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Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
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“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
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Bruttel, L. V., & Stolley, F. (2018) · Games · doi:10.3390/g9020028 · Cited by 18
“Regarding the context-dependence of dictator giving, it has been shown, for example, that dictators’ giving decreases if anonymity of decisions is increased [37–40]5, that the social distance between dictator and receiver affects dictators’ decision [38,42–45], that giving increases if the receiver is perceived as mor…”
Lönnqvist, J., & Walkowitz, G. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00337 · Cited by 21
Revisiting generosity in the dictator game: Experimental evidence from Pakistan
Umer, H. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.101503 · Cited by 17
Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game
Servátka, M. (2009) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.08.006 · Cited by 17
Inequality aversion, self-interest and social connectedness
Robson, M. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.029 · Cited by 18
Testing motives for charitable giving: A revealed-preference methodology with experimental evidence
Deb, R. A., Gazzale, R. S., & Kotchen, M. J. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.009 · Cited by 18
“In this respect, our design is similar to that of Eckel and Grossman (1996) who showed that using a wellknown charity rather that anonymous subjects increases the donation amounts in a dictator game.”
Chew, S. H., Ebstein, R. P., & Zhong, S. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.008 · Cited by 18
Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order
Gächter, S. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199945474.013.0002 · Cited by 17
“For example, people donate anonymously to charities (Eckel and Grossman 1996), they vote for reasons of civic duty, despite their vote being extremely unlikely pivotal (Riker and Ordeshook 1968); they respect the law (Cooter 2000) also if incentives that back up the obligations are weak (Galbiati…”
Attitudes and attitude certainty guiding pro‐social behaviour as a function of perceived elaboration
Moreno, L., Requero, B., Santos, D., Paredes, B., Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2021) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2798 · Cited by 17
“…measure of pro-group behaviour within the identity fusion literature (Gómez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2010), as well as in behavioural economics (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996), sociology (Simpson & Willer, 2008; Willer, 2009), and social psychology (Benenson et al., 2007).”
BackgroundThe influence of role awareness, empathy induction and trait empathy on dictator game giving
Herne, K., Hietanen, J. K., Lappalainen, O., & Palosaari, E. J. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0262196 · Cited by 20
“Examples include donations to charities [1] and intergenerational decisions [2].”
BackgroundAdres, E., Vashdi, D. R., & Zalmanovitch, Y. (2015) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12424 · Cited by 17
An experimental approach to comparing similarity- and guilt-based charitable appeals
van Rijn, J., Barham, B. L., & Sundaram-Stukel, R. (2017) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2017.02.004 · Cited by 17
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Hussey, A. J. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.03.005 · Cited by 14
Voting for environmental donations: Experimental evidence from Majorca, Spain
Blanco, E., López, M. C., & Coleman, E. A. (2012) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.12.014 · Cited by 17
Artificiality, Reactivity, and Demand Effects in Experimental Economics
Jiménez‐Buedo, M., & Guala, F. (2015) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393115618015 · Cited by 17
“In another experiment, over 73% of the dictators give money when the recipient is identified with a “reputable charity” like the Red Cross, and the average level of donations is tripled compared with an anonymous recipient condition (Eckel and Grossman 1996).16 How can we explain this evidence?”
BackgroundSorting into payment schemes and medical treatment: A laboratory experiment
Brosig‐Koch, J., Kairies‐Schwarz, N., & Kokot, J. (2017) · Health Economics · doi:10.1002/hec.3616 · Cited by 17
“To verify this transfer, we applied a procedure similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996), Hennig‐Schmidt et al. (2011), and Brosig‐Koch et al. (2016, 2017).”
MethodWhy Be Generous? Tests of the Partner Choice and Threat Premium Models of Resource Division
Eisenbruch, A. B., Grillot, R. L., & Roney, J. R. (2019) · Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology · doi:10.1007/s40750-019-00117-0 · Cited by 15
“…amount returned by the trustee is commonly interpreted as indicating trustworthiness or reciprocation, but it is also a clear measure of generosity; in fact, this stage of the trust game is equivalent to the dictator game, which is often used as a measure of altruism (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 1996).”
MethodEarly Childhood Environment, Breastfeeding and the Formation of PreferencesPreprint
Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2900413 · Cited by 17
“Moreover, almost all social interactions are shaped by social preferences, as e.g., altruism (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) 2While there is general evidence that, next to genes, social environment is an important source of heterogeneity (Cesarini et al., 2009; Benjamin et…”
BackgroundSubliminal influence on generosity
Andersson, O., Miettinen, T., Hytönen, K., Johannesson, M., & Stephan, U. (2016) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-016-9498-8 · Cited by 15
Butera, L., & Horn, J. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.011 · Cited by 19
Subsidizing unit donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared
Diederich, J., Eckel, C. C., Epperson, R., et al. (2021) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-021-09732-9 · Cited by 16
Self-citationUsing Dictator Game Experiments to Learn About Charitable Giving
Cartwright, E. J., & Thompson, A. R. (2022) · VOLUNTAS International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11266-022-00490-7 · Cited by 22
“Informally, with average giving of $2 in the study of Crumpler and Grossman (2008) compared to $3 in Eckel and Grossman (1996) warm glow seemingly accounts for two thirds of giving.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCarpenter, J. P., Liati, A., & Vickery, B. P. (2010) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463109358486 · Cited by 16
“While the case for impulsive behavior in the DG is strong, we also think that the degree to which impulsivity or “coming to play” matters in the DG depends on the protocol, specifically the context in which the recipient is portrayed — is there a reason to give? Compared to the double blind DG conducted in the sterile…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBargaining behavior and payoff uncertainty: Experimental evidence
Church, B. K., & Zhang, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(99)00015-x · Cited by 15
Social Preferences and Political ParticipationPreprint
Dawes, C. T., & Fowler, J. H. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1008205 · Cited by 16
Social Preferences or Sacred Values? Theory and Evidence of Deontological MotivationsPreprint
Chen, D. L., & Schonger, M. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2977060 · Cited by 15
Fong, C. M. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.556384 · Cited by 16
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Brain Activity in the Play of Dominant Strategy and Mixed Strategy Games
Wilson, R. K., Stevenson, R. T., & Potts, G. (2006) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00510.x · Cited by 15
Funkhouser, C. J., Zakriski, A. L., & Spoltore, J. D. (2017) · Psi Chi Journal of Psychological Research · doi:10.24839/2325-7342.jn22.1.19 · Cited by 19
Charity Begins at Home: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Charitable Giving
Eckel, C. C., Priday, B. A., & Wilson, R. K. (2018) · Games · doi:10.3390/g9040095 · Cited by 15
“In “real donation” experiments [2], women also tend to give more than men, though this difference may vary by context.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Ultimatum Game: Optimal Strategies without Fairness
Burnell, S. J., Evans, L., & Yao, S. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0669 · Cited by 15
“9 Eckel and Grossman (1996) report experimental findings in which respondent’s that were represented as charities received larger offers.”
BackgroundBrosig‐Koch, J., Hennig‐Schmidt, H., Kairies‐Schwarz, N., et al. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2278841 · Cited by 15
“(2011) and Eckel and Grossman (1996). To this end, one of the participants was randomly chosen to be the monitor.”
BackgroundMethodCalamity, Aid and Indirect Reciprocity: The Long Run Impact of Tsunami on AltruismPreprint
Becchetti, L., Castriota, S., & Conzo, P. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2101673 · Cited by 15
Bridging the gap between the economics lab and the field: Dictator games and donations
Wang, X., & Navarro‐Martinez, D. (2023) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/jdm.2023.19 · Cited by 17
“and our first field situation, but we decided to focus on these three because we believe that they are of particular relevance, and all three have been shown to significantly affect behavior in dictator game settings (e.g., Andreoni et al., 2017; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; List, 2007).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialFactors Affecting Support for Transnational Conservation Targeting Migratory Species
Vogdrup-Schmidt, M., Abatayo, A. L., Shogren, J. F., et al. (2018) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.11.011 · Cited by 14
“Information on the contribution of other participants or individuals (Croson and Shang, 2008; Frey and Meier, 2004) or about the recipient (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Glazer and Konrad, 1996), have been shown to alter individual contribution decisions.”
BackgroundMethodEffect of religious priming in prosocial and destructive behaviour
Zhang, J., Brown, E., & Xie, H. (2019) · Pacific Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-0106.12293 · Cited by 15
“…and Norenzayan (2015) and by van Elk et al. (2015)).2 Different from most previous studies, subjects in our study do not play a standard dictator game, but an Eckel and Grossman (1996) dictator game, in which they choose an amount to be donated to a charity instead of an anonymous stranger.”
Diversity and the provision of public goods: Experimental evidence from South Africa
Burns, J. C., & Keswell, M. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.018 · Cited by 14
Asset Legitimacy and Distributive Justice in the Dictator Game: An Experimental Analysis
Mittone, L., & Ploner, M. (2010) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.708 · Cited by 15
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Smith, A. (2014) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2014.10.005 · Cited by 15
“However, many of the common papers neglect the role of context, which is discussed by Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
Brañas‐Garza, P., Bucheli, M., & Espinosa, M. P. (2020) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2020.102332 · Cited by 14
The Effect of Neuropeptides on Human Trust and Altruism: A Neuroeconomic Perspective
Fehr, E. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79288-8_4 · Cited by 14
Interpersonal Interaction and Economic Theory: The Case of Public Goods
Bardsley, N. (2000) · Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-8292.00140 · Cited by 14
Reciprocation and altruism in social cooperation
Safin, V., Arfer, K. B., & Rachlin, H. C. (2015) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2015.04.009 · Cited by 14
“These prior experiments and others (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996) show clearly that pure altruism (with no possibility of reciprocation) is not uncommon.”
BackgroundGood News, Bad News, and Social Image: The Market for Charitable GivingPreprint
Butera, L., & Horn, J. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2438230 · Cited by 14
“An increase in the (perceived) quality of a charity can be considered as a reduction in the e↵ective cost of giving, or the cost of producing one unit of charitable output (see Eckel and Grossman 1996).”
Diversity and Crowd-out: A Theory of Cold-Glow Giving
Hungerman, D. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13348 · Cited by 14
The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians – Experimental EvidencePreprint
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From outcome-based to language-based preferencesPreprint
Capraro, V., Halpern, J., & Perc, M. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/5w9yf · Cited by 13
Stoffel, S., Kaushal, A., Grimani, A., von Wagner, C., Sniehotta, F. F., & Vlaev, I. (2022) · BMJ Open · doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2022-065804 · Cited by 13
Quality competition and hospital mergers—An experiment
Han, J., Kairies‐Schwarz, N., & Vomhof, M. (2017) · Health Economics · doi:10.1002/hec.3574 · Cited by 13
“…decision situation, which allows for altruism towards patients, we implemented a transfer of the monetary equivalent of quality choices similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996), Hennig‐Schmidt et al. (2011), Brosig‐Koch, Hennig‐Schmidt, et al. (2016), Brosig‐Koch, Hehenkamp, et al. (2016), and…”
MethodOn the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games When the Recipient is a Charity
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“Altruistic desires are based on some justifiable concern for the welfare of other users, both known and unknown users (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Wang and Lai 2006).”
BackgroundDynamics of American Giving: Descriptive Evidence
Rooney, P. M., Ottoni–Wilhelm, M., Wang, X., & Han, X. (2020) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764020977661 · Cited by 15
“12 Einolf’s (2018) work on how parents’ giving changes as their children age, for example giving to education, youth/family services, and religious congregations switching-off when the last child leaves the house, is an example of the kind of research that is needed.”
BackgroundSelf-serving behavior of the rich causes contagion effects among the poor
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“Students do even give more if the recipient is a charity (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Small, and Loewenstein 2003; Brañas-Garza 2006, Fong 2007).”
BackgroundDonations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games
Butz, B., & Harbring, C. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.101510 · Cited by 12
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“And yet, in experiment after experiment, these dictator games have shown that players continue to offer substantial amounts, often approaching the level of offers in the ultimatum games (Eckel and Grossman, 2006; Hoffman et al., 1996; Johannesson and Persson, 2000).”
BackgroundNumerosity and allocation behavior: Insights using the dictator game
Shrivastava, S., Jain, G., Nayakankuppam, D., et al. (2017) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500006665 · Cited by 12
“In another vein, it has been found that allocation increased when an anonymous recipient was replaced by an established charity (Eckel & Grossman 1996) or a deserving/skillful participant (Ruffle 1998).”
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“Using a real-world charity has also been used in other laboratory experiments, such as dictator game experiments (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
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“…will sacrifice their own earnings to be perceived as talented, several studies on anonymity in dictator games (e.g., Burnham 2003; Charness and Gneezy 2008; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996) suggest subjects will sacrifice earnings to be perceived as unselfish by others.”
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“We used a variant of this game (Eckel & Grossman, 1996, 1998), in which each participant received an amount of money (in coins) and had to decide how to distribute it, donating nothing, all or part of it to a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO, represented by a money box).”
MethodInternally Reporting Risk in Financial Services: An Empirical Analysis
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“The dictator game is a well-known behavioural economics experiment that tests altruistic and prosocial behaviour (Kahneman et al. 1986; Forsythe et al. 1994; Bardsley 2008; Eckel and Grossmann 1996; Dana et al. 2006).”
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“A real-donation allocation decision is like a Dictator Game, in which, between two subjects, a monetary sum is divided according to the decision of one (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Luccasen, Thomas, & Grossman, 2017).”
BackgroundFaust, L., Kolbe, M., Mansouri, S., & Momtaz, P. P. (2022) · Journal of risk and financial management · doi:10.3390/jrfm15030138 · Cited by 16
“Eckel and Grossman (1996) followed this approach when letting participants play anonymous dictator games1 and found that participants altruistically gave away money to others.”
BackgroundSocial Dilemmas: The Role of Incentives, Norms and Institutions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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