Consciousness and the social brain
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Reprinted with permission from CHOICE http://www.choicereviews.org, copyright by the American Libraries Association.
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Citations
Cited by
Buzsáki, G. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190905385.001.0001 · Cited by 358
Deliberate Metaphor Theory: Basic assumptions, main tenets, urgent issues
Steen, G. (2017) · Intercultural Pragmatics · doi:10.1515/ip-2017-0001 · Cited by 297
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness
Graziano, M. S. A., & Webb, T. W. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500 · Cited by 224
“We recently proposed the attention schema theory in an attempt to answer these and other related questions (Graziano and Kastner, 2011; Graziano, 2013; Graziano and Webb, 2014; Kelly et al., 2014).”
BackgroundMethodConsciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals
Paul, E. S., Sher, S., Tamietto, M., Winkielman, P., & Mendl, M. T. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.11.014 · Cited by 161
“For other neurofunctional accounts that link consciousness with self-representation, as well as the representation of other minds, see Humphrey (1978) and Graziano (2013).”
BackgroundCleeremans, A., Achoui, D., Beauny, A., Keuninckx, L., Martin, J.-R., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Vuillaume, L., & de Heering, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.11.011 · Cited by 142
“This third, “self-other loop”, we argue, is the scaffolding that makes it possible for an agent to redescribe its own activity to itself [93] — for now it is endowed with an (implicit, unconscious, enactive, embodied) internal model of what it takes to be an agent [94] — precisely what social theories of consciousness…”
Background(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Safron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133
“This later affordance has relevance to Higher-Order Theories of consciousness, including those emphasizing agentic modeling and social communication (Metzinger, 2010; Graziano, 2013; Rudrauf et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2019; Shea and Frith, 2019).”
BackgroundGraziano, M. S. A., Guterstam, A., Bio, B. J., & Wilterson, A. I. (2020) · Cognitive Neuropsychology · doi:10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630 · Cited by 129
Corti, K., & Gillespie, A. (2016) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.12.039 · Cited by 118
Non-human consciousness and the specificity problem: a modest theoretical proposal
Shevlin, H. (2021) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12338 · Cited by 111
Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space
Fleming, S. M. (2020) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niz020 · Cited by 111
Guingrich, R. E., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1322781 · Cited by 87
“You assume, because your experience of consciousness contains X and Y characteristics, that another person’s consciousness also contains X and Y characteristics, and this facilitates understanding and subsequent social interaction between you and the other person (Graziano, 2013).”
BackgroundThe Attention Schema Theory: A Foundation for Engineering Artificial Consciousness
Graziano, M. S. A. (2017) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2017.00060 · Cited by 79
“We suggested that the functional overlap within the TPJ may have a deeper significance (Graziano and Kastner, 2011; Graziano, 2013).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCan you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem
Kammerer, F. (2018) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1388361 · Cited by 80
Attributing awareness to oneself and to others
Kelly, Y. T., Webb, T. W., Meier, J. D., Arcaro, M. J., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1401201111 · Cited by 70
A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis
Dykstra, A. R., Cariani, P. A., & Gutschalk, A. (2017) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0103 · Cited by 61
Consciousness as Generative Entanglement
Clark, A., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2019) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil20191161241 · Cited by 50
Guingrich, R. E., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2025) · Oxford Intersections: AI in Society · doi:10.1093/9780198945215.003.0011 · Cited by 28
“…consciousness and Theory of Mind literature, some researchers suggest that consciousness is inherently an attribution, and that attributing similar consciousness to oneself and to others can facilitate understanding and foster relationships between people (Frith, 2002; Graziano, 2013; Prinz, 2017).”
Wilterson, A. I., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2102421118 · Cited by 26
“We previously proposed that the human attention schema has a relationship to subjective awareness (25 – 28).”
BackgroundRubio-Fernandez, P. (2021) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-021-00818-6 · Cited by 16
A Neurologically Inspired Network Model for Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory for Consciousness
van den Boogaard, E., Treur, J., & Turpijn, M. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59740-9_2 · Cited by 9
“This scenario relates to an angle on consciousness as related to social interaction; see also [9], Chap.”
BackgroundBirch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2014-08-20
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 52-0554-52-0554
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W580788546
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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