Cited by 54Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsMemory Processes and InfluencesCategorization, perception, and language

An encounter frequency account of how experience affects likelihood estimation

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Obrecht, Natalie A., Chapman, Gretchen B., Gelman, Rochel·2009·Memory & Cognition

Abstract

When making judgments, people often favor information received from a few individual sources over large-sample statistical data. Individual information is usually acquired piece by piece, whereas statistical information combines many observations into a single summary. We examined whether this difference in the frequency of encounters affects how data are weighted. In two experiments, subjects read statistical information indicating an event to be rare and contrasting information from individual cases suggesting the event to be common. We controlled whether the individual cases were summarized into a single summary like statistical information, or presented serially, case by case. Subjects' estimates of event frequencies were higher when the individual cases were presented in serial, rather than summarized, format. A third study demonstrated that subjects treat each data sample as an instance, and do not weight according to sample size. These results support the conclusion that people weight information according to encounter frequency.

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  1. Brase, G. L., & Barbey, A. K. (2006). Mental representations of statis- tical information. In A. Columbus (Ed.), Advances in psychology re- search (Vol. 41, pp. 91-113). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science.

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Authors
Obrecht, N. A., Chapman, G. B., & Gelman, R.
Affiliations
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
Corresponding author
Obrecht, Natalie A.
Venue
Memory & Cognition
Published
2009-07
Volume
37
Issue
5
Pages
632-643
ISSN
  • 0090-502X (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-5946
OpenAlex
W1983357294
Cited by
54
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
FWCI
1.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Memory & Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
Keywords
encounter rate, likelihood estimation, statistical data, sample size, data weighting, frequency judgment, rare events, summary statistics
MeSH terms
Humans, Judgment, Persuasive Communication, Probability Learning, Problem Solving, Reading, Likelihood Functions, Comprehension, Uncertainty

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