Cited by 371Academic and Historical Perspectives in PsychologyBehavioral and Psychological StudiesPhilosophy and History of Science

Mentalism, Behavior-Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the Purposes of Science

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Hayes, Steven C., Brownstein, Aaron J.·1986·The Behavior Analyst

Abstract

In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain philosophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue of behavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanistically, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some of the dangers of mentalism if not employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules.

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Crossref · 10.1007/bf03391944

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29 of 29 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Defusion emerged from the idea that thoughts do not automatically govern behavior and that contextual conditions are needed for such control.

    “An alternative to restructuring, defusion arose from the insight that thoughts do not necessarily exert control over behavior, with some contextual conditions being necessary to support this type of functional behavior-behavior relation (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986).”

    From A Process-Based Analysis of Cognitive Defusion in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (2023) · cites this paper as Hayes & Brownstein, 1986

    In “Mental Causality as Behavior-Behavior Relation” (page unavailable), the paper says that a relation between thinking and overt behavior requires analysis of the contingencies that produce it, supporting the claim that thoughts do not automatically control behavior. Our copy does not say that defusion arose from this insight or contrast defusion with restructuring. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • ACT is rooted in the pragmatic philosophy of functional contextualism.

    “ACT is rooted in the pragmatic philosophy of functional contextualism”

    From Acceptance and commitment therapy: model, processes and outcomes (2006) · cites this paper as Hayes & Brownstein, 1986

    In “Why Prediction Must Be Included and Control Emphasized” (page unavailable), the paper describes behavior analysis as contextualist and driven by a pragmatic theory of truth. It does not discuss ACT or establish that ACT is rooted in functional contextualism. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • From an ACT perspective, thoughts and feelings do not cause other actions, except as regulated by context.

    “From such a perspective, thoughts and feelings do not cause other actions, except as regulated by context”

    From Acceptance and commitment therapy: model, processes and outcomes (2006) · cites this paper as Hayes & Brownstein, 1986

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Cites

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3 of the 32 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Hayes, S. C., & Reese, H. W. (in press). A review of S. C. Pepper's "World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence." Journal ofthe Experimental Anal- ysis ofBehavior.
  2. Hayes, S. C., Rosenfarb, S. C., Wulfert, E., Korn, Z., & Zettle, R. D. (1985). Self-reinforcement procedures: Another way to set social standards? Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 18, 201- 214.
  3. Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. Berkeley: University of Califomia Press.
  4. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behav- ior. New York: Free Press.

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Authors
Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, A. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Nevada, Reno (US)
  • University of North Carolina at Greensboro (US)
Venue
The Behavior Analyst
Published
1986-10
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
175-190
ISSN
  • 0738-6729 (ISSN-L)
  • 2196-8918
OpenAlex
W1710715998
Cited by
371
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 8
FWCI
33.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Behavior Analyst (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Carolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (submittedVersion)
  • UNC Libraries
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Behavioral and Psychological Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
mentalism, prediction and control, behavior analysis, self-reinforcement, self-government, metatheory, philosophy of science

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