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Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Harsanyi, J. C.
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1973-12
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W2093074200
- Cited by
- 887
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 0.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.