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Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
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“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
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“Accepting zero offers within the UG or donating all money within the DG are outcomes that typically do not occur in bargaining games with monetary incentives (see e.g., Güth et al., 1982; Eckel and Grossman, 1996) so it is likely that these responses represent demand artifacts.”
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“In treatment 1, Part 1 of the experiment is the real-donation experiment (Eckel and Grossman 1996). Participants are endowed with $20. Participants select one charity from a list of ten (see Appendix A for instructions and materials). Many charities are presented so that participants are likely to find one they would…”
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“In Studies 1–3, we used real monetary stakes to test how views about the connectedness of self predict behavior on an incentive-compatible dictator-game-style charitable giving task (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Konow, 2009; Starmer & Sugden, 1991).”
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“2 A large literature in behavioral economics uses the dictator game as its core measure of altruism and pro-sociality (Forsythe et al 1994; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Whitt and Wilson, 2007; among many others).”
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“As in Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) and Bradler et al. (2013), the non-monetary incentive used is an award that is publicly 6See also Bohnet and Frey (1999); Eckel and Grossman (1996) on the value of embeddedness. given out following a tournament and that is conditional on performance.”
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“For related experimental studies of social preferences, see Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, and Miller (2007) and Eckel and Grossman (1996) on the role of needs, Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007a); Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007b); Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002); Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki (200…”
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“Literature on dictator games suggests that individuals endowed with money and high altruism tend to generously distribute money, demonstrating traits like fairness, equity, and reciprocity (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Henrich et al. 2001).”
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“In the Hoffman et al. (1994) study, the information available to the Proposer is unlikely to motivate charitable behavior (Eckel and Grossman 1996, 183, 184).”
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“For example, subjects give three times more to the American Red Cross than to anonymous recipients (Eckel and Grossman, 1996), and they give more to welfare recipients when they perceive that the recipients are poor because of bad luck rather than laziness (Fong, Forthcoming).”
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“Eckel & Grossman (1996) show that changing the receiver in a double-anonymous dictator game from an anonymous student to an established charity organization increases donations significantly.”
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“9Following Eckel and Grossman (1996), Dimant (2019), Bicchieri et al. (2020), and Bolton et al. (2020), we use a charity instead of a participant within each session to increase the salience of the pro- or antisocial decisions; behavior can either benefit or harm a credible institution delivering a…”
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“9 Eckel and Grossman (1996) compare transfer decisions when the object is a person or charity and their results could suggest that norms differ between student and charity recipient contexts.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationCATEGORY REPORTING IN CHARITABLE GIVING: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
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Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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