Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden
Open accessAbstract
A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical political ideology, both left- and right-wing, tend to share similar underlying psychological patterns. By utilizing data collected through a voting advice application in Sweden, this study aims to assess whether extreme leftists and rightists share similarities in the psychological and political understanding of how society functions. We propose three hypotheses to test this pattern: Extreme left and right individuals are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories than moderates; they are more likely to have negative economic evaluations; and they are less politically and interpersonally trustful. By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, we find a similar linkage between ideology and economic evaluations. However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideology is related to lower political and interpersonal trust.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Using Swedish voting-advice-application survey data (N = 3,958), the paper finds curvilinear associations between extreme left-right ideology and both conspiracy beliefs and negative economic evaluations, but not lower political or interpersonal trust. The authors conclude that political extremes share a more pessimistic societal outlook, though the effects are correlational and often weak.
Key findings
- Conspiracy beliefs: political ideology had significant linear and quadratic effects on the conspiracy index; both extremes were more likely than moderates to endorse conspiracy theories, with far-left respondents generally more likely than far-right respondents. For the five conspiracy items, all but “left politicians want to keep people poor” had a negative significant linear effect (p < .001), and the Olof Palme items showed curvilinear patterns.
- Economic evaluations: extreme ideological positions were related to more negative evaluations of the current Swedish economy (quadratic β = .07, p < .001), retrospective sociotropic evaluations (β = .04, p < .05), and prospective sociotropic evaluations (β = .04, p < .01). Right-wing respondents generally had more positive economic evaluations than leftists, but both extremes were more negative than moderates.
- Trust: H3 was not supported. Trust in politicians showed only a weak positive quadratic effect (β = .03, p < .05), and interpersonal trust had a non-significant quadratic effect (β = .03). Right-wing ideology corresponded with higher trust in politicians but slightly lower interpersonal trust.
- Controls: older, male, and higher-educated respondents were less likely to believe conspiracy theories; higher education was associated with better economic evaluations and higher political and interpersonal trust.
Methods
- Data: 3,958 respondents collected in June and August 2013, recruited from a 2010 online voting advice application on the Aftonbladet website; the sample was opt-in and non-probability, with a post-stratification weight for sex, age, and education (12 cells; highest-to-lowest weight ratio 9.8).
- Measures: left-right ideology on an 11-point scale from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right), with a mean-centered squared term for quadratic effects; controls for age, gender, and education. Dependent variables included five conspiracy items plus an index (Cronbach’s α = .74), two Olof Palme conspiracy items, three economic evaluations, trust in politicians (4-point scale), and interpersonal trust (11-point scale).
- Analysis: hierarchical regression analyses testing linear and quadratic relationships between ideology and the dependent variables.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: the study lacked a direct measure of pessimism, so it remains speculative whether societal pessimism is the core underlying factor; the findings are correlational, cannot establish causal direction, and may be bidirectional, requiring longitudinal data.
- Paper-stated: the online VAA opt-in sample suffers from under-coverage and self-selection and cannot be generalized to the total population.
- Paper-stated/evident: the quadratic and linear effects are sometimes weak, and the conspiracy quadratic effect is described as likely driven by only one extreme; the trust findings may also reflect Sweden’s overall high levels of trust.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 29 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Right-wing Swedes are more likely to assume that the PKK was involved in the assassination of Olof Palme.
“The positive statistically significant linear effect of the first proposition indicates that right-wing Swedes are more likely to assume that the PKK was involved in the assassination.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Political ideology has a quadratic relationship with conspiracy beliefs, such that political extremes are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs than moderates.
“By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs.”
- Also stated in: § Conspiracy Beliefs · hedged
“The results indicate that political ideology has both linear and quadratic statistically significant effects on our conspiracy belief measure.”
- Also stated in: § Conspiracy Beliefs · plain
“In a nutshell, the results reported in Table 1 and 2 confirm our first hypothesis: politically extreme individuals are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Conspiracy Beliefs · hedged
- Findingown data
The exception is the statement that left politicians keep the population poor on purpose, with which a much higher proportion of far-right Swedes agree.
“The only exception is the statement which asserts that left politicians keep the population poor on purpose, with which a much higher proportion of far-right Swedes agree.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Extreme political ideology corresponds to a decrease in the belief that the PKK was responsible for the political murder.
“The negative coefficient of the quadratic test, on the other hand, indicates that extreme political ideology corresponds to a decrease in the belief that the PKK was responsible for the political murder.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Right-wing individuals have generally more positive economic perceptions than leftists in 2013, during the incumbency of a center-right coalition.
“While the positive, statistically significant, linear effect of political ideology shows that right-wing individuals have generally more positive economic perceptions than leftists in 2013 (during the incumbency of a center-right coalition)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
Far-right individuals are in general less likely to believe that the Swedish police was involved in the murder of Olof Palme compared to far-left ones.
“The strong negative linear effect of political ideology, however, shows that far right individuals are in general less likely to believe the proposition compared to far left ones.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Extreme political ideology correlates with an increase in the belief that the Swedish police was involved in perpetrating the liquidation of Olof Palme.
“A positive quadratic statistically significant effect reveals that extreme political ideology correlates with increase in the belief that the Swedish police was involved in perpetrating the liquidation of the former Prime Minister.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For all but one conspiracy statement, there is a negative statistically significant linear effect (p < .001), indicating far-right Swedes are less likely to believe in conspiracies than left-wing counterparts.
“For all but one statement, there is a negative statistically significant linear effect (p < .001),which indicates that Swedes who associate with far-right ideology are less likely to believe in conspiracies than their left-wing counterparts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Swedes who place themselves at the political extremes have more negative evaluations for the current state of the national economy compared to moderates.
“in line with expectations, Swedes who place themselves at the political extremes have more negative evaluations for the current state of the national economy compared to moderates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Both extreme positions have lower evaluations of the present economic situation in Sweden.
“the negative quadratic effect reveals that both extreme positions have lower evaluations of the present economic situation in Sweden.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideology is related to lower political and interpersonal trust.
“However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideology is related to lower political and interpersonal trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The results in Table 5 do not support the hypothesis that extreme political orientation leads to lower levels of trust in politicians and interpersonal trust.
“The results in Table 5 do not provide support for our third hypothesis -that extreme political orientation leads to lower levels of trust in politicians and interpersonal trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals with far-left political orientation are much more likely to be pessimistic about economic developments.
“are much more likely to be pessimistic about economic developments”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals with far-left political orientation are less politically trustful.
“and are less politically trustful”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals with far-left political orientation are more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs than their right-wing counterparts.
“We find that individuals with far-left political orientation are more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs compared to their right-wing counterparts”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“we find that in the Swedish case, individuals on the left are more likely to believe in conspiracies than those on the right”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
- Findingown data
Age is a significant predictor of interpersonal trust, with older respondents more likely to trust fellow citizens.
“Age is also a significant predictor of interpersonal trust, with older respondents more likely to trust fellow citizens.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Conspiracy belief correlates negatively with positive economic perceptions, trust in politicians and interpersonal trust.
“we find that conspiracy belief correlates negatively with positive economic perceptions, trust in politicians and interpersonal trust (see Appendix)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals who profess extreme ideology are more likely to believe in conspiracies.
“The findings indicate that individuals who profess extreme ideology are indeed more likely to believe in conspiracies.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“In turn, political extremists are more likely to be conspiracy believers.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
“Our findings allow for a certain confirmation that extreme ideology is related to belief in conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · hedged
- Findingown data
In terms of ideology, the linear terms are significant for all but one of the dependent variables.
“the results suggest that in terms of ideology, the linear terms are significant for all but one of the dependent variables”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Both far-left and far-right individuals tend to have a more negative economic evaluation than political moderates.
“both far left-and far right individuals tend to have a more negative economic evaluation than political moderates”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For all items analyzed, higher levels of education are related to better economic evaluations.
“better economic evaluations”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For all items analyzed, higher levels of education are related to higher levels of political and interpersonal trust.
“and higher levels of political and interpersonal trust”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The core proposition of the paper is that the political extremes have a more pessimistic outlook on society than moderates, as reflected in a range of important socio-political variables.
“The core proposition of the present paper is that the political extremes have a more pessimistic outlook on society than moderates, as reflected in a range of important socio-political variables.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Inglehart, 1987
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
With the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions, the degree of political extremism and distrust within a society increases.
“with the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions the degree of political extremism and distrust within a society increases (Miller, 1974;Rydgren, 2005)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Miller, 1974
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Rydgren, 2005
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- Interpretationcitation
Even if various conspiracy theories differ significantly in content, they are driven by similar underlying psychological processes.
“This implies that, even if various conspiracy theories differ significantly in content, they are driven by similar underlying psychological processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wood et al., 2012
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- Interpretationreasoning
Both political extremes are more pessimistic about society than political moderates.
“the overarching theoretical message that we offer is that both political extremes are more pessimistic about society than political moderates”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Individuals who hold conspiracy beliefs are among the more pessimistic and distrustful fractions of society.
“This reveals that individuals who hold conspiracy beliefs are among the more pessimistic and distrustful fractions of society.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The curvilinear effect is not symmetrical, with the effects being steeper on one side of the curve than on the other.
“This shows that although there is curvilinear effect, it is not symmetrical, with the effects being steeper on one side of the curve than on the other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Swedes with radical or extreme ideology are not likely to have lower levels of political and interpersonal trust than others.
“This implies that Swedes with radical or extreme ideology are not likely to have lower levels of political and interpersonal trust than others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The political extremes are less trustful only about the causes of societal and political events.
“suggesting that the political extremes are less trustful only about the causes of societal and political events”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015
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- Study design and conductown data
The study yielded evidence of effects of extremism on various conceptually distinct constructs that suggest a negative worldview.
“One strength of the study presented here is that it yielded evidence of these effects of extremism on various conceptually distinct constructs that suggest such a negative worldview.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 20
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 22
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataHigher education and age are related to a more positive sociotropic economic evaluation, and males are more likely than females to evaluate the economy positively.
“The effects of the background variables show that higher education and age are related to a more positive sociotropic economic evaluation.Males are also more likely than females to evaluate the economy positively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOlder Swedes, males, and higher educated people are less likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
“The control variables all have negative statistically significant effects: older Swedes, males and higher educated people are less likely to believe in conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataSwedes who associate with far-left ideology are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories than those with far-right ideology, while both extremes are more prone than centrists.
“In general, Swedes who associate with a far-left ideology are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories than those with a far-right ideology, albeit both groups are more prone to conspiracy beliefs than centrists, expressed by the statistical significance of the quadratic effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere is a similar curvilinear pattern for all three economic variables, indicating extreme ideological positions are related to negative economic evaluations.
“We find a similar curvilinear pattern for all three economic variables.Thus, the results indicate that extreme ideological positions are related to negative economic evaluations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor the two other economic dependent variables, there is a strong positive linear effect of political ideology, indicating rightists' overall more positive economic evaluations compared to leftists, and the quadratic effects are weaker but still statistically significant.
“While there is a strong positive linear effect of political ideology on each of the dependent variables, which indicates rightists' overall more positive economic evaluations compared to leftists, the strength of the quadratic effects is somewhat weaker, but still statistically significant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataHigher education levels are associated with better economic perceptions in all cases, while age has a weak negative effect on prospective economic evaluations.
“As for the background variables, higher education levels are associated with better economic perceptions in all cases, while age has a weak negative effect on prospective economic evaluations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere is a statistically significant curvilinear pattern in both propositions for who is responsible for the murder of Olof Palme.
“The results reveal a statistically significant curvilinear pattern in both propositions for who is responsible for the murder.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe main dependent variables show moderate but significant correlations, indicating related but distinct constructs.
“the moderate but significant correlations between our main dependent variables (see Table A.1 in Appendix) indicate related but distinct constructs”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere is a weak curvilinear relationship between trust in politicians and political ideology, and a statistically insignificant relationship between interpersonal trust and ideological orientation.
“However, the results show weak curvilinear relationship between trust in politicians and political ideology, as well as statistically insignificant relationship between interpersonal trust and ideological orientation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe more educated Swedes are, the more likely they are to trust politicians and to have a high degree of interpersonal trust.
“With regard to education, the more educated Swedes are, the more likely they are to trust politicians, and to have a high degree of interpersonal trust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRight-wing ideology corresponds with higher levels of trust in politicians but with slightly lower levels of interpersonal trust.
“The results indicate that right-wing ideology corresponds with higher levels of trust in politicians but with slightly lower levels of interpersonal trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe quadratic terms produce non-significant effects with regard to interpersonal trust and a positive, albeit weak, effect with regard to trust in politicians.
“The quadratic terms, however, produce non-significant effects with regard to interpersonal trust and even a positive, albeit weak effect with regard to trust in politicians.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataPolitical radicals have somewhat more negative economic evaluations, although less clearly so in prospective and retrospective terms than for the general state of the Swedish economy.
“Political radicals also have somewhat more negative economic evaluations, although less clearly so, in prospective and retrospective terms, than for the general state of the Swedish economy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataMales are less likely to trust politicians, whereas they tend to trust people more.
“In terms of gender, males are less likely to trust politicians, whereas they tend to trust people more.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenA post-stratification weight accounting for sex, age and education was implemented to adjust for demographic deviations from the population.
“A post-stratification weight accounting for sex, age and education was implemented to adjust for demographic”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPrevious research suggests that political extremism predicts a general susceptibility to conspiracy theory belief.
“research suggests that political extremism predicts a general susceptibility to conspiracy theory belief (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015; see also Inglehart, 1987).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015
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- cites Inglehart, 1987
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May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe quadratic term for conspiracy beliefs is significant but weak and likely driven by only one extreme.
“Even though the quadratic term is significant, the effect is rather weak and is likely driven by only one extreme.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe conspiracy belief composite has a Cronbach's alpha of .74.
“we also include a variable which is composed of all five conspiracy theory variables compiled together (Cronbach's α = .74).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationDatasets collected online generally suffer from problems of under-coverage and self-selection that can potentially bias estimates.
“Datasets collected online generally suffer from problems of under-coverage and self-selection that can potentially bias estimates (Bethlehem, 2010;Hooghe & Teepe, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bethlehem, 2010
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- cites Hooghe & Teepe, 2007
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May combine two claims.
Study design and conductcitationOnline VAA opt-in surveys generate non-probability samples, so results cannot be generalized to the total population.
“Online VAA opt-in surveys generate non-probability samples, so results cannot be generalized to the total population.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bethlehem, 2010
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- cites Hooghe & Teepe, 2007
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PremisecitationExtreme political ideology, at either side of the political spectrum, is positively associated with an increased tendency to believe in conspiracy theories in the United States and the Netherlands.
“More recent studies using individual level data from the United States (US) and the Netherlands find that extreme political ideology, at either side of the political spectrum, is positively associated with an increased tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015
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Interpretationnone givenRadical political ideology in contemporary Swedish society can hardly be compared to early 20th century extreme political beliefs.
“Acknowledging that extremism is relative, and radical political ideology in contemporary Swedish society can hardly be compared to early 20 th century extreme political beliefs”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEconomic factors have a significant influence on political preferences.
“These scholars argue that economic factors have a significant influence on political preferences, considering that voters hold the government at least partially responsible for the functioning of the country's economy and their own well-being and that economic growth or decline influences the level of support for established political authorities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Downs, 1957
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- cites Fiorina, 1981
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- cites Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981
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PremisecitationExtreme ideological left and right positions correspond with lower trust levels.
“While it has been acknowledged that extreme ideological left and right positions correspond with lower trust levels (Inglehart, 1987)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Inglehart, 1987
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PremisecitationDistrust predicts conspiracy belief.
“given the evidence that distrust predicts conspiracy belief (see Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationExperimental conditions that induce a lack of control or uncertainty increase belief in conspiracies as compared to other conditions.
“For instance, experimental conditions that induce a lack of control or uncertainty increase belief in conspiracies as compared to other conditions (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011;Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010;van Prooijen & Acker, 2015;van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013;Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011
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- cites Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010
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- cites van Prooijen & Acker, 2015
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PremisecitationBoth the left and right extremes are more fearful of socioeconomic developments than political moderates in the Netherlands.
“a recent large-scale sample in the Netherlands reveals that both the left and right extremes are more fearful of socioeconomic developments than political moderates (van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationWhether right-wing or left-wing individuals are more distrustful varies from one country to another.
“whether rightwing or left-wing individuals are”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newton, 1999
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PremisecitationPolitical extremists are normally distrustful and critical towards the political system and its performance.
“while political extremists are normally distrustful and critical towards the political system and its performance (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greenberg & Jonas, 2003
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InterpretationcitationThe null findings on trust may not apply to the Swedish context, because Swedish society has an overall high degree of trust.
“Possibly, these findings do not apply to the Swedish context, due to Swedish society's overall high degree of trust (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationFeelings of threat increase people's support for radical leaders.
“that feelings of threat increase people's support for radical leaders (Hogg et al., 2010)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hogg et al., 2010
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Study design and conductown dataThe findings presented are correlational.
“The findings presented here are correlational”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe relationship between radicalism and societal pessimism may be bidirectional.
“It is well-possible, however, that the relationship between radicalism and societal pessimism is bidirectional.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe study did not have a direct measure of pessimism, so it remains speculative whether societal pessimism is the core underlying factor that binds the findings.
“A limitation of our study, however, is that we did not have a direct measure of pessimism, and it therefore remains speculative whether societal pessimism is the core underlying factor that binds these findings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationSocietal pessimism leads to extremism.
“Given results of previous research, it stands to reason that societal pessimism leads to extremism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationDistressing societal circumstances increase the appeal of extremist political movements.
“research suggests that distressing societal circumstances increases the appeal of extremist political movements (Midlarsky, 2011)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Midlarsky, 2011
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Interpretationown dataThe analyses confirm the findings of previous research and supplement them with an economic dimension.
“Our analyses confirm the findings of previous research and supplement them with an economic dimension.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAlthough the quadratic and linear effects of political ideology on some dependent variables are rather weak, their existence is still telling given the considerably high levels of political trust in Sweden.
“Although the quadratic and linear effects of political ideology on some of the dependent variables are rather weak, given the considerably high levels of (political) trust in Sweden (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016), the existence of such effects is still telling.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2016
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May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataBoth extremes converge in a mindset inclined to blame secret and evil conspiracies for society's major problems, along with pessimistic expectations about contemporary economic developments.
“we can conclude that both extremes converge in a mindset that is inclined to blame secret and evil conspiracies for the major problems that society faces, along with pessimistic expectations about contemporary economic developments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe curvilinear effects found are generally in line with previous research.
“While the curvilinear effects are generally in line with previous research (e.g., van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015
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The paper relies on this without support.
The study is the first empirical study of public opinion on conspiracy beliefs in Sweden.
“To our knowledge this also constitutes the first empirical study of public opinion on conspiracy beliefs in Sweden.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The 0–10 left-right scale's endpoints represent political extremes and its midpoint represents political moderation.
“Left-right political ideology was measured as an eleven-point scale question which asked the respondents to indicate their political orientation on a scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Radical individuals at both ends of the political spectrum are likely to share a similar pessimistic understanding of how the world and society function.
“This debate suggests that while there are also many psychological differences between people at the political left vs. right, radical individuals at both sides of the spectrum are likely to share a similar pessimistic understanding of how the world and society functions.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to political extremism across the political spectrum.
“political extremism across the political spectrum [20]”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [20]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Retrospective economic scale is described in opposite directions
MinorThe methods say the low end means the economy has gotten much worse and the high end means it has gotten much better. Table A.2 instead labels 1 as improvement and 5 as deterioration for the retrospective measure.
“All three economic evaluations use five point scales where 1 means "very bad"/"has gotten much worse"/"will get much worse" and 5 means "very good"/"has gotten much better"/"will get much better".”
“Retrospective socio-tropic economic evaluation (1 = will improve a lot; 5 = will deteriorate a lot)”
Interpersonal-trust scale has conflicting endpoints
MinorThe methods specify an 11-point scale numbered 0-10, while Table A.2 numbers its endpoints 1-11.
“The 'interpersonal trust' question has an 11-point answer scale ranging from 0 (cannot trust people at all) to 10 (can trust people a lot).”
“Interpersonal trust (1 = no trust at all; 11 = great deal of trust)”
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. J. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,551 · see citing works
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Bruνswik, E., Levinson, D. M., & Sandford, R. N. (2001) · SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks · doi:10.4135/9781446220986.n8 · Cited by 6,459 · see citing works
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…psychology have shown that extreme conservative positions, for example, can come as a consequence of anxieties associated with uncertainties and fears and enforced by dogmatic political comprehensions, authoritarian tendencies and intolerance towards dissenting individuals (Jost et al., 2003).”
Katz, R. S. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961197 · Cited by 2,482 · see citing works
Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600 · Cited by 2,125 · cited 4× · see citing works
“Ideologies aim at describing and interpreting the functioning of society by relying on assertions or assumptions about “human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities” (Jost et al., 2009, p. 309).”
InfluentialSociotropic Politics: The American Case
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400002544 · Cited by 1,539 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Most studies on the topic examine and test the basic assumptions of the theory – whether macroeconomic conditions are related to electoral preferences (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988).”
Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970
Miller, A. H. (1974) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1959140 · Cited by 1,454 · cited 4× · see citing works
“Political cynicism and distrust in institutions, which typically increase in times of economic crises, are frequently associated with the better electoral performance of extremist parties (Miller, 1974; Rydgren, 2005).”
InfluentialThe Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays
Barker, C. A., & Hofstadter, R. (1966) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1848349 · Cited by 1,454 · see citing works
Economics and elections: the major western democracies
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-1158 · Cited by 1,341 · see citing works
The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316 · see citing works
Bethlehem, J. (2010) · International Statistical Review · doi:10.1111/j.1751-5823.2010.00112.x · Cited by 1,315 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Datasets collected online generally suffer from problems of under-coverage and self-selection that can potentially bias estimates (Bethlehem, 2010; Hooghe & Teepe, 2007).”
Social Desirability Bias in CATI, IVR, and Web Surveys: The Effects of Mode and Question Sensitivity
Kreuter, F., Presser, S., & Tourangeau, R. (2008) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfn063 · Cited by 1,225 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…benefit is that computerized self-administration reduces measurement error relative to other modes of data collection, increasing both the level of reporting and the report accuracy of opinions and attitudes compared to more “conventional” surveys (Kreuter et al., 2008; Sakshaug et al., 2010).”
Lacking control increases illusory pattern perception
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1159845 · Cited by 1,119 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…experimental conditions that induce a lack of control or uncertainty increase belief in conspiracies as compared to other conditions (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).”
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111027 · Cited by 1,110 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Most of them examine and test the basic assumptions of the theory that macroeconomic conditions predict electoral preferences (e.g. Downs, 1957; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988).”
Personal need for structure: Individual differences in the desire for simple structure.
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.1.113 · Cited by 1,046 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Such a conviction functions as an instrument to cope with feelings of uncertainty and fear by constructing a more comprehensible and predictable understanding of the world (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).”
Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
Levi, M. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609336 · Cited by 948 · see citing works
Trust in modern societies: the search for the bases of social order
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-1248 · Cited by 834 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Political Trust and Extreme Political Ideology Interest in trust as a concept has produced voluminous literature in the social sciences and philosophy throughout the 1990s (Hardin, 1996; Misztal, 1996; Warren, 1999).”
Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511755934 · Cited by 829 · see citing works
Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity
Feldman, S., & Johnston, C. (2014) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12055 · Cited by 731 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The findings of Feldman and Johnston (2014) show a differentiation between the cultural and economic dimension of political ideology, which is crucial for understanding ideology in modern societies.”
Is extreme right‐wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family
Rydgren, J. (2005) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00233.x · Cited by 718 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Political cynicism and distrust in institutions, which typically increase in times of economic crises, are frequently associated with the better electoral performance of extremist parties (Miller, 1974; Rydgren, 2005).”
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12018 · Cited by 685 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Prominent examples of contemporary conspiracy beliefs pertain to issues such as climate change (Jolley & Douglas, 2014), the financial crisis and the common belief about the corrupt and nocuous nature of decision-makers, among others.”
Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550611434786 · Cited by 660 · see citing works
Lewandowsky, S., Oberauer, K., & Gignac, G. E. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612457686 · Cited by 638 · see citing works
Political Extremism Predicts Belief in Conspiracy Theories
van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. P. M., & Pollet, T. V. (2015) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550614567356 · Cited by 626 · see citing works
Self-citationAbalakina‐Paap, M., Stephan, W. G., Craig, T., & Gregory, W. L. (1999) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/0162-895x.00160 · Cited by 589 · cited 1× · see citing works
“745 somewhat surprising, given the evidence that distrust predicts conspiracy belief (see Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).”
Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories
van Prooijen, J. (2016) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3301 · Cited by 516 · see citing works
(1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511659959 · Cited by 508 · see citing works
Swami, V., Coles, R., Stieger, S., Pietschnig, J., Furnham, A., Rehim, S., & Voracek, M. (2011) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02004.x · Cited by 502 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Although there is a wide range of possible conspiracy theories, individuals who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in other conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., 2011, 2013).”
Swami, V., Chamorro‐Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.1583 · Cited by 499 · see citing works
Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies
Newton, K. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198295685.003.0008 · Cited by 484 · cited 1× · see citing works
“While it has been acknowledged that extreme ideological left and right positions correspond with lower trust levels (Inglehart, 1987), whether rightwing or left-wing individuals are “more distrustful varies from one country to another” (Newton, 1999, p. 181).”
The Paranoid Style In American Politics
Hofstadter, R. 1.-1. (1964) · Cited by 467 · see citing works
Greenberg, J., & Jonas, E. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.376 · Cited by 426 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Even though there are substantial differences between these ideologies, political psychologists have noted that extreme left- and right-wing ideologies may share a similar underlying psychological pattern (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).”
InfluentialEvil: inside human violence and cruelty
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-5368 · Cited by 425 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Throughout the 20th century, radical political ideologies served as the propeller of tragic events that have left a deep mark in human history (Baumeister, 1997; Midlarsky, 2011).”
Lewis‐Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0027 · Cited by 425 · see citing works
The Nature of Political Ideology in the Contemporary Electorate
Treier, S., & Hillygus, D. S. (2009) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfp067 · Cited by 422 · cited 1× · see citing works
“However, a large volume of work suggests that such a simplified conceptualization could easily overlook underlying aspects of ideological heterogeneity (Jost et al., 2009; Treier & Hillygus, 2009).”
The Influence of Control on Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Conceptual and Applied Extensions
van Prooijen, J., & Acker, M. (2015) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3161 · Cited by 407 · see citing works
Belief in conspiracy theories: The influence of uncertainty and perceived morality
van Prooijen, J., & Jostmann, N. B. (2013) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.1922 · Cited by 403 · see citing works
Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612464058 · Cited by 396 · see citing works
The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96
Hetherington, M. J. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585398 · Cited by 363 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Moreover, political trust affects citizen’s propensity to vote for opposition candidates (Hetherington, 1999).”
Sullivan, D., Landau, M. J., & Rothschild, Z. K. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0017457 · Cited by 346 · see citing works
Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy
Lewis‐Beck, M. S. (1986) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111099 · Cited by 341 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Many studies examining economic voting based on election surveys use four different dimensions: personal versus collective (usually labeled “ego-tropic” versus “socio-tropic”); retrospective versus prospective; simple versus mediated and cognitive versus affective (Lewis-Beck, 1986, p. 317).”
Hardin, R. (1996) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233695 · Cited by 331 · see citing works
The war of words defining the extreme right party family
Mudde, C. (1996) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402389608425132 · Cited by 319 · see citing works
Addicted to answers: need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., & Kossowska, M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2308 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century
Knight, K. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062502 · Cited by 293 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Political ideology constitutes a common belief and value system expressed in the way individuals view and react to their social environment (Jost et al., 2009; Knight, 2006).”
Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing
Clarke, S. (2002) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/004931032002001 · Cited by 286 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…the topic (e.g. Hofstadter, 1966) have already implied that conspiracy beliefs are intended to provide causal explanations for complex and distressing social events, an observation that was reflected upon theoretically by numerous authors (e.g., Bale, 2007; Clarke, 2002; Douglas et al., in press).”
The solace of radicalism: Self-uncertainty and group identification in the face of threat
Hogg, M. A., Meehan, C., & Farquharson, J. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.005 · Cited by 263 · cited 1× · see citing works
“After all, research suggests that distressing societal circumstances increases the appeal of extremist political movements (Midlarsky, 2011), and that feelings of threat increase people’s support for radical leaders (Hogg et al., 2010).”
Defensive Zeal and the Uncertain Self: What Makes You So Sure?
McGregor, I., & Marigold, D. C. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.838 · Cited by 259 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Somewhat paradoxically, uncertainty in one domain of life results in an increase of certainty, reflected in extreme convictions, in other (frequently political) domains (McGregor, 2006; McGregor & Marigold, 2003).”
Tropman, J. E., Lipset, S. M., & Schnider, W. (1983) · Cited by 221 · see citing works
American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact.
Sussman, L., Erikson, R. S., & Lutberg, N. R. (1975) · Contemporary Sociology A Journal of Reviews · doi:10.2307/2062183 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
Bale, J. M. (2007) · Patterns of Prejudice · doi:10.1080/00313220601118751 · Cited by 217 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…the topic (e.g. Hofstadter, 1966) have already implied that conspiracy beliefs are intended to provide causal explanations for complex and distressing social events, an observation that was reflected upon theoretically by numerous authors (e.g., Bale, 2007; Clarke, 2002; Douglas et al., in press).”
A retrospective on retrospective voting
Kiewiet, D. R., & Rivers, D. (1984) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/bf00987073 · Cited by 207 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…& Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for their own evaluation of the economy and analyze how it relates to government support (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Feldman, 1984; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet & Rivers, 1984; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988).”
Survey Participation, Nonresponse Bias, Measurement Error Bias, and Total Bias
Olson, K. M. (2006) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfl038 · Cited by 197 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Moreover, online survey questions are answered more accurately since they are answered in private, and thus, free of peer pressure introduced by interviewers (Olson, 2006).”
Authoritarianism in the former Soviet Union.
McFarland, S. G., Ageyev, V. S., & Abalakina-Paap, M. A. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.1004 · Cited by 195 · cited 2× · see citing works
“However, further empirical research has shown that some of these characteristics may need to be attributed to both leftand right-wing extreme ideological rigidity, as for instance suggested by findings that in the former Soviet Union, authoritarian tendencies are associated with increase in left-wing orientation (McFa…”
Newheiser, A., Farias, M., & Tausch, N. (2011) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.08.011 · Cited by 191 · see citing works
The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism
Hardin, R. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511550478.002 · Cited by 189 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Hardin (2002) notes that extremists are “epistemologically crippled”, in the sense that the main sources of information about political issues they trust, come from their own milieu, whereas outside sources that offer more nuanced perspective tend to be ignored.”
Conspiracy Thinking in the Middle East
Zonis, M., & Joseph, C. (1994) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791566 · Cited by 177 · cited 1× · see citing works
“We define conspiracy beliefs as suspicions that a group of individuals are involved in secret agreement, attempting to achieve hidden goals which are generally regarded as unlawful or malevolent (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Zonis & Joseph, 1994).”
Adaptive Political Attitudes: Duty, Trust, and Fear as Monitors of Tax Policy
Scholz, J. T., & Lubell, M. N. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991734 · Cited by 172 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In terms of behavior, political trust plays a decisive role in citizen’s adherence to governmental demands (Levi, 1997; Scholz & Lubell, 1998), which in turn fosters incumbent legitimacy.”
Swami, V., Pietschnig, J., Tran, U. S., Nader, I. W., Stieger, S., & Voracek, M. (2012) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.2873 · Cited by 162 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Although there is a wide range of possible conspiracy theories, individuals who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in other conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., 2011, 2013).”
Political Trust and Racial Ideology
Aberbach, J. D., & Walker, J. L. J. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958366 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
McGregor, I. (2006) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/10478400701366977 · Cited by 152 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Somewhat paradoxically, uncertainty in one domain of life results in an increase of certainty, reflected in extreme convictions, in other (frequently political) domains (McGregor, 2006; McGregor & Marigold, 2003).”
van Prooijen, J., Krouwel, A. P. M., Boiten, M., & Eendebak, L. (2015) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167215569706 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Self-citationTrust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy
Zmerli, S., & Newton, K. (2007) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203965757-10 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Sakshaug, J. W., Yan, T., & Tourangeau, R. (2010) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfq057 · Cited by 108 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…benefit is that computerized self-administration reduces measurement error relative to other modes of data collection, increasing both the level of reporting and the report accuracy of opinions and attitudes compared to more “conventional” surveys (Kreuter et al., 2008; Sakshaug et al., 2010).”
Clarke, H. D., Ho, K., & Stewart, M. C. (2000) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(99)00051-7 · Cited by 104 · cited 2× · see citing works
“While many scholars use objective economic indicators to assess whether the bad shape of the economy results in a decline of electoral support for incumbents (e.g. Carlsen, 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Harper, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for their own…”
Unemployment, inflation and government popularity — are there partisan effects?
Carlsen, F. (2000) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(99)00044-x · Cited by 87 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…use objective economic indicators to assess whether the bad shape of the economy results in a decline of electoral support for incumbents (e.g. Carlsen, 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Harper, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for…”
Origins of Political Extremism
Midlarsky, M. I. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511975868 · Cited by 78 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Throughout the 20th century, radical political ideologies served as the propeller of tragic events that have left a deep mark in human history (Baumeister, 1997; Midlarsky, 2011).”
Economic self-interest and the vote: Evidence and meaning
Feldman, S. (1984) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/bf00989619 · Cited by 76 · cited 2× · see citing works
“, 2000; Harper, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for their own evaluation of the economy and analyze how it relates to government support (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Feldman, 1984; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet & Rivers, 1984; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 19…”
Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe
HARPER, M. A. G. (2000) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414000033009004 · Cited by 71 · cited 3× · see citing works
“While many scholars use objective economic indicators to assess whether the bad shape of the economy results in a decline of electoral support for incumbents (e.g. Carlsen, 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Harper, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for their own…”
Into Pandora's Box of economic evaluations: a study of the Danish macro VP-function, 1986–1997
Nannestad, P., & Paldam, M. (2000) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(99)00043-8 · Cited by 60 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…the bad shape of the economy results in a decline of electoral support for incumbents (e.g. Carlsen, 2000; Clarke et al., 2000; Harper, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 2000), others take advantage of opinion surveys, which ask respondents for their own evaluation of the economy and analyze how it…”
Hooghe, M., & Teepe, W. (2007) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/1461444807082726 · Cited by 58 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Datasets collected online generally suffer from problems of under-coverage and self-selection that can potentially bias estimates (Bethlehem, 2010; Hooghe & Teepe, 2007).”
Extremist Political Positions and Perceptions of Conspiracy: Even Paranoids Have Real Enemies
Inglehart, R. (1987) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4618-3_14 · Cited by 42 · cited 4× · see citing works
“While it has been acknowledged that extreme ideological left and right positions correspond with lower trust levels (Inglehart, 1987), whether rightwing or left-wing individuals are “more distrustful varies from one country to another” (Newton, 1999, p. 181).”
InfluentialMotivated roots of conspiracies: The role of certainty and control motives in conspiracy thinking
Kossowska, M., & Bukowski, M. (2015) · Jagiellonian University Repository (Jagiellonian University) · doi:10.4324/9781315746838-16 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Det dunkelt tänkta : Konspirationsteorier om morden på John F. Kennedy och Olof Palme
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The Psychology Of Conspiracy Theories
Collett, S.-J. (2021) · Psych-Talk · doi:10.53841/bpstalk.2021.1.98.38 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511 · see citing works
Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance with government guidelines in England
Freeman, D., Waite, F., Rosebrock, L., Petit, A., Causier, C., East, A., Jenner, L., Teale, A.-L., Carr, L., Mulhall, S., et al. (2022) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291720001890 · Cited by 714 · see citing works
“Political extremes (left or right) are most associated with the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (Krouwel, Kutiyski, van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017; van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015).”
Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries
Imhoff, R., Zimmer, F., Klein, O., António, J. H. C., Babińska, M., Bangerter, A., Bilewicz, M., Blanuša, N., Bovan, K., Bužarovska, R., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7 · Cited by 274 · see citing works
Self-citationHornsey, M. J., Finlayson, M., Chatwood, G., & Begeny, C. T. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103947 · Cited by 273 · see citing works
Psychological Features of Extreme Political Ideologies
van Prooijen, J., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2019) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721418817755 · Cited by 225 · see citing works
Self-citationSternisko, A., Cichocka, A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.007 · Cited by 197 · see citing works
Suspicion of institutions: How distrust and conspiracy theories deteriorate social relationships
van Prooijen, J., Spadaro, G., & Wang, H. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.06.013 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories
Pierre, J. M. (2020) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.v8i2.1362 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
The partisan mind: Is extreme political partisanship related to cognitive inflexibility?
Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2019) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000661 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Trust in government in Sweden and Denmark during the COVID-19 epidemic
Nielsen, J. H., & Lindvall, J. (2021) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1909964 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
“Numerous studies have associated political ideology with political trust (see, for example, Krouwel et al. 2017).”
BackgroundNera, K., Wagner-Egger, P., Bertin, P., Douglas, K. M., & Klein, O. (2021) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2769 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
“…et al., 2019; Galliford & Furnham, 2017; Hart & Graether, 2018; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Miller et al. 2016; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018; van der Linden, 2015; van der Linden et al., 2020; Wagner-Egger & Bangerter, 2007; however, for an example of ―left-wing bias‖, see Krouwel et al., 2017).”
ResultThe Genesis of the Birther Rumor: Partisanship, Racial Attitudes, and Political Knowledge
Jardina, A. E., & Traugott, M. W. (2018) · The Journal of Race Ethnicity and Politics · doi:10.1017/rep.2018.25 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
“Furthermore, individuals often subscribe to multiple conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al. 2017).”
BackgroundConspiracy Thinking in Europe and America: A Comparative Study
Walter, A., & Drochon, H. (2020) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0032321720972616 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
“Several studies have found conspiracy thinking to be stronger at the political extremes (Krouwel et al., 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundInfluentialIndividual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories
Hornsey, M., Bierwiaczonek, K., Sassenberg, K., & Douglas, K. M. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00133-0 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Kuhn, S. A. K., Lieb, R., Freeman, D. H., Andreou, C., & Zander-Schellenberg, T. (2021) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291721001124 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Voter mobilisation in the echo chamber: Broadband internet and the rise of populism in Europe
SCHAUB, M., & MORISI, D. (2020) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12373 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
“…shows that belief in conspiracy theories correlates with support for populist parties in Italy (Mancosu et al. 2017) and with extreme left-wing and right-wing ideology in the United States, the Netherlands and Sweden (Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Marwick & Lewis 2017; Krouwel et al. 2017).”
Ideological extremism, perceived party system polarization, and support for democracy
Torcal, M., & Magalhães, P. C. (2022) · European Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s1755773922000066 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?
Enders, A. M., & Uscinski, J. E. (2021) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/1368430220960805 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
“…are more likely than extreme liberals, to believe conspiracy theories (van Prooijen et al., 2015); this results in a curvilinear, U-shaped relationship between conspiracy beliefs and political identities that oftentimes proves slightly stronger among conservatives (see also Krouwel et al., 2017).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialKim, S., & Kim, S. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12239904 · Cited by 65 · see citing works
“[71] study the relationship between ideologies and trust in conspiracy theories related to rumors.”
BackgroundConspiracy Theories, Populism, and Epistemic Autonomy
Harris, K. R. (2022) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2021.44 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
van Prooijen, J., & Kuijper, S. M. H. C. (2020) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Injustice Without Evidence: The Unique Role of Conspiracy Theories in Social Justice Research
van Prooijen, J. (2021) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-021-00376-x · Cited by 44 · see citing works
“, 2019), extremism, populism, and radicalization (Bartlett & Miller, 2010; Krouwel et al., 2017; Silva et al., 2017; Van Prooijen et al., 2015), and a range of human emotions (for overviews, see Douglas et al.”
BackgroundEmotion dysregulation and belief in conspiracy theories
Molenda, Z., Green, R., Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., & Douglas, K. M. (2023) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2022.112042 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Partisan ideological attitudes: Liberals are tolerant; the intelligent are intolerant.
Ganzach, Y., & Schul, Y. (2020) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000324 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Group-oriented motivations underlying conspiracy theories
van Prooijen, J. (2024) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/13684302241240696 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
“Various studies have observed stronger conspiracy beliefs at both the left and right extremes of the political spectrum (Krouwel et al., 2017; Nera et al., 2021; van Prooijen et al., 2015), although some studies have observed stronger conspiracy beliefs mostly at the far-right (van der Linden et…”
Conspiracy beliefs and attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccinations
Pivetti, M., Battista, S. D., Paleari, F. G., & Hakoköngäs, E. J. (2021) · Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology · doi:10.1177/18344909211039893 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
“For instance, some studies have revealed that extreme political (left or right) orientations were associated with the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (Krouwel et al., 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundStrömbäck, J., Broda, E., Bouchafra, S., Johansson, S., Rettenegger, G., & Lindgren, E. (2022) · European Journal of Communication · doi:10.1177/02673231221122951 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
“While Krouwel et al. (2017) found that ideological leaning to the left is associated with conspiracy beliefs in Sweden, our findings resonate with research showing that conspiracy thinking is more widespread among those that are leaning to the right ideologically (Walter and Drochon, 2020).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialKutiyski, Y., Krouwel, A. P. M., & van Prooijen, J. (2019) · The Social Science Journal · doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2019.03.004 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Self-citationChristner, C. (2022) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.7969 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
“Belief in conspiracy theories is particularly associated with extreme ideologies, both at the left and the right ends of the political spectrum (Krouwel et al., 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundPetrović, B., Međedović, J., Radović, O. B., & Lovrić, S. R. (2019) · Europe's Journal of Psychology · doi:10.5964/ejop.v15i1.1695 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
“understood if we have in mind that some studies have shown that both right- and left- political extremists are inclined to believe in conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al., 2017).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe stock market is rigged? Conspiracy beliefs and distrust predict lower stock market participation
Fiagbenu, M. E. (2022) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3981 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Schemer, C., Ziegele, M., Schultz, T., Quiring, O., Jackob, N., & Jakobs, I. (2021) · Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10776990211063527 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“Poor knowledge (Miller et al., 2016) or low education (Garrett & Weeks, 2017; Krouwel et al., 2017) is positively related to conspiratorial beliefs.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialMatute, J., Palau‐Saumell, R., Meyer, J., Derqui, B., & Jiménez‐Asenjo, N. (2021) · Journal of Risk Research · doi:10.1080/13669877.2021.1958044 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“Previous studies suggest that political cynicism and distrust in political systems, which typically increase in times of crises, are not necessarily associated with a specific political orientation, but with political extremism (both right and left) (Krouwel et al. 2017).”
BackgroundEvidence of decreased system justification among extreme conservatives in non-American samples
Caricati, L. (2019) · The Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/00224545.2019.1567455 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
“In short, if extreme rightists are similar to extreme leftists with respect to some characteristics that in turn enhance system criticism (e.g., Krouwel et al., 2017), then extreme rightists should criticize the system as much as, or similarly to, extreme leftists.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialNera, K., Leveaux, S., & Klein, P. (2020) · International Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.5334/irsp.401 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Injecting disinformation into public space: pseudo-media and reality-altering narratives
Palau-Sampio, D., & Carratalá, A. (2022) · El Profesional de la Informacion · doi:10.3145/epi.2022.may.12 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Democracy and belief in conspiracy theories in New Zealand
Marques, M. D., Hill, S., Clarke, E. J. R., Williams, M. N., Ling, M., Kerr, J. R., Douglas, K. M., Cichocka, A. K., & Sibley, C. G. (2022) · Australian Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1080/10361146.2022.2122773 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
“In samples from the United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden, conspiracy theorising appears to be strongest at both the far left and far right, and stronger at the extremes relative to centrists (van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Pollet 2015; Krouwel et al. 2017).”
BackgroundResultVerschwörungsmentalität und Extremismus – Befunde aus Befragungsstudien in der Schweiz
Baier, D., & Manzoni, P. (2020) · Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform · doi:10.1515/mks-2020-2044 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Wiederholt wurde bspw. die Zustimmung zu konkreten Verschwörungstheorien wie »The FBI was involved in the assassination of Martin Luther King« (Goertzel 1994) oder »The financial crisis was planned by bankers and politicians for their personal gain« (Krouwel et al. 2017) erfasst.”
BackgroundAspernäs, J., Erlandsson, A., & Nilsson, A. (2023) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2023.104394 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Left–right political orientations are not systematically related to conspiracism
Enders, A. M., Klofstad, C., Littrell, S., Miller, J. M., Theocharis, Y., Uscinski, J. E., & Zilinsky, J. (2024) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.13017 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“…the relationship between ideological self-identification and conspiracism is linear (van der Linden et al., 2021), whereas others find that it is curvilinear , taking the form of a U shape, sometimes higher on either the extreme right (Imhoff et al., 2022) or extreme left (Krouwel et al., 2017).”
Pseudo-Media Sites, Polarization, and Pandemic Skepticism in Spain
Palau-Sampio, D. (2021) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2021.685295 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Marino, G., & Iannelli, L. (2023) · Frontiers in Sociology · doi:10.3389/fsoc.2023.1174161 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“In line with the theoretical shortage, few studies introduce the topic of problematic information from a historical perspective (Krouwel et al., 2017; Enders and Smallpage, 2019; Rottweiler and Gill, 2020; Rousis et al., 2020; Enders and Uscinski, 2021).”
BackgroundIonescu, O., Tavani, J., & Collange, J. (2021) · International Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.5334/irsp.573 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Religion, Conspiracy Thinking, and the Rejection of Democracy: Evidence From the UK
Yendell, A., & Herbert, D. (2022) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.v10i4.5904 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“The results confirm the findings of other studies that show an influ‐ ence of belief in conspiracy theories on attitudes toward democracy and right‐wing extremism (e.g., Imhoff et al., 2022; Krouwel et al., 2017; Pickel & Yendell, 2020).”
ResultJang, H., Barrett, B., & McGregor, S. C. (2023) · Information Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2023.2234970 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“…on dimensions of public opinion outside of the left-right orientation have slowly increased over the past decade, including studies on conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2019; Krouwel et al., 2017), populistic beliefs (e.g., Erisen et al., 2021), and Mani-chean thinking (e.g., Selçuk, 2016).”
BackgroundConspiracy Theories and Violent Extremism
Bierwiaczonek, K., van Prooijen, J., van der Linden, S., & Rottweiler, B. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009407892.011 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Conspiracy theories, credibility and trust in information
Gualda, E. (2019) · Communication & Society · doi:10.15581/003.32.1.179-195 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Loziak, A., & Havrillová, D. (2024) · Europe's Journal of Psychology · doi:10.5964/ejop.10049 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Several studies have found that people at the extreme ends of the political spectrum—at both left and right end are more likely than others to believe in conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al., 2017; van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundMadness of the crowd: Understanding mass behaviors through a multidisciplinary lens
Brindal, E., Kakoschke, N., Reeson, A. F., & Evans, D. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.924511 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“More recently, research has moved away from psychopathological traits toward more modifiable ones such as preference for extremist ideologies and/or high levels of mistrust (Krouwel et al., 2017).”
BackgroundThe Psychology and Neuroscience of Partisanship
Harris, E., Pärnamets, P., Sternisko, A., Robertson, C. E., & Bavel, J. J. V. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108779104.005 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Zoch, G., & Wamsler, S. (2024) · Political Research Exchange · doi:10.1080/2474736x.2024.2403438 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Further, higher political trust is linked to a lower susceptibility to conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al. 2017).”
Role of Conspiracy Mentality and Paranormal Beliefs in Predicting Conspiracy Beliefs Among Neopagans
Dyrendal, A., Kennair, L. E. O., & Lewis, J. (2018) · International Journal for the Study of New Religions · doi:10.1558/ijsnr.36716 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Schultz, T., Ziegele, M., Jackob, N., Jakobs, I., Quiring, O., & Schemer, C. (2021) · ZRex – Zeitschrift für Rechtsextremismusforschung · doi:10.3224/zrex.v1i1.05 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Democracy and belief in conspiracy theories in New ZealandPreprint
Marques, M. D., Hill, S., Clarke, E. J. R., Williams, M. N., Ling, M., Kerr, J. R., Douglas, K. M., Cichocka, A. K., & Sibley, C. G. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/s8qf4 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Pärnamets, P., Alfano, M., Bavel, J. J. V., & Ross, R. M. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/2ujra · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Going beyond simplicity: Using machine learning to predict belief in conspiracy theories
Brandenstein, N. (2022) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2859 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and vaccinations: A conceptual replication study in Turkey
Pivetti, M., Paleari, F. G., Ertan, I., Battista, S. D., & ULUKÖK, E. (2023) · Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology · doi:10.1177/18344909231170097 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“This result is partially in line with many studies showing that extreme political (left or right) orientations were associated with the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Krouwel et al., 2017).”
ResultAdolphe, M. G., Pamela, F. M., & Nemboué, W. T. (2020) · European Scientific Journal ESJ · doi:10.19044/esj.2020.v16n26p51 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Malang, T., & Ohliger, V. (2023) · Journal of Legislative Studies · doi:10.1080/13572334.2023.2253413 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“To test for extremist parties, we use the quadratic function of the values which transforms the values of the extremist parties on the right and left spectrum to higher positive values (Krouwel et al., 2017).”
How belief in conspiracy theories could harm sustainability
van Prooijen, J., Šrol, J., & Maglić, M. (2025) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-025-02243-0 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Conspiracy theories are prevalent at both extremes of the political spectrum, although some studies suggest that this is particularly the case at the far right 69,74–78 .”
Public Attitudes Toward Priority Setting Principles in Health Care During COVID-19
Tinghög, G., & Strand, L. (2022) · Frontiers in Health Services · doi:10.3389/frhs.2022.886508 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Sapountzis, A., Figgou, L., & Michos, I. (2022) · Feminism & Psychology · doi:10.1177/09593535221113648 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“…theorizing as a political attitude explored its links with political extremism and maintained that political extremists are more prone to show distrust and adopt conspiracy theories concerned with the alleged sources of socio-political problems (Krouwel et al., 2017; Van Proojien et al., 2015).”
BackgroundCzech, F. (2018) · Polish Political Science Yearbook · doi:10.15804/ppsy2018406 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The non-linearity between populist attitudes and ideological extremism
Tamaki, E. R., & Jung, Y. J. (2025) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2025.10045 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Do Real and Invented Scandals Fuel Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories?
Wagner‐Egger, P., Fernandes, D. D. O., Carrel, J., & Delouvée, S. (2023) · European Journal of Psychology Open · doi:10.1024/2673-8627/a000034 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Maman, L., Feldman, Y., & Tyler, T. R. (2025) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.70020 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Schepisi, M., Gjoneska, B., Mari, S., Panasiti, M. S., Porciello, G., & Imhoff, R. (2023) · Journal of Trust Research · doi:10.1080/21515581.2023.2248083 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“…to rate their trust towards a speci fi c target or institution (Imho ff & Lamberty, 2018; Jovan č evi ć & Mili ć evi ć , 2020; Kari ć & Me đ edovi ć , 2021; Krouwel et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2016; Pummerer et al., 2021), or more indirectly, asked to rate their perceived benevolence of others…”
BackgroundYoo, J., Johnson, T. J., & Lacasa-Mas, I. (2024) · Mass Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/15205436.2024.2401842 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Krouwel et al. (2017) found that extreme ideologies on both the left and right are associated with a greater propensity for conspiracy beliefs than cen-trists.”
Cope, Z. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197527085.013.27 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Exploring the Extremes: The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Populism on Conspiracy Beliefs in Austria
Hofmann, D. (2024) · The social science · doi:10.3390/socsci13100558 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…and views towards democracy (Balta et al. 2022; Bergmann and Butter 2020; Bilewicz and Imhoff 2022; Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Czech 2022; Grzesiak-Feldman 2015; Imhoff et al. 2022a; Krouwel et al. 2017; Müller 2022; Pantazi et al. 2022; Papaioannou et al. 2023a, 2023b; Walter and Drochon 2022).”
van Prooijen, J., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108779104.029 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Self-citationYustisia, W., Putra, I. E., & Hakim, M. A. (2023) · Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy · doi:10.1111/asap.12355 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Kweon, Y., & Choi, B. (2023) · Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions · doi:10.1111/gove.12808 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Nera, K., Wagner‐Egger, P., Bertin, P., Douglas, K. M., & Klein, O. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/s37vy · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Conspiracy Worldviews and Political Violence: The Mediating Role of Satisfaction With DemocracyPreprint
Bonetto, É., Adam‐Troian, J., & Arciszewski, T. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/e83nx · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Flakus, M., Koc, P., Plisiecki, H., & Pokropek, A. (2025) · Social Psychology · doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000571 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Partisanship and plane crashes: can partisanship drive conspiratorial beliefs?
Blackington, C. (2021) · East European Politics · doi:10.1080/21599165.2021.2015687 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“spiracy theories (Krouwel et al. 2017; Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Pollet 2015), particularly those on the far-right of the ideological spectrum (Bergmann 2018).”
BackgroundConscientiousness of representatives and agreement with their party positions
Bundi, P., Varone, F., Loewen, P. J., & Breunig, C. (2023) · Journal of Legislative Studies · doi:10.1080/13572334.2023.2233207 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Personality traits influence political positions (Joly et al. 2018; Best, 2011; Desrochers et al., 2019; Dynes et al., 2019; Krouwel et al., 2017; Schoonvelde et al., 2019).”
Take the Streets or Take the Parliament? Political Participation Choices of Radical Left Individuals
Krauss, S., & Wagner, S. (2023) · Political Studies Review · doi:10.1177/14789299231204708 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Although radical right-wing supporters show greater political distrust in the political system (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002), research has found that lower political trust is also a common feature of the radical left (Krouwel et al., 2017; Kutiyski et al., 2021).”
Poier, S., & Nikodemska‐Wołowik, A. M. (2024) · Journal of Infection and Public Health · doi:10.1016/j.jiph.2024.102519 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Casiraghi, M. C. M., Curini, L., & Nai, A. (2024) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.13021 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“On this point, if trust is not substantially related to political extremism (Krouwel et al., 2017), increasing evidence suggests that the way in which political trust unfolds is also a function of the underlying ideological stance of the individual, most notably in terms of ideological support for…”
Deverson, S., Delfabbro, P., & Georgiou, N. (2025) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.70021 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Conspiracy Theory Belief and Conspiratorial Thinking
Farhart, C. E. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108779104.036 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Akyol, E., & Atlı, A. (2023) · Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Vizyoner Dergisi · doi:10.21076/vizyoner.1100806 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Do ideologically extreme voters have extreme perceptions of political parties?
Padilla, J. (2023) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102707 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Endtricht, R., & Kanol, E. (2024) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0312418 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Ančić, B., & Cepić, D. (2021) · Sociologija i prostor · doi:10.5673/sip.59.0.7 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Paranormalism, Voting Intention, and Other Conspiracy Mentality Predictors in Sweden
Tidelius, C. (2024) · Temenos - Nordic Journal for the Study of Religion · doi:10.33356/temenos.144628 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Kobayashi, T., Zhou, Y., Seki, L., & Miura, A. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2475472 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Determinants and consequences of belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories among youth in India
Sharma, S., Shahnawaz, M., & Zafar, M. (2025) · Asian Journal Of Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/ajsp.70053 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Adamus, M., Šrol, J., Mikušková, E. B., Adam‐Troian, J., & Chayinska, M. (2025) · British Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjso.70036 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…in the current geopolitical context, as economic anxiety or a general sense of disillusionment with the economy and democracy are known to be relevant drivers of political preferences and voting support for populist politicians and parties (Krouwel et al., 2017; Papaioannou et al., 2024).”
Buchmayr, F., & Krouwel, A. (2025) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.13085 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“On the one hand, there is research that shows conspir-acy belief is primarily concentrated at all political extremes (Imhoff et al., 2022; van Prooijen et al., 2015; Krouwel et al., 2017), albeit often with stronger conspiratorial tendencies on the right end of the political spectrum.”
Self-citationClarke, E. J. R., Eckerle, F., Kerr, J. R., Hill, S., Ling, M., Marques, M. D., & Williams, M. N. (2025) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70082 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Although the extreme ends of the left–right orientation spectrum have received attention as exhibiting similarities in system-level beliefs (Krouwel et al., 2017), the midpoint has largely been ignored FIGURE 6 LOESS trend lines of relationships between left–right items and selected issues items,…”
Conspiracy theories, credibility and trust in information
Gualda, E., & Araújo, J. R. (1970) · Communication & Society · doi:10.15581/003.32.37823 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Data gathering ability contributes to visual organization and probabilistic reasoning
Bernadyn, T. F., & Feigenson, K. A. (2018) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00582 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“, 2013), and that extreme ideology is explicitly linked to endorsing conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al., 2017; Van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundKrouwel, A. P. M., Bale, T., & Tremlett, L. (2020) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Sonderheft · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-28988-1_7 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Cognitive Underpinnings of Ideological Thinking
Zmigrod, L. (2019) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · doi:10.17863/cam.44894 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Zoch, G., & Wamsler, S. (2023) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/dwpbv · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Conspiracy theorists in policing: causes, challenges, and considerations
Evans, N. (2023) · Journal of Policing Intelligence and Counter Terrorism · doi:10.1080/18335330.2023.2203711 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Extremists (of the ideological, political, or religious kind) are both more inclined to believe conspiracy theories than moderates, and often incorporate conspiracy theories into their broader belief systems (Bartlett & Miller, 2010; Krouwel et al., 2017).”
Background
- Authors
- Krouwel, A., Kutiyski, Y., van Prooijen, J.-W., Martinsson, J., & Markstedt, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- Venue
- Journal of Social and Political Psychology
- Published
- 2017-10-28
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 435-462
- ISSN
- 2195-3325 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2765452345
- Semantic Scholar
- de259a3af2342bee44a0098a6fd1719b45f9620e
- Cited by
- 137
- References
- 79
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 19.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Journal of Social and Political Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PschyOpen (publishedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Europe’s Journal of Psychology (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Psychology Archives (cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluation, public trust in government, interpersonal trust, left-right ideology, voting advice applications
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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