. (2025) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics14173338 · Cited by 10 · cited 8×
“This refinement aligns with financial and operational risk assessment practices where uncertainty in threat evolution is explicitly modeled [27,47].”
InfluentialKagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., Allen, R., & Rice, M. (2025) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2025.111560 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
“The gap lies in connecting quantum-era cryptographic readiness with the operational realities of telecom systems limited bandwidth, long device lifecycles, and interoperability constraints [11].”
Self-citationBhatt, S., Bhushan, B., Srivastava, T., & Anoop, V. S. (2023) · Springer Tracts in Electrical and Electronics Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-99-3668-7_12 · Cited by 9
You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I. W. A. J., & Ko, Y. (2024) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app14219726 · Cited by 7
QISS: Quantum-Enhanced Sustainable Security Incident Handling in the IoT
Blanco, C., Santos-Olmo, A., & Sánchez, L. E. (2024) · Information · doi:10.3390/info15040181 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“As telecommunication infrastructures evolve toward quantum-era connectivity, the assumption that encryption ensures perpetual secrecy is no longer valid [9,10].”
A Framework for Dealing With Cybersecurity Risks as Part of Information Security
Spagnolo, M., Ndou, V., Giribaldi, D., & Arena, V. (2023) · Digitalization, Sustainable Development, and Industry 5.0 · doi:10.1108/978-1-83753-190-520231007 · Cited by 2
Presidential Cold War Doctrines: What Are They Good for?
Heiss, M. A. (2024) · Diplomatic History · doi:10.1093/dh/dhad067 · Cited by 2
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Peter, 2025, Future-Proofing Data: Assessing the Feasibility of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms to Mitigate ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ Attacks, Asian J. Comput. Inf. Syst. (ACRI), 25, 60
- Gidney, C., Ekerå, M., and Fowler, A.G. (2025). How to Factor 2048-bit RSA with Less Than One Million Noisy Qubits. arXiv.
- Sankalp, M.R., Lokapal, G., Mohan, B.A., and Basavaraj, G.N. (2025, January 21–22). Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges in 6G Networks Through AI-Driven Adaptive Defense Mechanisms and Quantum-Resilient Protocols. Proceedings of the 2025 International Conference on Computing for Sustainability and Intelligent Future (COMP-SIF), Bangalore, India.
- Dina, 2024, Cryptographic Standards for a Post-Quantum World, IEEE Spectr., 61, 5
Cited by
Hybrid ML-KEM in TLS 1.3: Performance Analysis on ARM64 Under Network Stress
İnce, C. (2026) · Computer Science · doi:10.53070/bbd.1898820 · Cited by 7
İnce, C. (2026) · Türk doğa ve fen dergisi :/Türk doğa ve fen dergisi · doi:10.46810/tdfd.1883893 · Cited by 1
Маликова, Ф., Lakhno, V., Алимсеитова, Ж., Лахно, М., Тогжанова, К., & Beketova, G. (2026) · Information · doi:10.3390/info17050485 · Cited by 1
“The HNDL strategy poses a long-term hidden threat, as the “harvesting” phase can occur undetected and last for years [12,13].”
Adaptive Execution Timing for Offline First Quorum Coordination in LoRa Mesh Networks
Kagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., & Allen, R. (2026) · Telecom · doi:10.3390/telecom7050123
Self-citationWhen and How to Use Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Systematic Literature Review
Annahdi, T., Alsumayt, A., & Nagy, N. (2026) · Network · doi:10.3390/network6030070
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., & Allen, R.
- Affiliations
- Swinburne University of Technology (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Branch, Philip
- Venue
- Telecom
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2025-12-18
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 100
- ISSN
- 2673-4001 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4417454511
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15
- FWCI
- 6.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Telecom (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- SmartSat Cooperative Research Center
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
- Keywords
- harvest now decrypt later, post-quantum cryptography, quantum computing threats, hybrid key exchange, forward secrecy, cryptographic agility, telecommunications infrastructure, data retention, exposure windows, satellite networks, health networks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.