Cited by 15Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of Science

Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate

Open access
Colombo, Matteo·2018·Synthese

Abstract

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms-or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11229-017-1427-7

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  • Without direct empirical markers of prediction error precision or falsifiable predictions about symptom onset or treatment response, Bayesian models of schizophrenia offer little more than descriptive reinterpretation.

    “Without direct empirical markers of prediction error precision or falsifiable predictions about symptom onset or treatment response, such models offer little more than descriptive reinterpretation (Bowers and Davis 2012; Colombo 2018).”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Colombo 2018

    The Conclusion (page unavailable) discusses Bayesianism as a modelling approach to the acquisition of psychological traits, not models of schizophrenia. Searches for schizophrenia, prediction-error precision, empirical markers, and symptom onset or treatment response found no passage addressing the attributed claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Fodor J Fodor J The present status of the innate controversy RePresentations 1981 Cambridge MA MIT Press 257 316
  2. Lorenz KZ Evolution & the modification of behaviour 1965 Chicago University of Chicago Press

Cited by

Sorted by citations

  • The myth of the Bayesian brain

    Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6 · Cited by 14 · see citing works

    “Other critiques have highlighted the difficulty of empirically constraining priors and loss functions in perceptual models (Colombo 2018), and the problematic metaphysical overreach of the Free Energy Principle in its attempts to explain life, cognition, and action through a single variational…”

Authors
Colombo, M.
Affiliations
Tilburg University (NL)
Corresponding author
Colombo, Matteo
Venue
Synthese
Published
2017-05-22
Volume
195
Issue
11
Pages
4817-4838
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W2611485873
Cited by
15
References
103
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3
FWCI
0.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Tilburg University
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
Bayesianism, nativism, empiricism, predictive processing, language of thought, cognitive mechanisms, philosophy of mind

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