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Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
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“Fund allocation in the Dictator Game is considered a real-life test of altruism since it involves a ‘put your money where your mouth is’ decision where giving to another is both costly and not subject to strategic considerations of reciprocity; this is particularly the case when “Dictator” and “Recipient” identities are made anonymous [4].”
From The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund allocations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task (2009) · cites this paper as [4]
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“Generosity in the DG may also be enhanced by replacing anonymous recipient with a reputable charity institution [24] or the welfare of the recipient, presenting the desire to help [25].”
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Fong, C. M., & Luttmer, E. F. P. (2018) · doi:10.1184/r1/6571082 · Cited by 1
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“Second, giving in dictator games can be seen as a measure for altruism (compare e.g. Eckel and Grossman [66]), not a measure for valuation of work as it is in our study.”
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“Eckel and Grossman (1996) replaced the anonymous partner in a dictator game with a charity, the American Red Cross, as a partner for the first time.”
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“…Brønn and Vrioni 2001; Kim and Park 2011), corporate social presence may also have a positive impact on the performance of employees within the firm (e.g. Charness et al. 2016a, b; Crumpler and Grossman 2008; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Kajackaite and Sliwka 2017; Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2014a, b).”
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“For instance, the seminal work by Eckel and Grossman (1996) investigates contexts in which subjects make donations to others, but these studies do not attempt to directly investigate individuals’ motivations.”
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“…in some specific individuals in the population (helping some — possibly family members or people with merit — to the detriment of others) (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 1996), the desire to punish what is seen as incorrect (selfish, unethical, etc) behavior (Falk et al., 2005).”
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“Moreover, for independent nonstudent samples, Eckel and Grossman (1996) find that giving to a charity is significantly higher than donations to an anonymous individual.”
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“This study assesses this explanation by examining the relationship between contributing content online and generous behavior in the dictator game, a widely used measure of generosity (Bekkers, 2007; Eckel & Grossman, 1996).”
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“…need for help (Cirelli et al., 2014) or asking participants how much money they want to donate to someone else (e.g., dictator game, Bardsley, 2008; Eckel & Grossman, 1996) capitalize on actions rather than self-reports and are, thus, less prone to social desirability or self-interpretation…”
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“However, further research on the topic studying different variations of the dictator game offers alternative explanations for the observed positive transfers, which are consistent with self-regarding behavior—in particular, playing with earned money instead of a windfall endowment [8–14], earned entitlements [9], high…”
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“5 Our model is closely related to the relative payment model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (see also Bolton 1991, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) in which each player cares not only about his/her absolute monetary payoff, but also about the relative payoffs of the players.”
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“There is an established literature on the importance of double-blind protocol in preventing these peer-e¤ects in experiments (Ho¤man et al. 1996, Eckel and Grossman 1996).”
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The Endogenous Nature of Social PreferencesPreprint
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“(1994), Eckel and Grossman (1996), Rue (1998) and Bolton et. al.”
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“(1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996). go further to describe how the desirability of outcomes depends on the the actions required to implement them and, consequently, how pre-existing inequalities affect distributional preferences.”
BackgroundCircumstantial Risk: Impact of Future Tax Evasion and Labor Supply Opportunities on Risk ExposurePreprint
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“However, such behavior has also support by the results of previous papers, which find a higher tendency to donate where the recipient is a charity (e.g. Eckel & Grossman 1996, Konow 2010) or is otherwise deemed worthy (Fong 2007).”
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“…donations to organizations to induce them to care about an outcome independent of its monetary consequences is a standard approach in experimental economics (see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Imas, 2014; Bartling and Özdemir, 2017; DellaVigna and Pope, 2018; Cassar, 2019; Sutter et al., 2020).”
Experimentally Induced Empathy Does Not Affect Monetarily Incentivized Dictator Game BehaviorPreprint
Lönnqvist, J.-E., & Walkowitz, G. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3140006
“The game that best shows this incongruity is the Dictator Game (DG; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996), currently the most prominent paradigm used by economists to investigate why human behavior sometimes deviates from pure self-interest (Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998;…”
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Grodeck, B., & Grossman, P. J. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4010270 · Cited by 1
“A real donation dictator game (Eckel and Grossman, 1996): Participants are assigned to play in one of five randomly determined treatments.”
Self-citationFrohlich, N., & Oppenheimer, J. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_185 · Cited by 1
Corr, P. J., & Matthews, G. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108264822.001 · Cited by 1
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Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wayne State University (US)
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-191
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099209125
- Cited by
- 1,126
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 63 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 54 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- altruism, fairness, deservingness, charitable giving, donation behavior
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