Cited by 68Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentFace Recognition and PerceptionCognitive Functions and Memory

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: Evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, “reality-unknown” false belief and false photograph tasks

Apperly, Ian A., Samson, Dana, Chiavarino, Claudia, Bickerton, Wai-Ling, Humphreys, Glyn W.·2007·Cognition

Abstract

To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.04.012

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Authors
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Bickerton, W.-L., & Humphreys, G. W.
Affiliations
University of Birmingham (GB)
Corresponding author
Apperly, Ian A.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007-05
Volume
103
Issue
2
Pages
300-321
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2111460981
Cited by
68
References
51
Citations by year
2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
FWCI
9.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Libraries (submittedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Leverhulme Trust
  • Stroke Association
  • Medical Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
Keywords
theory of mind, false belief reasoning, domain specificity, brain injury, executive function, social cognition
MeSH terms
Adult, Aged, Brain, Cognition Disorders, Culture, Female, Humans, Functional Laterality, Middle Aged, Neuropsychological Tests, Nonverbal Communication, Psychological Theory, Severity of Illness Index, Social Perception, Visual Perception, Stroke, Encephalitis, Herpes Simplex

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