The enactive approach
The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Embodied approaches to cognition hold that the body is crucial for cognition. Yet despite many decades of research,1 what this “embodiment thesis”2 (Wilson and Foglia, 2011) amounts to still remains unclear, as the present volume with its diverse range of contributions indicates (see also Shapiro, 2011). How to interpret the embodiment thesis depends on how to interpret the meanings of its key terms, “body” and “cognition,” as well as on what it means exactly to say that the body is “crucial” for cognition (Kyselo and Di Paolo, in press). In recent years, the term “embodied” has been used elastically to refer to anything from conservative ideas about how bodily action provides a format for neuronal representations (Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009; Gallese, 2010; Goldman, 2012) or helps to reduce computational load (Clark, 2008; Wheeler, 2005, 2010; Wilson, 2004), to a variety of “radical embodiment” (Clark, 1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001) proposals-for example, that kinesthetic body schemas are a constitutive part of mental skills (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Nunez, 2010), that sensorimotor know-how is a constitutive part of perceptual experience (O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Noe, 2004), that bodily life regulation is a constitutive part of phenomenal consciousness and its extended neurophysiological substrates (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Thompson and Cosmelli, 2011), and that social sensorimotor interaction can be a constitutive part of social cognition (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher, 2010). In some cases, these radical embodiment proposals are based on the “enactive” view that cognition depends constitutively on the living body, understood as an autonomous system (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009; Froese and Ziemke, 2009). Our aim in this chapter is to explain this key enactive notion of autonomy and why it is needed if embodied cognitive science is to offer a genuine alternative to more traditional functionalist and cognitivist views.
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Cites
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Self-citationAutopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model
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Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
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Self-citationCan social interaction constitute social cognition?
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009 · Cited by 911
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
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Self-citationDefining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
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Cited by
Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation
Ramstead, M. J. D., Badcock, P. B., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2017.09.001 · Cited by 354
Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6 · Cited by 278
The body social: an enactive approach to the self
Kyselo, M. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986 · Cited by 170
From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again
Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9 · Cited by 159
Movement-based embodied contemplative practices: definitions and paradigms
Schmalzl, L., Crane-Godreau, M. A., & Payne, P. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00205 · Cited by 124
Metadata
- Authors
- Paolo, E. A. D., & Thompson, E. T.
- Published
- 2014-04-29
- Pages
- 86-96
- OpenAlex
- W2486393665
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 5.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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