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Enhancing Intelligent Transport Systems Through Decentralized Security Frameworks in Vehicle-to-Everything Networks

Open access
Tariq, Usman, Ahanger, Tariq Ahamed · 2025 · World Electric Vehicle Journal

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 15 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Vehicle Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) play an essential role in intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) by improving road safety and traffic management through robust decentralized communication between vehicles and infrastructure. Yet, decentralization introduces security vulnerabilities, including spoofing, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks, which can compromise the reliability and safety of vehicular communications. The novel D-CASBR framework integrates three essential components: hybrid machine learning methods for real-time anomaly detection, a consortium blockchain for secure information exchange, and a fog-enabled reputation system to manage trust.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes D-CASBR, a decentralized intrusion detection framework for VANET/V2X that combines hybrid machine learning, consortium blockchain, fog computing, and privacy-preserving cryptography. It reports 95% anomaly detection accuracy with minimal false positives and improved simulation-based throughput and message-loss metrics.

Key findings

  • D-CASBR achieved 95 percent anomaly detection accuracy with minimal false positives, according to the abstract.
  • Message loss rate increased with link length from 0.5 km to 2.5 km, escalating from 2.5% to 4.5%, with a reported peak of 5.0% in one 0.5 km iteration; LDPC error rates ranged from 0.3% to 1.5% across Table 4 iterations.
  • The proposed V2V security protocol reported 40,613 signing messages per second and 40,613 verified messages per second, compared with 858/614 (Wang et al.), 357/255 (Nazih et al.), 89/47 (Peixoto et al.), 562/411 (Gaouar et al.), and 2579/655 (Zhan et al.).
  • Higher node numbers improved spatial coverage, redundancy, peer-to-peer consensus, and reduced false positives and single points of failure, as described in the conclusions and Figure 5.

Methods

  • The D-CASBR framework integrates decentralized intrusion detection with fog computing, consortium blockchain, SDN, identity-based broadcast encryption, anonymous V2V communication, hybrid ML using ElasticNet and Gradient Boosting, reputation scoring with PBFT/VRF, SMPC via SecureNN, homomorphic encryption, zk-SNARKs, Bloom filters, federated differential learning with GANs/SecAgg, and Isolation Forest.
  • Simulation used ns-3 and a JiST/SWANS Ulm Highway model over an 8 × 8 km area for 24 h and 10 iterations, with densities from 1 to 2000 nodes, three lanes, maximum speed 40 m/s, average speed 25 m/s, 802.11p/DSRC at 5.9 GHz, maximum packet size 4096 bytes, and beacons at 10 Hz with 209-byte size.
  • Scenarios included low/medium/high-density networks, rapid mobility changes, intermittent connectivity, high-speed highway movement, Sybil attacks, GPS spoofing, and replay attacks; evaluation covered message loss rate, anomaly detection ratio, signing/verification throughput, and alert communication cost.

Limitations

  • Stated in the paper: computational intensity and overhead in real-time processing, difficulty detecting highly sophisticated stealth anomaly types, and resource consumption and latency issues in blockchain operations.
  • Evident from the text: evaluation is simulation/emulation-based using ns-3 and JiST/SWANS rather than a real-world deployment.
  • Evident from the text: some results appear in incomplete or fragmented tables and sections, which limits reproducibility and detailed verification of reported metrics.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/wevj16010024

Cites

37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Taxonomy of vulnerabilities in VANETs. (Summarized according to reference [2-8]) Figure 1. Taxonomy of vulnerabilities in VANETs. (Summarized according to reference [2-8]).
Figure 1 Taxonomy of vulnerabilities in VANETs. (Summarized according to reference [2-8]) Figure 1. Taxonomy of vulnerabilities in VANETs. (Summarized according to reference [2-8]).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 Framework architecture of novel decentralized intrusion detection system with Collaborative Anomaly Scoring and Blockchain-based Reputation (D-CASBR). Figure 2. Framework architecture of novel decentralized intrusion detection system with Collaborative Anomaly Scoring and Blockchain-based Reputation (D-CASBR).
Figure 2 Framework architecture of novel decentralized intrusion detection system with Collaborative Anomaly Scoring and Blockchain-based Reputation (D-CASBR). Figure 2. Framework architecture of novel decentralized intrusion detection system with Collaborative Anomaly Scoring and Blockchain-based Reputation (D-CASBR).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 Simulation environment and factors. Figure 3. Simulation environment and factors.
Figure 3 Simulation environment and factors. Figure 3. Simulation environment and factors.CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 4
CC-BY · From the PDF
6. Conclusions Figure 5. Anomaly detection ratio with number of nodes. [11-15] Figure 5. Anomaly detection ratio with number of nodes. [11-15].
6. Conclusions Figure 5. Anomaly detection ratio with number of nodes. [11-15] Figure 5. Anomaly detection ratio with number of nodes. [11-15].CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 6
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 7
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 8
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 9
CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

3 Valid · 3 Not valid · 5 Not checked · 65 Own results and interpretations

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 32
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 17
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 3

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Metadata

Authors
Tariq, U., & Ahanger, T. A.
Affiliations
Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University (SA)
Corresponding author
Tariq, Usman
Venue
World Electric Vehicle Journal
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2025-01-03
Volume
16
Issue
1
Pages
24
ISSN
2032-6653 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4406026543
Cited by
19
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 9
FWCI
4.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • World Electric Vehicle Journal (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University (2024/01/31056)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
intelligent transportation systems, vehicular ad hoc networks, vehicle-to-everything communication, decentralized security, blockchain, secure multi-party computation, anomaly detection, spoofing attacks, denial-of-service attacks, fog computing, reputation systems, trust management, consortium blockchain, VANET security

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.