Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the slot-specific priorities framework and can be found by a cumulative offer mechanism that is strategy-proof and respects unambiguous improvements in priority.
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Citations
Cites
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“…Duke Kominers Society of Fellows, Harvard University Tayfun Sönmez Department of Economics, Boston College We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots avail- able to accept contracts.”
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“If Z = Y , then we have Z Pi (Ỹ ) = Y for some i ∈ I, so that Z is stable and Pareto dominates Y—a contradiction.”
BackgroundMatching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
Hatfield, J. W., & Kominers, S. D. (2012) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.4.1.176 · Cited by 106
Self-citationContract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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“3Like our model, the Westkamp (2013) model of matching with complex constraints permits priorities to vary across slots (see also Braun et al. 2014).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kominers, S. D., & Sönmez, T.
- Venue
- Theoretical Economics
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2016-05
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 683-710
- ISSN
- 1555-7561 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-6837
- OpenAlex
- W2508480868
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 34.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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