The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.
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“Ecological psychology and the FEP have often been framed as competing frameworks for cognitive science (Bruineberg et al., 2022; though for an argument to the contrary, see Bruineberg et al., 2018), given that the former rejects representational notions, and the latter relies on them extensively.”
From A potential mechanism for Gibsonian resonance: behavioral entrainment emerges from local homeostasis in an unsupervised reservoir network (2024) · cites this paper as Bruineberg et al., 2018
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“The free-energy principle then reveals the deep continuity between mind and life that Clark (2013) has hinted at as being reminiscent of enactive approaches towards life and mind20 (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Stewart et al. 2010; Colombetti 2013; Di Paolo et al. 2010).”
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“On the other hand, the free-energy principle is consistentwithmany other accounts of self-organizing (living) systems such as synergetics (Tschacher and Haken2007), global brain dynamics (Freeman1987, 2000),metastability (Kelso2012; Rabinovich et al. 2008), autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980;…”
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Self-citationAnswering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation
Ramstead, M. J. D., Badcock, P. B., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2017.09.001 · Cited by 354
“This inferential aspect leads us to notions like embodied inference [44,45], the Bayesian brain [46], the Bayesian cell [27], and even a Bayesian culture [29,47].”
Generalised free energy and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w · Cited by 236
A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference
Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319862774 · Cited by 220
“As such, generative models are more about the control and regulation of action than they are about figuring out what is ‘out there’ beyond the veil of sensory impressions, and representing the world (Anderson, 2017; Bruineberg et al., 2016).”
BackgroundActive inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition
Gallagher, S., & Allen, M. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 · Cited by 214
“On the one hand, it has been argued, the general framework of the predictive model (specifically the free-energy principle, and the concept of active inference) is consistent with autopoietic enactivist views (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. 2016; Kirchhoff 2016).”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Amsterdam University Medical Centers (NL)
- Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Bruineberg, Jelle
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2016-10-21
- Volume
- 195
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2417-2444
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- PMC
- PMC6438652
- OpenAlex
- W2534098824
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 90
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 22.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Pure Amsterdam UMC (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Pure Amsterdam UMC (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- NWO (276-20-019)
- European Research Council (ERC-StG679190)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- free energy principle, active inference, predictive coding, unconscious inference, Bayesian inference, self-organization, hypothesis testing, perception
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.