Quining Qualia
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Citations
Cited by
The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model
Scherer, K. R. (2009) · Cognition and Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699930902928969 · Cited by 1,385
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Pryor, J. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 · Cited by 1,127
Herman, D. (2009) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444305920 · Cited by 1,002
The ego tunnel: the science of the mind and the myth of the self
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-3487 · Cited by 615
How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588921003731586 · Cited by 487
(2017) · Cited by 436
Are we explaining consciousness yet?
Dennett, D. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00130-x · Cited by 329
“It is unfortunate that the term qualia has been adopted ± in spite of my warnings (Dennett, 1988, 1991, 1994b) ± by some cognitive neuroscientists who have been unwilling or unable to believe that philosophers intend that term to occupy a peculiar logical role in arguments about functionalism that…”
Self-citationDifferential Ineffability and the Senses
Levinson, S. C., & Majid, A. (2014) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12057 · Cited by 304
In principle obstacles for empathic AI: why we can’t replace human empathy in healthcare
Montemayor, C., Halpern, J., & Fairweather, A. (2022) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-021-01230-z · Cited by 293
“21 For discussion, see Block (1980); Dennett (1990).”
BackgroundEngagement in HCI: Conception, Theory and Measurement
Doherty, K., & Doherty, G. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3234149 · Cited by 264
Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
Jack, A. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1 · Cited by 198
“Although often overlooked, it is self-evident that a full theory of consciousness should give an account of the processes which specifically operate on reportable information, and underlie its various behavioural effects – in particular the processes involved in the actual production of reports…”
BackgroundFeinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667 · Cited by 158
“…(Nagel, 1989; Searle, 1992, 1997; Tye, 2000; Metzinger, 2003; Velmans, 2009; Feinberg, 2012), or the experience of qualia (Churchland and Churchland, 1981; Jackson, 1982; Levine, 1983; Dennett, 1988, 1991; Flanagan, 1992; Kirk, 1994; Chalmers, 1995, 1996, 2010; McGinn, 1999; Metzinger, 2003).”
The vegetative state and the science of consciousness
Shea, N., & Bayne, T. (2010) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axp046 · Cited by 143
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
Feinberg, T. E. (2012) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2011.10.019 · Cited by 59
Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: folk versus philosophical phenomenality
Peressini, A. (2014) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.793150 · Cited by 32
“” [13] Dennett proposes PIP (phenomenal information property) detectors, following Peter Bieri and Fred Dretske. His provocative suggestion meshes rather well with a recent prominent scientific account of consciousness and qualia, Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information account; see Tononi (2008) and Peressini (2013) f…”
BackgroundInfluentialTaste–Odor Integration in Espresso Coffee
Chiralertpong, A., Acree, T. E., Barnard, J., & Siebert, K. J. (2008) · Chemosensory Perception · doi:10.1007/s12078-008-9018-0 · Cited by 20
“Whether the subjects actually experience sweet taste is difficult to prove and provides fodder for some philosophical disagreements (Dennett 1988; De Leon 2001).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dennett, D. C.
- Venue
- Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1993-11-19
- OpenAlex
- W2914019037
- Cited by
- 384
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.41
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.