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Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
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Metadata
- Authors
- Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 137-188
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146289454
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 42.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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