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Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
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“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
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Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J., & Moore, J. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00178-0 · Cited by 133
Contracting Benefits of Corporate Giving: An Experimental Investigation
Balakrishnan, R., Sprinkle, G. B., & Williamson, M. G. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-10127 · Cited by 123
The Relationship between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality MeasuresPreprint
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2199369 · Cited by 130
Paradigmatic experiments: The Dictator Game
Guala, F., & Mittone, L. (2009) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.007 · Cited by 128
“Even in a doubleblind environment, the Red Cross attracted donations from over 73% of the dictators, as opposed to only 27% in the anonymous recipients condition (Eckel and Grossman 1996).”
BackgroundElinor Ostrom, B. (2009) · Springer series in game theory · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_13 · Cited by 137
Why Do People Volunteer? An Experimental Analysis of Preferences for Time Donations
Brown, A. L., Meer, J., & Williams, J. F. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2951 · Cited by 126
Carlsson, F., He, H., & Martinsson, P. (2012) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-012-9326-8 · Cited by 122
The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution
Bowles, S. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139012980 · Cited by 122
Israel, S., Lerer, E., Shalev, I., Uzefovsky, F., Reibold, M., Bachner‐Melman, R., Granot, R., Bornstein, G., KNAFO, A., & Yirmiya, N. (2008) · Progress in brain research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(08)00434-2 · Cited by 122
Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics
Johansson‐Stenman, O., & Konow, J. (2010) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9356-7 · Cited by 117
“Eckel and Grossman (1996) find that student dictators are less generous toward fellow students than toward the presumably more needy recipients of their donations to the American Red Cross.”
BackgroundBrosig‐Koch, J., Hennig‐Schmidt, H., Kairies‐Schwarz, N., & Wiesen, D. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.011 · Cited by 116
Using experimental economics to measure the effects of a natural educational experiment on altruism
Bettinger, E., & Slonim, R. L. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.10.006 · Cited by 116
COMPARING STUDENTS TO WORKERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FRAMING ON BEHAVIOR IN DISTRIBUTION GAMES
Carpenter, J. P., Burks, S. V., & Verhoogen, E. (2005) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1016/s0193-2306(04)10007-0 · Cited by 112
Hennig‐Schmidt, H., & Wiesen, D. (2014) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.03.001 · Cited by 115
Rutström, E. E., & Williams, M. B. (2000) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00109-8 · Cited by 115
“(1993), and Eckel and Grossman (1995, 1996). 4 We review two such studies below: Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), and Burrows and Loomes (1994).”
BackgroundAnonymity in the dictator game revisited
Franzén, A., & Pointner, S. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.005 · Cited by 114
“Selection from closed envelopes was done randomly (second random 4 This was already pointed out by Frohlich et al. (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (1996). device) so that an expected number of 4.36 subjects should be in each allocated money category due to both random devices.”
MethodInfluentialPro-social motivation, effort and the call to public service
Banuri, S., & Keefer, P. E. (2015) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.10.011 · Cited by 112
“Standard results for this game show that individuals (on average) give about 10 percent of their endowment to the other player (Hoffman et al. 1994; Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
Espinosa, M. P., & KovářÃk, J. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00088 · Cited by 130
“Regarding social aspects of the game, reducing the Dictator–Recipient social distance and enhancing feelings toward the Recipient typically increase giving (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Brañas-Garza, 2006; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012).”
BackgroundThe Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Political Science
Wilson, R. K. (2011) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041309-114513 · Cited by 113
Zhao, K., Ferguson, E., & Smillie, L. D. (2015) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12237 · Cited by 110
Apicella, C. L., Cesarini, D. A., Johannesson, M., Dawes, C. T., Lichtenstein, P., Wallace, B., Beauchamp, J. P., & Westberg, L. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011153 · Cited by 110
“A variant of this approach first used by Eckel and Grossman [38] is that the subject decides how to allocate a sum of money between herself and a charity.”
MethodSocial Rationality, Semi-Modularity and Goal-Framing: What Is It All About?
Lindenberg, S. M. (2008) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2008-0217 · Cited by 105
Risk, Reward, and Economic Decision Making in Aging
Roalf, D. R., Mitchell, S. H., Harbaugh, W. T., & Janowsky, J. S. (2011) · The Journals of Gerontology Series B · doi:10.1093/geronb/gbr099 · Cited by 107
“Instead, younger adults will forgo a small financial reward in the Ultimatum game (e.g., $1) if they feel they are being treated unfairly by another person (e.g., the person keeps $9 for themselves; Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundZettler, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Heydasch, T. (2013) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2013.01.012 · Cited by 114
Feiler, D. C., Tost, L. P., & Grant, A. M. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.05.014 · Cited by 111
“These personal goals are conceptually distinct and often have incompatible means for attainment (Riediger & Freund, 2004), as is the case when an individual must divide resources between oneself and others (Eckel & Grossman, 1996), such as in social dilemmas (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).”
BackgroundThe Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments and CooperationPreprint
James Andreoni, A., Harbaugh, W. T., & Vesterlund, L. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.436500 · Cited by 103
How do incidental emotions impact pro-environmental behavior? Evidence from the dictator game
Ibanez, L., Moureau, N., & Roussel, S. (2016) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.003 · Cited by 104
Borzaga, C., & Depedri, S. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511522154.007 · Cited by 113
Volunteers and pseudo-volunteers: The effect of recruitment method in dictator experiments
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2000) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01669303 · Cited by 105
Self-citationDo People Behave in Experiments as in the Field? - Evidence from DonationsPreprint
Benz, M., & Meier, S. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.756372 · Cited by 105
Giving to government: Voluntary taxation in the lab
Li, S. X., Eckel, C. C., Grossman, P. J., et al. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.005 · Cited by 104
“The experiment consists of a series of distinct budget allocation decisions, called " real donation " tasks, introduced by Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
Self-citationThe Beauty Premium: Physical Attractiveness and Gender in Dictator Games
Rosenblat, T. (2008) · Negotiation Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00198.x · Cited by 103
On the Norms of Charitable Giving in Islam: A Field ExperimentPreprint
Lambarraa-Lehnhardt, F., & Riener, G. (2012) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.126795 · Cited by 102
Truth in giving: Experimental evidence on the welfare effects of informed giving to the poor
Fong, C. M., & Oberholzer‐Gee, F. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.017 · Cited by 92
“In our main treatment, 32.8% of subjects chose to buy the information, indicating a good number of subjects have a positive willingness-to-pay to achieve an income distribution that better matches their preferences.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBribing versus gift-giving – An experiment
Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.004 · Cited by 100
“In our case, the third party is Médecins Sans Frontières, a well-known non-profit organization, the donation to which would depend on the subjects’ behavior.2 Eckel and Grossman (1996) have introduced donations to charities in experiments, focusing on a dictator game.”
BackgroundExamining the role of fairness in high stakes allocation decisions
List, J. A., & Cherry, T. L. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.021 · Cited by 99
“For example, our data are in large part consistent with the data reported in, for example, Hoffman et al. (1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996), and Bohnet and Frey (1999), as we find that rates of positive offers, equal splits, and average positive offers are in the range of 50 percent, 20 percent,…”
Ferguson, E., Taylor, M., Keatley, D. A., Flynn, N., & Lawrence, C. (2012) · Transfusion · doi:10.1111/j.1537-2995.2011.03557.x · Cited by 108
Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look
Davis, D. D., Millner, E. L., & Reilly, R. J. (2005) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-005-0867-y · Cited by 97
Ethical differentiation and market behavior: An experimental approach
Rode, J., Hogarth, R. M., & Menestrel, M. L. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.003 · Cited by 96
Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab
Klaus Abbink, A., & Serra, D. (2012) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2012)0000015006 · Cited by 97
Decomposing desert and tangibility effects in a charitable giving experiment
Reinstein, D. A., & Riener, G. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9298-0 · Cited by 90
An Exchange Theory of Money and Self-Esteem in Decision Making
Zhang, L. (2009) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0014225 · Cited by 93
“People give money to anonymous others whom they have little chance of meeting in the future (Batson, 1987, 1991; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Krebs, 1970).”
BackgroundOde to the Sea: Workplace Organizations and Norms of Cooperation
Uri Gneezy, B., Leibbrandt, A., & List, J. A. (2014) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12209 · Cited by 97
“In the donation game (Eckel and Grossman, 1996), we measure pro-social behaviour towards individuals outside the participants’ societies.”
BackgroundCorrupt reciprocity – Experimental evidence on a men's game
Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2011) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.irle.2011.04.002 · Cited by 90
Mental accounting and other-regarding behavior: Evidence from the lab
Cherry, T. L. (2001) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(01)00058-7 · Cited by 90
Jacobsson, F., Johannesson, M., & Borgqúist, L. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02049.x · Cited by 89
“In double blind dictator game experiments the mean donation has ranged between 8% and 16% (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996; Eckel and Grossman, 1996, 1998; Johannesson and Persson, 2000; Burnham, 2003).”
Charity in the Laboratory: Matching, Competition, and Group Identity
Charness, G., & Holder, P. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2923 · Cited by 88
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., Rutström, E. E., et al. (2012) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gps021 · Cited by 88
The development of personality across the lifespan
Donnellan, M. B., & Robins, R. W. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511596544.015 · Cited by 89
Temperament and brain networks of attention
Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0254 · Cited by 95
Brown, W. M., & Moore, C. L. (2002) · Brunel University Research Archive (BURA) (Brunel University London) · Cited by 87
Charitable Triad Theory: How donors, beneficiaries, and fundraisers influence charitable giving
Chapman, C. M., Louis, W. R., Masser, B., & Thomas, E. F. (2022) · Psychology and Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21701 · Cited by 86
Accuracy of self-reports on donations to charitable organizations
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2010) · Quality & Quantity · doi:10.1007/s11135-010-9341-9 · Cited by 86
“It is well known that making the act of giving publicly observable increases giving (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Hoffman et al. 1996).”
BackgroundThe power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game
Capraro, V., & Vanzo, A. (2019) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004356 · Cited by 89
“…and the recipient, is considered to be the standard measure of altruistic behavior and, for this reason, is among the most studied decision problems in social science (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Engel, 2011; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016).”
BackgroundSocial Preferences and Political Participation
Dawes, C. T., Loewen, P. J., & Fowler, J. H. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611000508 · Cited by 90
Opting-in: Participation bias in economic experiments
Slonim, R. L., Wang, C., Garbarino, E., & Merrett, D. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.013 · Cited by 97
“The experimental donation decision is a modified dictator game initially used in the lab by Eckel and Grossman (1996) that pairs subjects with a well-known charity.”
MethodMoral distance in dictator games
Aguiar, F., Brañas‐Garza, P., & Miller, L. M. (2008) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500000917 · Cited by 100
“Secondly, and more interestingly, the experiment used a “moral frame,” the kind of design that allows moral motivations such as fairness and altruism to play a role (Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFace-Saving or Fair-Minded: What Motivates Moral Behavior?
Cappelen, A. W., Halvorsen, T., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvw014 · Cited by 112
Honesty in Managerial ReportingPreprint
Evans, J. H., Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., et al. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.269448 · Cited by 83
Social Preferences and the Brain
Fehr, E. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374176-9.00015-4 · Cited by 84
Reisenzein, R., & Weber, H. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511596544.007 · Cited by 84
Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment
Reinstein, D. A., & Riener, G. (2011) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9245-8 · Cited by 80
Social Utility in Ultimatum Bargaining
Handgraaf, M. J. J., van Dijk, E., & Cremer, D. D. (2003) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1023/a:1025940829543 · Cited by 77
“Several studies have shown that decreasing the social distance between allocators, recipients, and experimenters increases allocator offers in dictator games (Bohnet and Frey, 1996; Hofmannet l., 1996b), and in ultimatum games (Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundSmith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364 · Cited by 83
From Outcome-Based to Language-Based Preferences
Capraro, V., Halpern, J. Y., & Perc, M. (2024) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20221613 · Cited by 94
“However, this result was not replicated in other experiments (Dreber et al. 2013, Eckel and Grossman 1996, Halvorsen 2015, Hauge et al. 2016).”
ResultPlaying with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation
Brekke, K. A., Hauge, K. E., Lind, J. T., & Nyborg, K. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.003 · Cited by 75
Leaver, C., Ozier, O. W., Serneels, P. M., & Zeitlin, A. D. (2021) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20191972 · Cited by 94
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.017 · Cited by 77
From personality to altruistic behavior (and back): Evidence from a double-blind dictator game
Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Hepp, J., Klein, S. A., & Zettler, I. (2014) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2014.12.004 · Cited by 75
Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men? Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator GamesPreprint
Heinz, M., Juranek, S., & Rau, H. A. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1698188 · Cited by 76
“These ndings seem to provide valuable new insights in terms of other-regarding preferences induced by a real-e ort task.(14) For the future, it seems to be promising to uncover further gender di erences in setups with real e ort tasks.”
The Selfishness Questionnaire: Egocentric, Adaptive, and Pathological Forms of Selfishness
Raine, A., & Uh, S. (2019) · Journal of Personality Assessment · doi:10.1080/00223891.2018.1455692 · Cited by 73
“Similar to one version of the dictator game (Eckel & Grossman, 1996), the recipient for this study was a charity foundation (Save the Children).”
The giving type: Identifying donors
de Oliveira, A. C. M., Croson, R. T. A., & Eckel, C. C. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.012 · Cited by 76
“Following Eckel and Grossman (2008), in the risk measure participants are asked to choose their most-preferred gamble from a series of six 50/50 gambles with varying payoff amounts: $80/$80, $60/$120, $40/$160, $20/$200, $0/$240, and $20/$260.”
Self-citationReconciling pro-social vs. selfish behavior: On the role of self-control
Martinsson, P., Myrseth, K. O. R., & Wollbrant, C. (2012) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500002278 · Cited by 67
“We designated the Colombian Red Cross as recipient, and each student was granted an endowment of 15,000 Colombian Pesos (e.g., similar to Eckel & Grossman, 1996).7 A session lasted on average about one hour, and average session earnings were 12,000 Colombian Pesos (including a 5,000 Peso show-up…”
MethodRational Choice Theory and Interest in the “Fortune of Others”
Paternoster, R., Jaynes, C. M., & Wilson, T. (2017) · Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency · doi:10.1177/0022427817707240 · Cited by 86
Dorner, Z. (2019) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102257 · Cited by 78
Butler, J. V., Serra, D., & Spagnolo, G. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3240 · Cited by 75
DO WEALTH DIFFERENCES AFFECT FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS?*
Armantier, O. (2006) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00383.x · Cited by 73
“Unlike Eckel and Grossman (1996), the differences in wealth, and the needs of participants are difficult to justify morally in the present study.”
Nonprofit watchdogs: Do they serve the average donor?
Cnaan, R. A., Jones, K. H., Dickin, A., & Salomon, M. (2011) · Nonprofit Management and Leadership · doi:10.1002/nml.20032 · Cited by 69
“All that is necessary for a donor to feel a warm glow is for that donor to deem an organization deserving (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundThe effect of charitable giving on workers’ performance: Experimental evidence
Charness, G., Cobo‐Reyes, R., & Sánchez, Á. (2016) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.009 · Cited by 67
“Eckel and Grossman (1996) propose an experiment employing the double-blind dictator game of Hoffman et al. (1994). Each dictator was asked to divide $10 between one’s self and a recipient. The two treatments differed in terms of the identity of the recipient. In Treatment 1, the recipient was an anonymous student in a…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCorruption, social judgment and culture: An experiment
Salmon, T. C., & Serra, D. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.004 · Cited by 75
“14Framing effects have been found in a large set of pro-social games, including public goods games (Andreoni (1995), Cookson (2000), Rege and Telle (2004), among the others), and dictator games (Eckel and Grossman (1996); Brañas-Garza (2007)).”
Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games
Johannesson, M., & Persson, B. (2000) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00283-4 · Cited by 70
“The procedure is the same as the design used by Hoffman et al. (1994); Hoffman et al. (1996) and Eckel and Grossman (1996, 1998), with some 1 2modifications.”
MethodResultInfluentialReligion and prosocial behaviour: a field test
Grossman, P. J., & Parrett, M. (2010) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/13504851003761798 · Cited by 71
“…games have tested for trusting behaviour and trustworthiness (Fehr et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2008; Tan and Vogel, 2008).1 The ambiguous findings may be because these studies were conducted in a sterile, context-free environment, but, as shown by Eckel and Grossman (1996), context does matter.”
BackgroundSelf-citationJustice and Fairness in the Dictator Game
Schurter, K., & Wilson, B. J. (2009) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.130 · Cited by 70
Thielmann, I., Heck, D. W., & Hilbig, B. E. (2016) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004605 · Cited by 69
“…containing a pre- specified monetary endowment, decide in private how much of this endowment to keep for themselves, and finally place the envelope with the remaining money for the recipient into a hidden ballot box (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein & Zettler, 2015).”
BackgroundBlaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics
Eckel, C. C., & Gintis, H. M. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.026 · Cited by 69
“In addition, using a 'deserving' recipient instead of a random student subject increases giving (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
Self-citationReputation Management: Evidence for Ability But Reduced Propensity in Autism
Cage, E., Pellicano, E., Shah, P., & Bird, G. (2013) · Autism Research · doi:10.1002/aur.1313 · Cited by 67
“…predicted that in the no motivation condition, when reputation is merely implied, typical adults, but not those with autism, would donate more in an attempt to manage their reputation— particularly when donating to charity as this recipient would be seen as more deserving [Eckel & Grossman, 1996].”
BackgroundKeeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load
Hauge, K. E., Brekke, K. A., Johansson, L., Johansson‐Stenman, O., & Svedsäter, H. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-015-9454-z · Cited by 65
“Eckel and Grossman (1996). The design largely followed that used by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), with the important modification that we measured the difference in generosity rather than self-control under cognitive load.”
BackgroundMethodAre Consumers Acting Fairly Toward Companies?
Jang, H., & Chu, W. (2012) · Journal of Macromarketing · doi:10.1177/0276146712448193 · Cited by 69
“We obtained data for Hoffman et al. (1994) from Eckel and Grossman (1996).”
MethodSelf-interest, sympathy and the origin of endowments
Cherry, T. L., & Shogren, J. F. (2008) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.04.007 · Cited by 66
“…b tween observation and standard game theory.3 But dictators earning the endowments inherently alters th symmetry of effort and possibly the perceived relative deservingnes of the players, which previous work argues may influence dictato offers (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Charness and Rabin, 2002).”
BackgroundResultMotivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment
D’Adda, G. (2011) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.06.006 · Cited by 71
“Experiments in the laboratory show that greater anonymity is associated with lower contributions in dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundBehavioral Economics, Economic Theory and Public PolicyPreprint
Altman, M. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1152105 · Cited by 74
The Human Face of Game Theory: Trust and Reciprocity in Sequential GamesPreprint
Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 64
Self-citationCan social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior?
Kamas, L., & Preston, A. E. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.017 · Cited by 62
The Effects of Perceived Anonymity on Altruistic Punishment
Piazza, J. R., & Bering, J. M. (2008) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470490800600314 · Cited by 62
“This is consistent with the position that women are more committed to norm enforcement than men (see Eckel and Grossman, 1996b).”
BackgroundResultImplicit racial bias and prosocial behavior
Štěpáníková, I., Triplett, J., & Simpson, B. (2011) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.02.004 · Cited by 65
Strong reciprocity and the welfare state
Fong, C. M., Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. M. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · Cited by 64
Altruism in individual and joint-giving decisions: What's gender got to do with it?
Kamas, L., Preston, A. E., & Baum, S. (2008) · Feminist Economics · doi:10.1080/13545700801986571 · Cited by 62
Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs
Gershon, R., Cryder, C., & John, L. K. (2020) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/0022243719888440 · Cited by 60
“Much of the research demonstrating the effectiveness of selfish (vs. prosocial or other-benefiting) incentives compares self-benefiting incentives with a contribution to a charity or unknown individual (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 1996; Imas 2014).”
BackgroundAre Women More Generous Than Men? A Meta-Analysis
Bilén, D., Dreber, A., & Johannesson, M. (2020) · Journal of the Economic Science Association · doi:10.1007/s40881-021-00105-9 · Cited by 68
“8 With “gender in the title”, we do not explicitly mean the word “gender”, so we include Eckel and Grossman (1998) that mention “women” and “men” in the title.”
Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?
Koch, A. K., & Normann, H. (2008) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00900.x · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
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