Cited by 84Memory Processes and InfluencesPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Memory as mental time travel

Open access
Perrin, Denis, Michaelian, Kourken·2017·The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory

Abstract

Episodic memory contrasted both with nondeclarative memory, devoted in part to skills and habits, and, within the category of declarative memory, with semantic memory, devoted to general facts. This definition was broadly compatible with traditional analyses of what philosophers had referred to as recollective, experiential, or personal memory, including the popular causal theory. Empirical research within the mental time travel (MTT) framework has revealed a wealth of commonalities between episodic memory and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT), leaving no doubt that there is some sort of tight relationship between them. This chapter surveys the evidence and arguments to which continuists and discontinuists have appealed. It describes plausible versions of continuism and discontinuism. It provides a brief overview of the psychological evidence for each view. The chapter provides a more detailed review of philosophical arguments for discontinuism, and sets out continuist critiques of those arguments. It discusses one promising discontinuist response to continuist critiques.

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  • Because past and future representations do not differ in structure or content, the fluency of the constructive process indicates whether a given event was previously experienced.

    “According to this view, because past and future representations themselves do not differ in structure or content, it is hypothesized that it is the fluency of the constructive process -an attribute of both memory and imagination -that indicates whether or not a given event was previously experienced (Perrin & Michaelian, 2017).”

    From Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation. (2020) · cites this paper as Perrin & Michaelian, 2017

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Berntsen, D. and A. Bohn (2010) Remembering and forecasting: The relation. Memory & Cognition 38(3): 265-78.
  2. Brewer, W. F. (1996) What is recollective memory? Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory. Ed. D. C. Rubin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Michaelian, K. (2016a) Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events. Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Eds. K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar. New York: Oxford University Press.
  4. Mitchell, K. J. and M. K. Johnson (2000) The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Eds. E. Tulving and F. I. M. Craik. New York: Oxford University Press.
  5. Tulving, E. (1972) Episodic and semantic memory. Organization of Memory. Eds. E. Tulving and W. Donaldson, pp. 381-402. New York: Academic Press.

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Authors
Perrin, D., & Michaelian, K.
Affiliations
Institut de philosophie de Grenoble (FR)
Venue
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2017-07-14
Volume
11
Issue
2
Pages
228-239
OpenAlex
W2785082000
Cited by
84
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2
FWCI
17.13
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
mental time travel, episodic memory, continuism, discontinuism, personal memories, implicit memory, semantic memory, philosophy of memory

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