The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
Open accessAbstract
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
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Citations
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The Political Economy of Clientelism*
Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2013) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12010 · Cited by 554
Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K.-S. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027 · Cited by 443
Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
Vicente, P. C. (2014) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12086 · Cited by 365
Chuang, Y., & Schechter, L. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.008 · Cited by 356
Familiarity Does Not Breed Contempt: Generosity, Discrimination, and Diversity in Delhi Schools
Rao, G. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20180044 · Cited by 335
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 863-881
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4214820194
- Cited by
- 403
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 77.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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