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Cited by 181

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Understanding as representation manipulability

Wilkenfeld, Daniel A. · 2013 · Synthese

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Citations

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Show all 5 references

Research works printed but not linked: 25

  1. Bechtel W. (2008) Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. Routledge/Laurence Erlbaum Associates, New York
  2. Churchland P. M. (1989) A neurocomputational perspective. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
  3. de Regt H.W. (2009) nderstanding and scientific explanation. In: Regt H.W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (eds) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA
  4. de Regt H. W., Dieks D. (2005) A contextual approach to scientific understanding. Synthese 144(1): 137–170 · DOI · Paper page
  5. de Regt H. W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (2009) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA
  6. Grimm S.R. (2006) Is understanding A species of knowledge?. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(3): 515–535 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Hempel C. G. (1965) Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science by carl G. hempel. Free Press, New York
  8. Holyoak K., Thagard P. (2002) Analogical mapping by constraint satisfaction. In: Polk T.A., Seifert C.M. (eds) Cognitive modeling. MA, MIT Press, Cambridge
  9. Kim, J. (1994). Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. Philosophical Issues, Vol. 5: Truth and Rationality, 51–69. · DOI · Paper page
  10. Kitcher P. (1989) Scientific understanding and the causal structure of the world. In: Kitcher P., Salmon W. (eds) Scientific explanation. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 410–505
  11. Knuuttila T., Merz M. (2009) Understanding by modeling: An objectual approach. In: Regt H.W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (eds) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh PA
  12. Koslowski, B., Marasia, J., Chelenza, M., & Dublin, R. (2008). Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework Cognitive Development (Special Issue on Scientific Reasoning) · DOI
  13. Kvanvig J. L. (2003) The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK · DOI · Paper page
  14. Larson R. K., Segal G. (1995) Knowledge of meaning: An introduction to semantic theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA · DOI
  15. Lenhard J. (2009) The great deluge: Simulation modeling and scientific understanding. In: Regt H.W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (eds) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA
  16. Lipton P. (2009) Understanding without explanation. In: Regt H.W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (eds) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA
  17. Lombrozo T. (2009) Explanation and categorization: How “why?” informs “what?”. Cognition 110: 248–253 · DOI
  18. Newell A., Simon H. A. (2000) GPS, a program that simulates human thought. In: Cummins R., Cummins D. D. (eds) Minds, brains, and computers. McGraw-Hill, New York, pp 69–84
  19. Pitt D. (2004) The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(1): 1–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x · DOI · Paper page
  20. Salmon W. C. (1984) Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
  21. Trout J. D. (2002) Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. Philosophy of Science 69(2): 212–233 · DOI · Paper page
  22. Trout J. D. (2005) Paying the price for a theory of explanation: De regt’s discussion of trout. Philosophy of Science 72: 198–208 · DOI
  23. Woodward J. (2004) Making things happen. Oxford University Press, New York · DOI · Paper page
  24. Ylikoski P. (2009) The illusion of depth of understanding in science. In: Regt H.W., Leonelli S., Eigner K. (Eds) (eds) Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA
  25. Zagzebski L. (2001) Recovering understanding. In: Steup M. (eds) Knowledge, truth, and duty: Essays on epistemic justification. Oxford University Press, New York

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Wilkenfeld, D. A.
Venue
Synthese
Published
2011-12-13
Volume
190
Issue
6
Pages
997-1016
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W2011122440
Cited by
181
References
5
FWCI
13.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding as representation manipulability. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x
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Wilkenfeld, D. A. (2013). Understanding as representation manipulability. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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