The DOI matches its Crossref record; 236 of the 243 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning
Open accessAbstract
Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists' proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify thedifferent forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.
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“The accumulating evidence that people formulate verbal constructions only after they have implicitly made decisions7 also calls into question the efficacy of cognitive targets of standard interventions.”
From The mind your health project: a randomized controlled trial of an innovative behavioral treatment for obesity (2013) · cites this paper as [7]
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Cited by
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Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
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Metadata
- Authors
- Osman, M.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Osman, Magda
- ORCID
- Osman, Magda
- Venue
- Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 988-1010
- ISSN
- 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5320
- OpenAlex
- W2022112401
- Cited by
- 444
- References
- 243
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 3.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Queen Mary Research Online (Queen Mary University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Keywords
- dual-process theory, reasoning, dual-process models, representational properties
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Models, Psychological, Problem Solving
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