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Cited by 444Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCognitive Science and Education ResearchClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 236 of the 243 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Open access
Osman, Magda·2004·Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
DOI 10.3758/bf03196730
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Abstract

Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists' proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify thedifferent forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.

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  1. Benassi, V. A., &Knoth, R. L. (1993). The intractable conjunction fallacy: Statistical sophistication, instructional set, and training.Journal of Social Behavior & Personality,8, 83–96.
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Metadata

Authors
Osman, M.
Affiliations
University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
Osman, Magda
ORCID
Osman, Magda
Venue
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2004-12
Volume
11
Issue
6
Pages
988-1010
ISSN
  • 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5320
DOI
10.3758/bf03196730
OpenAlex
W2022112401
Cited by
444
References
243
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 13
FWCI
3.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Queen Mary Research Online (Queen Mary University of London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Economic and Social Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
dual-process theory, reasoning, dual-process models, representational properties
MeSH terms
Humans, Models, Psychological, Problem Solving

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