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Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
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“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
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Rodrigues, J., Ulrich, N., Mussel, P., Carlo, G., & Hewig, J. S. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02119 · Cited by 59
Self-regulation and control in personality functioning
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511596544.027 · Cited by 59
Introduction to field experiments in economics with applications to the economics of charity
List, J. A. (2008) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-008-9201-9 · Cited by 59
“One provocative example is the large scale natural field experiment in this special issue due to Eckel and Grossman (2008). The paper reports key results from a fundraising drive run by Minnesota National Public Radio (MPR). The central objective of the paper is to present an apples-to-apples comparison of how theoret…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialToward a neo-Darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics
Burnham, T. C. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.015 · Cited by 57
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Communication: Content or relationship?
Mohlin, E., & Johannesson, M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.12.003 · Cited by 58
Giving it now or later: Altruism and discounting
Kovářík, J. (2008) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.12.005 · Cited by 57
“Positive giving in Dictator game has been found to be an extremely robust phenomenon (Camerer, 2003, Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Ho¤man et al., 1994), which is interpreted as evidence of altruistic behavior.”
BackgroundFrom transactions to encounters: the joint generation of relational goods and conventional values
Gui, B. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.003 · Cited by 58
The Logic of Good Social Relations
Kolm, S. (2000) · Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-8292.00139 · Cited by 58
How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behavior - An Experimental InvestigationPreprint
Hennig‐Schmidt, H., Selten, R., & Wiesen, D. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1444069 · Cited by 58
Face-Saving or Fair-Minded: What Motivates Moral Behavior?Preprint
Cappelen, A. W., Halvorsen, T., Sørensen, E. Ø., et al. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2229899 · Cited by 56
Personal norms — and not only social norms — shape economic behavior
Bašić, Z., & Verrina, E. (2024) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105255 · Cited by 63
Xu, Y., Li, W., & Chi, S. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.643759 · Cited by 66
“As one of the most popular altruism behaviors in various cultures, donation could be an important dimension of altruism (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundHungerman, D. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.12.002 · Cited by 55
Bolsen, T., Ferraro, P. J., & Miranda, J. J. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12052 · Cited by 52
On the norms of charitable giving in Islam: Two field experiments in Morocco
Lambarraa-Lehnhardt, F., & Riener, G. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.006 · Cited by 54
Zhao, K., Ferguson, E., & Smillie, L. D. (2017) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550616683018 · Cited by 54
“Specifically, Eckel and Grossman (1996) have argued that altruistic processes are context dependent and are unlikely to be elicited in the neutrally framed dictator game, in which there is no reason for division of the money nor any basis to judge the deservingness of each player.”
BackgroundResultInforming others is associated with behavioral and neural signatures of value.
Tamir, D., Zaki, J., & Mitchell, J. P. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000122 · Cited by 59
“First, participants were instructed that learners would not know why they received information on some trials and not on others, nor would they know that information they received came from the informer (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Zaki & Mitchell, 2011).”
BackgroundEmpathy in a Citizen Deliberation Experiment
Grönlund, K., Herne, K., & Setälä, M. (2017) · Scandinavian Political Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12103 · Cited by 55
“A comparable study to our own was conducted by Eckel and Grossman (1996), who found that about 73 percent of experimental subjects made an allocation to the American Red Cross.”
ResultTHE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ALTRUISM, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL CAPITALPreprint
Carter, M. R., & Castillo, M. E. (2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.12616 · Cited by 53
Personality in cross-cultural perspective
Dragūns, J. G. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511596544.035 · Cited by 51
Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings
Rabellino, D., Morese, R., Ciaramidaro, A., Bara, B. G., & Bosco, F. M. (2016) · Journal of Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1080/20445911.2016.1138961 · Cited by 50
“We investigated altruistic punishment and anti-social behavior by conducting a Third-Party Punishment experiment (TPP) within a Dictator Game [29], [30], [31].”
MethodThe effect of altruistic tendency on fairness in third-party punishment
Lu, S., Tan, P., Cheng, Y., Chen, J., & Qu, C. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00820 · Cited by 48
“The third-party punishment of dictator game is an effective tool to explore altruistic punishment and fairness distribution (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundGiving versus taking for a cause
Grossman, P. J., & Eckel, C. C. (2015) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.002 · Cited by 51
Self-citationThe social contingency of momentary subjective well-being
Rutledge, R. B., de Berker, A. O., Espenhahn, S., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms11825 · Cited by 57
Brañas‐Garza, P., Rodríguez-Lara, I., & Sánchez, Á. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep42446 · Cited by 51
THREE THEMES ON FIELD EXPERIMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Cárdenas, J.-C., & Carpenter, J. P. (2005) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1016/s0193-2306(04)10004-5 · Cited by 53
“In the main treatment and with the flavor of the study conducted by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), the experimenter announced the family name (and therefore the caste membership) of each participant at the beginning of the session.”
BackgroundPro-social preferences and self-selection into jobs: Evidence from South African nurses
Lagarde, M., & Blaauw, D. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.004 · Cited by 50
Church, B. K., Gaa, J. C., Nainar, S. M. K., & Shehata, M. (2005) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq200515322 · Cited by 51
Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Biodiversity Conservation Videos on Charitable Donations
Shreedhar, G., & Mourato, S. (2019) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.01.001 · Cited by 50
Do women behave more reciprocally than men? Gender differences in real effort dictator games
Heinz, M., Juranek, S., & Rau, H. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.015 · Cited by 50
LESOROGOL, C. K. (2007) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/523017 · Cited by 50
“Eckel and Grossman (1996) found that replacing an anonymous player 2 with a well-known charity, the Red Cross, led to significant increases in offer size.”
Background(Un)Informed charitable giving
Krasteva, S. S., & Yıldırım, H. (2013) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.011 · Cited by 48
Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the ArtPreprint
Bearden, J. N. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.626183 · Cited by 50
“Though not strictly a “cultural difference,” Eckel and Grossman (1996b) found gender differences in bargaining behavior using a punishment game.”
BackgroundAnthropomorphization of artificial agents leads to fair and strategic, but not altruistic behavior
de Kleijn, R., van Es, L., Kachergis, G., & Hommel, B. (2018) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.09.008 · Cited by 49
“In the dictator game, the amount given away is considered a “ more pure ” measure of altruism (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), as the receiver does not have the option of turning down an o ff er, removing the fear of rejection.”
Sidestepping the rock and the hard place: The private avoidance of prosocial requests
Lin, S., Schaumberg, R. L., & Reich, T. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2016.01.011 · Cited by 49
“Moreover, refusing to help a charitable organization may implicate one's internalized moral standard more than refusing to give to a peer in an economic game because charitable organizations are more “deserving” of assistance than peer recipients (Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundInfluentialWang, J., Iversen, T., Hennig‐Schmidt, H., & Godager, G. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103411 · Cited by 49
Norm, network, and commons: The invisible hand of community
Lejano, R. P., & de Castro, F. F. (2013) · Environmental Science & Policy · doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2013.07.012 · Cited by 50
Carter, M. R., & Castillo, M. E. (2011) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/660000 · Cited by 47
Transaction costs, the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving
Knowles, S., & Servátka, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.001 · Cited by 45
“First implemented by Eckel and Grossman (1996), there now exists a large body of literature which uses Dictator Games to analyze giving to charity.”
Dilemmas and Bargains: Autism, Theory-of-Mind, Cooperation and FairnessPreprint
Hill, E. L., & Sally, D. F. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.407040 · Cited by 47
Song, F., Cadsby, C. B., & Morris, T. (2004) · International Journal of Conflict Management · doi:10.1108/eb022917 · Cited by 46
Groups, cooperation and conflict in games
Tan, J. H. W., & Zizzo, D. J. (2007) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.023 · Cited by 45
Carruthers, C. K., & Wanamaker, M. (2015) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.3368/jhr.50.4.837 · Cited by 46
Demand for Giving to Multiple Charities: An Experimental Study
Filiz‐Ozbay, E., & Uler, N. (2018) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvy011 · Cited by 49
“Among others, see also Eckel and Grossman (1996) for a dictator game experiment where the recipient is a real charity. nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvy011/4964787 by U niversity of M aryland user on 16 N ovem ber 2018 giving to multiple…”
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Chapter 23 Strong reciprocity and the welfare state
Fong, C. M., Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. M. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)02023-9 · Cited by 47
An experimental investigation of intrinsic motivations for giving
Tonin, M., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2013) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9360-9 · Cited by 48
“2 Eckel and Grossman (1996) was the first paper to introduce a real charity as recipient in a dictator experiment.”
Experimental tests of the Somatic Marker hypothesis
Leland, J. W., & Grafman, J. H. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.001 · Cited by 47
Not Only the Miserable Receive Help: Empathy Promotes Prosocial Behaviour Toward the Happy
Telle, N.-T., & Pfister, H.-R. (2012) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-012-9157-y · Cited by 48
“1997; Oswald 2002), but also in the form of giving up and donating money to a person or organisation for a good cause (BrañasGarza 2006; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Greitemeyer 2009; Verhaert and Van den Poel 2011).”
BackgroundMethodInformation, competition, and the quality of charities
Krasteva, S. S., & Yıldırım, H. (2016) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.008 · Cited by 44
Young Children’s Development of Fairness Preference
Li, J., Wen, W., Yu, J., & Zhu, L. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01274 · Cited by 50
“In addition to children’s fair behavior when they are in power as the distributors, children’s reactions when they are powerless recipients in dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1996) may provide a complementary picture of children’s preferences for fairness.”
BackgroundDisaster, Aid, and Preferences: The Long-run Impact of the Tsunami on Giving in Sri Lanka
Becchetti, L., Castriota, S., & Conzo, P. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12.014 · Cited by 42
Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments
Oberholzer‐Gee, F., & Eichenberger, R. (2008) · The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy · doi:10.2202/1935-1682.1718 · Cited by 42
Moshagen, M., Hilbig, B. E., & Musch, J. (2011) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.793 · Cited by 43
Holm, H. J., & Engseld, P. (2005) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-005-1463-x · Cited by 43
Save the planet or close your eyes? Testing strategic ignorance in a charity context
Lind, J. T., Nyborg, K., & Pauls, A. (2019) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.02.010 · Cited by 42
The Stability of Social Preferences in a Low-Income Neighborhood
de Oliveira, A. D., Eckel, C., & Croson, R. T. A. (2012) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.15 · Cited by 46
“and Leibbrandt (2008) to the case of public goods and in Eckel et al. (2007) for own human”
BackgroundMethodResultSelf-citationOn the possible conflict between economic growth and social development
Antoci, A., Sacco, P. L., & Vanin, P. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.008 · Cited by 41
A neural signature of fairness in altruism: A game of theta?
Rodrigues, J., Ulrich, N., & Hewig, J. S. (2014) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2014.977401 · Cited by 41
“This very strong effect shows that the “need” for money (Eckel & Grossman, 1996) of a person can easily be operated in this paradigm, and that the need of people has a strong effect, independent of the extent of altruism or being watched.”
BackgroundAre nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?
Jacobsen, K. J., Eika, K. H., Helland, L., et al. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.07.003 · Cited by 41
Belot, M. V. K., Duch, R. M., & Miller, L. (2010) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 40
Does Windfall Money Encourage Charitable Giving? An Experimental Study
Li, H., Liang, J., Xu, H., et al. (2018) · VOLUNTAS International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11266-018-9985-y · Cited by 40
The Neural Basis of and a Common Neural Circuitry in Different Types of Pro-social Behavior
Luo, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00859 · Cited by 50
“Pro-social behaviors that are exhibited in game tasks have been found and replicated under controlled environments in many behavioral experiments; players like to share wealth with strangers (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), punish defectors at a cost (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher…”
BackgroundINEQUALITY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN A MONEY-BURNING AND STEALING EXPERIMENT
Zizzo, D. J. (2004) · Research on economic inequality · doi:10.1016/s1049-2585(04)11010-7 · Cited by 40
The effects of a recipient's gender in a modified dictator game
Saad, G., & Gill, T. (2001) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/13504850010005260 · Cited by 39
“3 Incidentally, Eckel and Grossman (1996) mention that à person ® nding $10 on the ground is unlikely to share his good fortune with an unknown individual who just happens by at that moment’ (p.”
BackgroundInfluentialExperiments and Economic Development: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing WorldPreprint
Cárdenas, J.-C., & Carpenter, J. P. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 40
Nasr, E. S., Kilgour, D. M., & Noori, H. (2015) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2015.02.011 · Cited by 39
“…of partner’s action in both repeated and sequential prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Clark & Sefton, 2001; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1996; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Fehr & Gächter, 1998) by suggesting reciprocation of strategy type (niceness) as a generalized result not applying solely…”
BackgroundABC Information, Fairness Perceptions, and Interfirm Negotiations
Masschelein, S., Cardinaels, E., & den Abbeele, A. G. H. L. V. (2012) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-10214 · Cited by 39
“Consequently a seller is likely to agree to new contract terms that increase the buyer’s profit when the seller perceives the arguments as fair (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Ruffle 1998).”
BackgroundBehavioral Responses to Natural DisastersPreprint
Castillo, M. E., & Carter, M. R. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 47
Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm CompliancePreprint
Bicchieri, C., Dimant, E., Gächter, S., & Nosenzo, D. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3355028 · Cited by 42
What is fair? An experimental guide to climate negotiations
Brick, K., & Visser, M. (2014) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.11.010 · Cited by 38
Social Preferences and the Brain
Fehr, E., & Krajbich, I. M. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-416008-8.00011-5 · Cited by 44
Konow, J., & Schwettmann, L. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-3216-0_5 · Cited by 52
WARM‐GLOW GIVING: EARNED MONEY AND THE OPTION TO TAKE
Luccasen, R. A., & Grossman, P. J. (2016) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/ecin.12417 · Cited by 38
Self-citationIntrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
Banuri, S., & Keefer, P. E. (2013) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-6729 · Cited by 38
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Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 38
Self-citationYan, T., Ribbink, D., & Pun, H. (2018) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2017.12.001 · Cited by 38
Contagious yawning, empathy, and their relation to prosocial behavior.
Franzén, A., Mäder, S., & Winter, F. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000422 · Cited by 39
Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y. B. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w19649 · Cited by 37
Curbing coca cultivation in Colombia — A framed field experiment
Ibáñez, M., & Martinsson, P. (2013) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.005 · Cited by 36
To Earmark or to Nonearmark? The Role of Control, Transparency, and Warm-Glow
Özer, Ö., Urrea, G., & Villa, S. (2024) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2022.0096 · Cited by 39
Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence
Mechtenberg, L., Muehlheusser, G., & Roider, A. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103447 · Cited by 52
“, Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Alekseev, Charness, and Gneezy (2017).”
BackgroundWhy interpersonal relations matter for economics
Gui, B., & Sugden, R. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.002 · Cited by 34
de Oliveira, A. C. M., Croson, R. T. A., & Eckel, C. C. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1883767 · Cited by 36
“The first study to do this was Eckel and Grossman (1996), and in their study individuals gave on average 30.1% of their $10 endowment.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationWill the Personalization of Online Social Networks Foster Opinion Polarization?Preprint
Mäs, M., & Bischofberger, L. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2553436 · Cited by 39
Personal Norms — and Not Only Social Norms — Shape Economic BehaviorPreprint
Bašić, Z., & Verrina, E. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3720539 · Cited by 35
How much can we learn about voluntary climate action from behavior in public goods games?
Goeschl, T., Kettner, S. E., Lohse, J., & Schwieren, C. (2020) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106591 · Cited by 49
Quality certification for nonprofits, charitable giving, and donor's trust: Experimental evidence
Adena, M., Alizade, J., Bohner, F., Harke, J., & Mesters, F. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.007 · Cited by 34
The effects of induced emotions on environmental preferences and behavior: An experimental study
Ibanez, L., & Roussel, S. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0258045 · Cited by 36
“A social link between the dictator and the recipient generally increases donations [56,57].”
BackgroundResultThe expanding definition of framing and its particular impact on economic experimentation
Elliott, C. S., & Hayward, D. M. (1998) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/s1053-5357(99)80086-9 · Cited by 33
Prospective Mobility, Fairness, and the Demand for RedistributionPreprint
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“In unreported analyses, I found the effects of education to be quite sensitive to measurement error in current income.”
Ferguson, A. M., Cameron, C. D., & Inzlicht, M. (2021) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2021.03.011 · Cited by 37
Does the use of tax revenue matter for tax compliance behavior?
Doerrenberg, P. (2015) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.005 · Cited by 34
Bachke, M. E., Alfnes, F., & Wik, M. (2013) · VOLUNTAS International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11266-012-9347-0 · Cited by 34
The synergistic effect of prosociality and physical attractiveness on mate desirability
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Smile, Dictator, You're on Camera
Buchanan, J. A., McMahon, M. K., Simpson, M., et al. (2017) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.1002/soej.12214 · Cited by 33
Sakai, J. T., Dalwani, M. S., Gelhorn, H. L., Mikulich‐Gilbertson, S. K., & Crowley, T. J. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036158 · Cited by 32
“This game shares some similarities with previous tests of altruism [1–3] or behavioral economic games [4,5].”
BackgroundResultEffects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, J., Dimant, E., & Mittone, L. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.004 · Cited by 33
“Tax evasion in the experimental laboratory translates into an actual social welfare loss outside the lab (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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