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Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy
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“This possibility led the European Parliament to propose”
From In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Solaiman 2017
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“All the challenges mentioned above culminate in the academic discourse about legal personality of robots 55 , which may lead to alarming narratives of technological totalitarianism.”
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“It is a kind of pretense in which legal systems can decide to engage, regardless of whether an entity really is a person (See examples in Solaiman 2017, pp. 3–4).”
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“To solve this problem, this article does not advocate that systems should be granted full legal-personhood [10] [64] [69] as this will come with a host of other problems, such as its being able to own property, sue (as well as being sued), and have its own legal rights.”
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“2010; Solaiman 2017; Bryson et al.”
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“Legal constraints may prevent some forms of delegation, demanding responsibility from humans (Solaiman, 2017).”
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“Granting AI and robots legal personhood would result in “exonerating humans from liability and thereby diluting the effectiveness of deterrence” (Solaiman, 2017, p. 177).”
BackgroundLet Me Take Over: Variable Autonomy for Meaningful Human Control
Methnani, L., Tubella, A. A., Dignum, V., & Theodorou, A. A. (2021) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2021.737072 · Cited by 85
“Although the systems themselves cannot be granted legal personhood and held accountable, the organisations and individuals who may be bene fi ting through their development, deployment, and use can (Bryson et al., 2017; Solaiman, 2017).”
BackgroundWhy robots should not be treated like animals
Johnson, D. G., & Verdicchio, M. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9481-5 · Cited by 64
“2 Some scholars, like Solaiman, turn to animals as a model to deny that robots should be granted personhood (Solaiman 2017).”
BackgroundThe sense of agency in human–AI interactions
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“One path dismisses any prospect of holding these systems responsible, arguing that the responsibility for algorithmic decisionmaking should be left to humans and not algorithms [99]; doing otherwise could lead to vast social and legal unrest [91].”
BackgroundThirty years of artificial intelligence and law: the third decade
Villata, S., Araszkiewicz, M., Ashley, K. D., Bench-Capon, T. J. M., Branting, L. K., Conrad, J. G., & Wyner, A. (2022) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-022-09327-6 · Cited by 71
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“In this way we can sidestep questions of the personhood of AI systems [57].”
BackgroundKuipers, B. (2018) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3173087 · Cited by 54
“35 Since society depends on cooperation, which depends on trust, if robots are to participate in society, they must be designed to be trustworthy.”
BackgroundCollecting the Public Perception of AI and Robot Rights
Lima, G., Kim, C., Ryu, S., Jeon, C., & Cha, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3415206 · Cited by 95
“Scholars have argued that adopting similar proposals would be neither beneficial, necessary, nor desirable [44].”
BackgroundInfluentialArtificial intelligence and moral rights
Miernicki, M., & Ng, I. (2020) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01027-6 · Cited by 70
“2017; Solaiman 2017), but also to legislative initiatives (Committee on Legal Affairs (2015).5 However, often times the discussion in this context centers on liability issues which are a different question from the grant of moral copyrights (Miernicki and Ng 2019); the attribution of liability is…”
BackgroundAI for Everyone? Critical Perspectives
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“…two key analogies are used when discussing the possibility of acknowledging legal personality or legal personhood for AI systems: one between AI and animals, and another between AI and juristic persons or collective subjects (Solaiman 2017; Chen and Burgess 2019; Kurki and Pietrzykowski 2017).”
BackgroundChen, J., & Burgess, P. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-018-9229-x · Cited by 39
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BackgroundSergey Ivanovich Zakhartsev is 45 years old
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“Many of them, in fact, are very common (Kaplan and Haenlein 2019; Solaiman 2017) and are present in every sector (Kurzweil 2005).”
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“31 Coleman (2001), 274 and Solaiman (2017).”
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“…intelligence robots reaches this stage sometime in the future, then it becomes highly persuasive to grant them an artificial legal personality, which suggests the ability to hold property, the right to sue and be sued, and the right to work and earn an income and to be paid on time (Solaiman 2017).”
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“…the requirements or attributes of legal personhood are: (1) a person shall be capable of being a subject of law; (2) being a legal subject entails the ability to exercise rights and to perform duties; and (3) the enjoyment of rights needs to exercise awareness and choice (Solaiman, 2017, p. 161).”
BackgroundKwanya, T. (2023) · Social and cultural studies of robots and AI · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08215-3_4 · Cited by 11
Monterossi, M. W. (2020) · Global Jurist · doi:10.1515/gj-2019-0054 · Cited by 10
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“Journal of Social Research Development, Volume 4, Issue 2, JUNE, 2023 389 how complex AI systems can be (Solaiman, 2017).”
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“Today, all human beings are legal persons, and non-human objects and abstractions such as rivers and corporations have limited forms of legal personhood (Bryson et al, 2017; Solaiman, 2017).”
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Mays, K. K., Cummings, J. J., & Katz, J. E. (2024) · International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1080/10447318.2024.2338332 · Cited by 10
“By some definitions, legal personhood is comprised not only of rights given but also of the rights holder’s duties (Solaiman, 2017), although this is not explicitly enshrined in the law (Kurki, 2019).”
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Subject Structure of the Offense in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robotics
Sidorova, A. V. (2019) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-27015-5_64 · Cited by 7
Kempers, E. B. (2022) · Transnational Environmental Law · doi:10.1017/s2047102522000139 · Cited by 7
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“Neuroderechos”, prueba neurocientífica y garantía de independencia judicial
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Inclusion of Humanoid Robots in Human Society: Ethical Issues
Chatila, R. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6046-2_147 · Cited by 6
Explaining the Punishment Gap of AI and Robots.
Lima, G., Cha, M., Jeon, C., & Park, K. (2020) · Cited by 6
The intelligent machine: a new metaphor through which to understand both corporations and AI
Laukyte, M. (2020) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01018-7 · Cited by 6
“Solaiman (2017, 35–36), for his part, argues that the legal personhood ascribed to corporations cannot be applied to robots because machines lack the “fundamental tenets of such legal recognition,” and those who liken robotic personhood to corporate and personhood ignore that, unlike the…”
BackgroundThe Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings
Jowitt, J. (2021) · Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics · doi:10.1017/s096318012000105x · Cited by 5
Spelz, J. F. D. (2021) · REVISTA IUS · doi:10.35487/rius.v15i48.2021.742 · Cited by 5
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The Punishment Gap: The Infeasible Public Attribution of Punishment to AI and RobotsPreprint
Lima, G., Cha, M., Jeon, C., & Park, K. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · Cited by 5
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Subjectivity
Księżak, P., & Wojtczak, S. (2023) · Law, governance and technology series · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-19447-4_2 · Cited by 4
Hybrid theory of corporate legal personhood and its application to artificial intelligence
Raskulla, S. (2023) · SN Social Sciences · doi:10.1007/s43545-023-00667-x · Cited by 10
Schweitzer, D. (2021) · Nature and Culture · doi:10.3167/nc.2020.160103 · Cited by 5
Liability Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles Accidents
Xue, C. (2021) · Advances in economics, business and management research/Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research · doi:10.2991/aebmr.k.210803.075 · Cited by 4
“A court could hold the autonomous vehicle itself liable for its actions depend on whether the autonomous vehicle can be treated as a juridical person.[10]”
BackgroundARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A SOCIAL REGULATOR: PROS AND CONS
Дремлюга, Р., & Koshel, A. S. (2018) · Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион Экономика политика право · doi:10.24866/1813-3274/2018-3/55-68 · Cited by 4
Rivers as Subjects and Indigenous Water Rights in Colombia
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“Roman law restricted the legal personality for a long time to the family’s head only.(7) The head of the family is the one who enjoys nature without the slaves, women, or children.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Solaiman, S. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Wollongong (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Solaiman, S. M.
- ORCID
- Solaiman, S. M.
- Venue
- Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Published
- 2016-11-14
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 155-179
- ISSN
- 0924-8463 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8382
- OpenAlex
- W2550953130
- Semantic Scholar
- 68f9887afdbe992e41d6eee4208ab15c2d51cdcf
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 5
- FWCI
- 69.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Artificial Intelligence and Law (publishedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Health and Safety Executive
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Law › Animal Law and Welfare
- Keywords
- legal personality, robots, industrial robots, corporate personality, idols, animal personality, personhood, liability, autonomous robots
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