The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“In this model ostracizing noncooperators is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium and, hence, rational for selfish group members.”
From Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000) · cites this paper as Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989)
In the citing paper
“Our work is also related to the interesting study of Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) who show that, if there are opportunities for ostracizing non-cooperators, rational egoists can maintain cooperation for T-1 periods in a T-period Prisoner's Dilemma.”
From Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000) · cites this paper as Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989)
Citations
Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- Akerlof, 1976, The economics of caste and of the rat race and other woeful tales, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 599, 10.2307/1885324 · DOI
- Akerlof, 1980, A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 749, 10.2307/1885667 · DOI · Paper page
- Bendor, 1987, Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action, American Political Science Review, 81, 129, 10.2307/1960782 · DOI
- Boehm, 1985, Execution within the clan as an extreme form of ostracism, Social Science Information, 24, 309, 10.1177/053901885024002005 · DOI
- Fudenberg, 1986, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information, Econometrica, 54, 533, 10.2307/1911307 · DOI · Paper page
- Gruter, 1985, Ostracism on trial: The limits of individual rights, Social Science Information, 24, 101, 10.1177/053901885024001005 · DOI
- Kessel, 1958, Price discrimination in medicine, Journal of Law and Economics, 1, 20, 10.1086/466540 · DOI
- Masters, 1984, Ostracism, voice and exit: The biology of social participation, Social Science Information, 23, 877, 10.1177/053901884023006001 · DOI
- Rasmusen, 1987, A new version of the folk theorem,
- Romer, 1984, The theory of social custom: A modification and some extensions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 717, 10.2307/1883122 · DOI
- Thompson, 1981, A pure theory of strategic behavior and social institutions, American Economic Review, 71, 366
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Punishment in animal societies
Clutton-Brock, T. H., & Parker, G. A. (1995) · Nature · doi:10.1038/373209a0 · Cited by 1,043
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2008) · The Innate Mind, Volume 3 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019 · Cited by 650
Allen, N. B., & Badcock, P. B. T. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.6.887 · Cited by 494
The impact of personality on behavior in five Prisoner's Dilemma games
Boone, C., De Brabander, B., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (1999) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(99)00012-4 · Cited by 217
Information technology, Repeated Contracts, and the Number of Suppliers
Aral, S., Bakos, Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2631 · Cited by 65
Taking charge and stepping in: Individuals who punish are rewarded with prestige and dominance
Redhead, D., Dhaliwal, N., & Cheng, J. T. (2021) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12581 · Cited by 53
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50
Ziegler, R. (2008) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2007.10.001 · Cited by 35
Reischmann, A., & Oechssler, J. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Hirshleifer, D., & Rasmusen, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1989-08
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-106
- ISSN
- 0167-2681
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
