Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; 7 of the 53 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI) was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatalism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solutionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities.
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Overview
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TL;DR
The paper argues that the AI responsibility gap is not one problem but at least four interconnected gaps—culpability, moral accountability, public accountability, and active responsibility—arising from technical, organisational, legal, ethical, and societal sources. It critiques fatalist, deflationist, and solutionist responses and sketches a comprehensive approach based on designing sociotechnical systems for meaningful human control.
Key findings
- The responsibility gap should be reframed as at least four interconnected problems: gaps in culpability, moral accountability, public accountability, and active responsibility; these can occur with non-learning systems too and have multiple sources, some technical, organisational, legal, ethical, and societal.
- Current partial approaches distort the problem: “fatalism” treats it as new and intractable; “deflationism” dismisses it as not new and not a problem; “solutionism” treats it as solvable by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools, with risks of “technical solutionism” and “legal solutionism.”
- The paper proposes meaningful human control (MHC) as a more comprehensive design-oriented approach, with two major conditions: “tracking” (the sociotechnical system responds to relevant human reasons and facts) and “tracing” (for each relevant action, at least one human agent along the design, development, and use chain has sufficient knowledge and moral awareness/capacity).
- It illustrates the gaps and proposed approach with examples including automated driving systems, AI-driven medical diagnosis, algorithmic public administration, and the Uber automated vehicle accident.
Methods
- Conceptual/normative analysis and critical literature review in moral and legal philosophy and ethics of technology; no empirical data collection or sample is reported.
- The analysis draws on philosophical, legal, and sociological theories of responsibility (e.g., Hart, Bovens, van de Poel, Gardner) to distinguish four forms of responsibility and map corresponding gaps and causes.
- It uses illustrative cases—automated driving, medical diagnosis, public administration, and the Uber accident—to show how gaps arise and how MHC tracking/tracing might address them.
Limitations
- Stated: the MHC proposal is a sketch; future research will develop it in more detail, and future philosophical, empirical, and technical work must clarify which responsibility gaps emerge in different systems and contexts and the extent to which MHC may effectively address them.
- Evident: the paper is conceptual and does not empirically test or operationalize MHC; its examples are illustrative rather than a systematic empirical sample.
- Evident: the critical review is described as a “representative sample” of the literature, not a systematic review.
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Claims the paper makes
6 Valid · 3 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 62 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Moral accountability also has an instrumental value.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Collingridge, 1980 matched to “The Social Control of Technology” (1982) source
- Could not verifycites Genus and Stirling (2018) matched to “Collingridge and the dilemma of control: Towards responsible and accountable innovation” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction discusses ethical responsibility and accountability, but does not say that moral accountability has instrumental value. The Conclusion contrasts responsibility as a struggle against incumbent power with instrumental facilitation; it does not establish or explicitly deny the claimed value. Searches for “moral accountability” and “instrumental value accountability” found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Stilgoe et al., 2013 matched to “Developing a framework for responsible innovation” (2013) source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Most of these discussions point to the fact that algorithmic decision-making is often difficult to understand for - and explain to - human agents, due to the different, and sometimes inscrutable for persons, ways of AI operations: the so-called 'black box' problem (Castelvecchi, 2016).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Castelvecchi, 2016 matched to “Can we open the black box of AI?” (2016) source
The unlabelled opening passage describes neural networks as opaque and says their stored information is exceedingly difficult to decipher. The “ILLUSTRATION BY SIMON PRADES” passage explicitly calls this the black-box problem and says it can be difficult for humans to understand how such systems work or for the systems to explain themselves. The source discusses AI, particularly deep-learning neural networks, rather than every algorithmic decision system. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Nor does this approach incentivise engineers to go beyond the current state of art in technology and look for innovative solutions which may improve the capabilities of current technology to better satisfy complex and potentially conflicting societal demands (Van den Hoven et al., 2012) such as, for instance, higher levels of safety combined with better predictability etc.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Van den Hoven et al., 2012 matched to “Engineering and the Problem of Moral Overload” (2012) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says the standard response to conflicting engineering requirements is to weigh values and make trade-offs, while technical solutions are sometimes overlooked. “Moral Residues as Motors for Technological Innovation” argues that engineers should seek more advanced technology when current technology cannot meet their obligations. The paper does not specifically say that an old-style division of labour fails to incentivise engineers to do so. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Partly supported
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In the paper
“By using Mecacci and Santoni de Sio's (2020) approach, we can more easily identify other actors whose higher-level plans and goals played or could have played a control role in the story, and may therefore have some form of responsibility in it.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Mecacci and Santoni de Sio's (2020) matched to “Meaningful human control as reason-responsiveness: the case of dual-mode vehicles” (2020) source
Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The general concern is that AI may make individual persons less able to understand, explain, and reflect upon their own and other agents' behaviour. Let us call this the moral accountability gap .”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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Heikoop, D. D., Hagenzieker, M., Mecacci, G., Calvert, S., Santoni De Sio, F., & van Arem, B. (2019) · Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science · doi:10.1080/1463922x.2019.1574931 · Cited by 41 · cited 1×
“…2015; Moyes, 2016; Schwarz, 2018), MHC has been recently investigated in the field of automated driving systems (Calvert et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Heikoop et al., 2019; Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) and medical automation (Braun et al., 2020; Ficuciello et…”
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“…Ekelhof, 2019; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015; Moyes, 2016; Schwarz, 2018), MHC has been recently investigated in the field of automated driving systems (Calvert et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Heikoop et al., 2019; Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) and medical automation…”
BackgroundSelf-citationGaps in the Control of Automated Vehicles on Roads
Calvert, S. C., van Arem, B., Heikoop, D. D., Hagenzieker, M., Mecacci, G., & de Sio, F. S. (2020) · IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/mits.2019.2926278 · Cited by 41 · cited 1×
“…Ekelhof, 2019; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015; Moyes, 2016; Schwarz, 2018), MHC has been recently investigated in the field of automated driving systems (Calvert et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Heikoop et al., 2019; Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) and medical automation…”
BackgroundSelf-citationEngineers and Active Responsibility
Pesch, U. (2015) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-014-9571-7 · Cited by 38 · cited 7×
“Institutions like the modern state, the market, and science, have since the time of their birth been the object of systematic intellectual reflection by statesmen, scientists, philosophers, etc., and they were therefore seen and built according to a complex “intellectual template” ((Pesch, 2015),p 930).”
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Full platoon control in Truck Platooning: A Meaningful Human Control perspective
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“…Ekelhof, 2019; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015; Moyes, 2016; Schwarz, 2018), MHC has been recently investigated in the field of automated driving systems (Calvert et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Heikoop et al., 2019; Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) and medical automation…”
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“Also from a normative point of view, courts being “dictated to” by experts were considered as a dangerous shift towards technocracy and not in line with a “right-based” society (Mulheron, 2010).”
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Ali, S., Abuhmed, T., El-Sappagh, S., Muhammad, K., Alonso-Moral, J. M., Confalonieri, R., Guidotti, R., Del Ser, J., Díaz-Rodríguez, N., & Herrera, F. (2023) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2023.101805 · Cited by 1,762
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REVIEWING THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AI IN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES
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Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2021-05-14
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1057-1084
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W3160005967
- Cited by
- 490
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 165 · 2025: 117 · 2024: 88 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 13
- FWCI
- 64.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- Research Repository (Delft University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (MVI.16.044)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- responsibility gap, artificial intelligence, moral culpability, accountability, learning automata, fatalism, deflationism, solutionism, meaningful human control, socio-technical systems, ethics of technology, legal theory, ethics
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
