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Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1981
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 503-519
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2063021809
- Cited by
- 779
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 34.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.