Inferences about mental states
Open accessAbstract
Human social cognition relies on an ability to predict what others will think, feel or do in novel situations. Research in social neuroscience has consistently observed several brain regions that contribute ubiquitously to these abilities, including medial prefrontal cortex and aspects of lateral and medial parietal cortex. Interestingly, parallel work has suggested that this same network of regions subserves several seemingly distinct phenomena—notably, the abilities to remember the past, imagine the future and visualize spatial layouts—suggesting the existence of a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience. This use of self-projection to understand others' minds requires perceivers to solve three distinct cognitive challenges: (i) generating a simulated facsimile of one's own hypothetical mental states in a given situation, (ii) suppressing one's own current mental states, and (iii) deciding on the appropriateness of simulated states for understanding a particular other person. The present paper reviews recent psychology and neuroscience research aimed at understanding the underlying mechanisms that allow humans to solve each of these cognitive challenges to use self-projection to predict and understand the mental states of others.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This review argues that humans infer others’ mental states partly through self-projection, supported by a shared MPFC/TPJ/medial parietal network also used for episodic memory, prospection, and spatial navigation. It outlines three challenges—simulating one’s own hypothetical states, suppressing one’s current states, and judging whether self is a valid proxy—and reviews evidence on similarity, preference prediction, and TPJ-mediated self–other distinction.
Key findings
- Mentalizing consistently engages medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and medial parietal cortex; the same network is implicated in remembering the past, imagining the future, and spatial navigation, suggesting a common self-projection process.
- Self-projective mentalizing is restricted to similar others: ventral MPFC tracks perceived similarity during mentalizing, and repetition suppression occurs in ventral MPFC for self-judgments following judgments of a similar other but not a dissimilar other.
- Predicting one’s own preferences engages ventral MPFC; patients with ventral MPFC damage show inconsistent preferences (e.g., A>B, B>C, but C>A), and less ventral MPFC activity accompanies far-future versus next-24-hours preference judgments, correlating with greater impatience for immediate rewards (e.g., willingness to wait one month for a larger payment).
- TPJ is implicated in suppressing one’s own mental states during false-belief reasoning and in non-social attentional reorienting, suggesting a shared suppression/reorienting process.
Methods
- Review article synthesizing psychology and neuroscience research; no new primary data or sample are reported.
- Draws on fMRI, lesion, TMS, neuropsychological patient studies, repetition suppression, false-belief tasks, and attentional reorienting tasks.
- Main analysis is a narrative synthesis linking brain regions to the cognitive challenges of self-projection.
Limitations
- The paper states that how perceivers infer mental states of dissimilar others remains an unsettled challenge, that the exact cognitive process of TPJ has yet to be fully uncovered, and that additional work is needed to support the suggestion that self-preference prediction relies on simulation.
- The paper states that relatively little research has directly examined how perceivers suppress their own mental states.
- Evident from the text: as a review, conclusions depend on cited studies, some listed as submitted or in press, and no systematic meta-analysis or new empirical test is provided.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 46 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
Significantly less ventral MPFC activity accompanied predictions about the far future compared with the present.
“As predicted, significantly less ventral MPFC activity accompanied predictions about the far future, consistent with the possibility that participants failed to project themselves fully into another time and place when considering distant events.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
The minimum amount a participant would wait for was directly related to the degree to which ventral MPFC differentiated between present and future judgements.
“Critically, the minimum amount necessary for which a participant would wait (a measure of how impatient that participant was for the immediate reward) was directly related to the degree to which the ventral MPFC differentiated between judgements in the present and the future, suggesting that impatient participants may have failed to adequately simulate the experience of receiving the larger reward”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
The extent to which ventral MPFC activity differentiated between present and future preferences correlated significantly with participants' unwillingness to wait for a larger payment instead of taking a smaller, immediate one.
“More intriguingly, the extent to which this ventral MPFC activity differentiated between present and future preferences correlated significantly with participants' unwillingness to wait for a larger payment instead of taking a smaller, immediate one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Abstract
Self-projection to understand others' minds requires generating a simulated facsimile of one's own hypothetical mental states in a given situation.
“This use of self-projection to understand others' minds requires perceivers to solve three distinct cognitive challenges: (i) generating a simulated facsimile of one's own hypothetical mental states in a given situation”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
The pattern of activation in MPFC/TPJ/medial parietal during mentalizing is observed regardless of whether inferences are prompted by stories, cartoons, competitive/economic games, or task instructions.
“Researchers have observed this pattern of activation regardless of whether mental state inferences are prompted by stories (Fletcher et al. 1995; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; Saxe & Wexler 2005; Saxe & Powell 2006; Mitchell 2008), cartoons (Castelli et al. 2000, 2002; Gallagher et al. 2000; Martin & Weisberg 2003; Wheatley et al. 2007)”
- Also stated in: § 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing · plain
“in the context of competitive and economic games (McCabe et al. 2001; Gallagher et al. 2002), or by task instructions to think about a specific person's mind (Goel et al. 1995; Mitchell et al. 2004, 2005b, 2006a).”
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- cites Castelli et al. 2000
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- cites McCabe et al. 2001
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- Also stated in: § 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing · plain
- Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Studies have established a small and highly reliable network of regions preferentially engaged when perceivers mentalize about the minds of others, including MPFC, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex.
“Such studies have established a small and highly reliable network of regions that is preferentially engaged when perceivers mentalize about the minds of others. Most notably, these areas include the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial parietal cortex.”
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- cites Saxe & Kanwisher 2003
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- cites Castelli et al. 2000
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- Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
In Jenkins et al. 2008, self-reports following judgements of a similar other showed the same repetition suppression pattern in ventral MPFC as repeated self-judgements.
“Critically, this same pattern was observed for self-reports that followed judgements of a similar other”
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- Interpretationcitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
This provides additional evidence that perceivers rely on the same processes when thinking about their own preferences or those of a like-minded individual.
“providing additional evidence that perceivers rely on the same processes when thinking about their own preferences or those of a like-minded individual.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia have pronounced atrophy in medial frontal regions.
“Moreover, patients with the frontal variant of frontotemporal dementia, who typically experience gross changes in social behaviour and mentalizing ability, have been shown to have particularly pronounced atrophy in medial frontal regions (Bozeat et al. 2000; McKhann et al. 2001; Gregory et al. 2002; Salmon et al. 2003).”
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- cites Gregory et al. 2002
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- Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Mentalizing difficulties arise reliably when TMS creates transient functional lesions of MPFC or TPJ.
“Likewise, mentalizing difficulties arise reliably when transcranial magnetic stimulation is used to create transient ‘functional lesions’ of the MPFC (Lev-Ran et al. submitted) or the TPJ (Young et al. submitted).”
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- cites Young et al. submitted
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- Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
The same pattern of medial frontal, temporo-parietal and medial parietal activity accompanies prospection, episodic memory, and spatial navigation.
“Most notably, these regions are engaged by attempts to prospectively imagine the future or to retrospectively remember the past (Addis et al. 2007; Buckner & Carroll 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Spreng et al. in press).”
- Also stated in: § 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing · hedged
“In addition, the same network has also been argued to play a role in spatial navigation (Buckner & Carroll 2007; Spreng et al. in press).”
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- cites Buckner & Carroll 2007
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- cites Spreng et al. in press
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- Also stated in: § 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing · hedged
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
Using one's predictions about self as a proxy for others only works when one can reasonably assume that another person will have similar responses to a situation.
“Using one's predictions about self as a proxy for others only works when one can reasonably assume that another person will have similar responses to a situation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
Recent studies suggest that perceivers restrict projective mentalizing to targets perceived as similar to self.
“Using the involvement of the MPFC as one benchmark for whether one has deployed self-projection as a basis for mental state inference, a number of recent studies have suggested that perceivers do indeed restrict projective mentalizing to those targets perceived as similar to self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Mitchell et al. 2005a
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- cites Mitchell et al. 2006b
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- cites Jenkins et al. 2008
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Involvement of the MPFC can serve as a benchmark for whether self-projection has been deployed.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
The fact that prospection, episodic memory, spatial navigation and mentalizing each draws on the same set of brain regions suggests that each draws on a common set of cognitive processes.
“The fact that prospection, episodic memory, spatial navigation and mentalizing each draws on the same set of brain regions suggests that each likewise draws on a common set of cognitive processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Overlapping activation of the same brain regions across tasks indicates that the tasks draw on a common set of cognitive processes.
- Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
The same ventral MPFC region implicated in the similarity study has been implicated repeatedly in earlier studies of self-referential thought.
“Importantly, this same region of ventral MPFC has been implicated repeatedly in earlier studies of self-referential thought, in which participants were instructed to report on their own, first-person mental states, preferences or personality traits (Johnson et al. 2002; Kelley et al. 2002; Macrae et al. 2004; Schmitz et al. 2004; Vogeley et al. 2004; Moran et al. 2006).”
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- cites Kelley et al. 2002
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- cites Macrae et al. 2004
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- Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
In Mitchell et al. 2006b, reporting one's own preferences or judging those of a similar other was associated with activity in a ventral MPFC region nearly identical to the one observed for similar others in the first study.
“Critically, reporting one's own preferences or judging those of the similar other was associated with activity in a ventral MPFC region that was nearly identical to the one observed for similar others in the first study”
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Involvement of the MPFC can serve as a benchmark for whether self-projection has been deployed.
- Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
In Mitchell et al. 2005a, a ventral MPFC region responded preferentially to photographs of people perceived to be similar to the participant, but only during the mentalizing task.
“Analyses identified brain areas in which activity correlated with subsequent ratings of similarity, revealing that a ventral MPFC region responded preferentially to photographs of people perceived to be similar to the participant, but only during the mentalizing task.”
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Involvement of the MPFC can serve as a benchmark for whether self-projection has been deployed.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Mentalizing may rely heavily on the same constructive, projection-based processes as other tasks that draw on this network.
“That is, mentalizing may rely heavily on the same kinds of constructive, projection-based processes as do other tasks that draw on this network of brain regions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Impairments in social knowledge follow lesions to either MPFC or TPJ.
“Impairments in social knowledge follow lesions to either the MPFC (Stone et al. 1998; Bird et al. 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2004, 2006) or the TPJ (Apperly et al. 2004, 2006).”
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- cites Apperly et al. 2004
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- Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
In Jenkins et al. 2008, reporting one's own preference immediately following an initial judgement of self was associated with significant reductions of ventral MPFC activity.
“Reporting one's own preference immediately following an initial judgement of self was associated with significant reductions of ventral MPFC activity, demonstrating that this region does indeed show repetition suppression for repeated stimuli.”
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- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
If a perceiver views herself as dissimilar from a target, her use of self-projective mentalizing may be wholly inappropriate.
“If a perceiver views herself as dissimilar from a target individual, her use of self-projective mentalizing may be wholly inappropriate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
In Addis et al., both prospection and episodic memory engaged a highly overlapping network including MPFC, bilateral TPJ, and medial parietal cortex.
“For example, Addis et al. asked participants alternately to imagine their future self experiencing a specific event (cued by an object, such as ‘dress’) or to recall an actual event that occurred in their past. Both prospection and episodic memory engaged a highly overlapping network of regions that included MPFC, bilateral TPJ and medial parietal cortex.”
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- Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizing
Autism is linked to decreased metabolic activity in MPFC.
“Autism, defined centrally as a social-cognitive deficit (APA 1994; Baron-Cohen 1995), has been linked to decreased metabolic activity in the MPFC (Kennedy et al. 2006).”
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- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
When an assumption of self-other similarity cannot be made, perceivers will decline to project themselves into the mental experience of the other person.
“By contrast, when an assumption of self–other similarity cannot be made, perceivers will decline to project themselves into the mental experience of the other person.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
Together, these data suggest that perceivers selectively deploy self-referential strategies for mentalizing only when they can reasonably use their own mental states as a proxy for those of another (i.e. similar) person.
“Together, these data suggest that perceivers selectively deploy self-referential strategies for mentalizing only when they can reasonably use their own mental states as a proxy for those of another (i.e. similar) person.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
These observations suggest that when asked to calculate their own preferences, respondents may begin by simulating themselves enmeshed in the relevant situation and reading off the kinds of feelings they expect to have about it.
“These observations are suggestive that, when asked to calculate their own preferences, respondents may begin by (either consciously or unconsciously) simulating themselves enmeshed in the relevant situation and reading off the kinds of feelings they expect to have about it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
Neuropsychological patients with damage to ventral MPFC show considerable instability in their reported preferences.
“Consistent with the observation that the ventral MPFC subserves predictions about one's own likes and dislikes, neuropsychological patients with damage to this region show considerable instability in their reported preferences.”
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- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
We must first conjure up the actual feeling states that accompany a particular experience or think the thoughts that might arise in a given scenario before we can extend those simulated feelings and thoughts to another person.
“That is, we must first conjure up the actual feeling states that accompany a particular experience or think the thoughts that might arise in a given scenario before we can proceed to extend those simulated feelings and thoughts to another person.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
When the same participants alternately performed both an attentional reorienting task and a false belief task, the very same region of the TPJ was engaged.
“Indeed, when the same participants alternately performed both this kind of attentional reorienting task and the false belief task, the very same region of the TPJ was engaged (Mitchell 2008), suggesting that these two seemingly disparate tasks actually draw on the same cognitive process.”
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- Premisecitation§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
The same region of the TPJ implicated in reasoning about false beliefs has been observed repeatedly during non-social tasks that require participants to reorient spatial attention away from a salient distractor.
“Interestingly, the same region of the TPJ implicated in reasoning about false beliefs has been observed repeatedly during non-social tasks that require participants to reorient spatial attention away from a salient distractor (Corbetta et al. 2000, 2005; Corbetta & Shulman 2002; Shulman et al. 2002; Astafiev et al. 2003, 2006; Kincade et al. 2005; Serences et al. 2005).”
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- cites Corbetta & Shulman 2002
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- cites Shulman et al. 2002
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- Interpretationcitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
This pattern suggests that perceivers spontaneously computed their own mental states in considering a like-minded individual.
“suggesting that perceivers also spontaneously computed their own mental states in considering those of a like-minded individual.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
The TPJ is consistently observed when perceivers encounter someone whose mental states conflict with their own.
“This region has been observed consistently when perceivers encounter someone whose mental states conflict with their own, suggesting a role for this region in tracking the differences between self and other.”
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- cites Saxe & Wexler 2005
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- cites Saxe & Powell 2006
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- Interpretationcitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
This suggests participants did not spontaneously consult their own self-based knowledge when judging a person perceived to be dissimilar.
“suggesting that participants did not spontaneously consult their own self-based knowledge when judging a person perceived to be dissimilar.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 3. The effect of perceived similarity on self-projective mentalizing
In Jenkins et al. 2008, when participants judged self after a dissimilar other, significant activation above baseline was observed in ventral MPFC.
“By contrast, when participants judged self after a dissimilar other, significant activation above baseline was observed in the ventral MPFC”
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- Premisecitation§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
Lesions to the TPJ impair reasoning about false beliefs.
“and lesions to TPJ impair reasoning about false beliefs (Samson et al. 2004; Apperly et al. 2005, 2006).”
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- cites Apperly et al. 2005, 2006
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- Interpretationcitation§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
Inaccurate predictions about distant preferences may result from a failure to project oneself appropriately into the future, i.e., a failure to engage in a rich simulation of the concrete details of future activities.
“Such inaccurate predictions about our distant preferences may result from failure to project ourselves appropriately into the future. That is, we may fail to engage in a rich simulation of the concrete details involved in actually engaging in certain future activities (Trope & Liberman 2003).”
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- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
Impatient participants may have failed to adequately simulate the experience of receiving the larger reward.
“Critically, the minimum amount necessary for which a participant would wait (a measure of how impatient that participant was for the immediate reward) was directly related to the degree to which the ventral MPFC differentiated between judgements in the present and the future, suggesting that impatient participants may have failed to adequately simulate the experience of receiving the larger reward”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The ventral MPFC subserves simulations of the concrete details involved in future activities.
- Premisecitation§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental states
Individual differences in the tendency to engage the ventral MPFC during judgements of future preferences correlate with rational economic decisions.
“Recently, we have extended this suggestion by demonstrating that individual differences in the tendency to engage the ventral MPFC during judgements of future preferences correlate with rational economic decisions (Mitchell et al. submitted).”
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- Rests on an assumption: Individuals tend to make decisions that maximize present happiness at the expense of future enjoyment.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
This consistent observation suggests a role for the TPJ in tracking the differences between self and other.
“This region has been observed consistently when perceivers encounter someone whose mental states conflict with their own, suggesting a role for this region in tracking the differences between self and other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given§ 6. Conclusions
A decade of neuroscience research has implicated the MPFC, the medial parietal cortex, and the TPJ in subserving the cognitive processes necessary to mentalize about others.
“Specifically, a decade of neuroscience research has implicated several regions—the MPFC, the medial parietal cortex and the TPJ—in subserving the cognitive processes necessary to mentalize about others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
To the extent that one's own mental states are a highly salient representation, the TPJ may be required to inhibit attention away from one's own beliefs and reorient them towards those of others.
“To the extent that one's own mental states (e.g. what one knows to be an actual fact) is this kind of highly salient representation, the TPJ may be required to inhibit attention away from one's own beliefs and reorient them towards those of others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
These two seemingly disparate tasks (attentional reorienting and false belief) actually draw on the same cognitive process.
“Indeed, when the same participants alternately performed both this kind of attentional reorienting task and the false belief task, the very same region of the TPJ was engaged (Mitchell 2008), suggesting that these two seemingly disparate tasks actually draw on the same cognitive process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental states
The cognitive process shared by attentional reorienting and false belief likely involves a suppression of salient stimuli in favour of a less immediate alternative.
“Although the exact identity of this cognitive process has yet to be fully uncovered, it seems likely that it involves a suppression of salient stimuli in favour of a less immediate alternative.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Conclusions
One strategy for understanding other minds is through mental simulation of another person's experience.
“That the same network of brain regions subserves mentalizing suggests that one strategy for understanding other minds is through mental simulation of another person's experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 8
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 11
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
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Findingown data§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental statesMost participants would only wait for a later reward when it was substantially larger than the immediate pay-off, although some were willing to wait a month for any larger reward (even $11).
“Although some participants were willing to wait a month for any larger reward (even $11), most would only wait when the later reward was substantially larger than the immediate pay-off.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ AbstractParallel work suggests a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience.
“suggesting the existence of a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 1. IntroductionHumans may be able to deploy a variety of strategies for generating a representation of social entities, depending on available information and specific social goals.
“humans may well be able to deploy a variety of strategies for generating a representation of the social entities in our environment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ AbstractSelf-projection to understand others' minds requires suppressing one's own current mental states.
“(ii) suppressing one's own current mental states”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ AbstractResearch in social neuroscience has consistently observed several brain regions that contribute ubiquitously to social cognition, including medial prefrontal cortex and aspects of lateral and medial parietal cortex.
“Research in social neuroscience has consistently observed several brain regions that contribute ubiquitously to these abilities, including medial prefrontal cortex and aspects of lateral and medial parietal cortex.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ AbstractThe same network of regions subserves remembering the past, imagining the future, and visualizing spatial layouts.
“Interestingly, parallel work has suggested that this same network of regions subserves several seemingly distinct phenomena—notably, the abilities to remember the past, imagine the future and visualize spatial layouts—suggesting the existence of a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Addis et al. 2007
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- cites Buckner & Carroll 2007
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- cites Schacter et al. 2007
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Premisereasoning§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizingConsideration of others' mental states produces greater activation in these regions, especially MPFC, and this is one of the most reliable observations in cognitive neuroscience.
“In fact, the observation that consideration of others' mental states produces greater activation in these regions (especially in the MPFC) is one of the most reliable observations in cognitive neuroscience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ AbstractSelf-projection to understand others' minds requires deciding on the appropriateness of simulated states for understanding a particular other person.
“(iii) deciding on the appropriateness of simulated states for understanding a particular other person”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizingIn using self-projection for social cognition, perceivers may construct a mental representation of a target's experience, predict thoughts/feelings they may have in such a situation, and assume the target will think/feel much the same.
“In making use of such projective strategies for social cognition, perceivers may construct a mental representation of a target's experience (i.e. one different from that being currently experienced first-hand), predict the kinds of thoughts and feelings they may have in such a situation and then assume that the target of mentalizing will think or feel much the same thing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizingProspection, episodic memory, and spatial navigation each require perceivers to conjure up a world other than the one currently inhabited.
“One answer to this question is that each requires perceivers to conjure up a world other than the one that they currently inhabit: prospection obliges perceivers to imagine possible future scenarios; episodic memory relies on the reconstruction of bygone events; and spatial navigation often includes simulations of possible routes between locations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizingMentalizing also relies on the MPFC/TPJ/medial parietal network, suggesting that understanding other minds may require mentally projecting oneself into a scenario other than the one currently being experienced.
“That mentalizing also relies on the MPFC/TPJ/medial parietal network suggests that understanding other minds may likewise require mentally projecting oneself into a scenario other than the one currently being experienced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Overlapping activation of the same brain regions across tasks indicates that the tasks draw on a common set of cognitive processes.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 2. The functional neuroanatomy of mentalizingThe same network has been argued to play a role in spatial navigation.
“In addition, the same network has also been argued to play a role in spatial navigation (Buckner & Carroll 2007; Spreng et al. in press).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Buckner & Carroll 2007
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- cites Spreng et al. in press
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May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental statesIn Fellows & Farah (2007), healthy controls and patients with dorsolateral PFC damage reported highly stable preferences, whereas patients with ventral MPFC damage showed much more inconsistent preferences.
“Both healthy controls and patients with dorsolateral PFC damage reported highly stable preferences: if a participant preferred Ben Affleck over Matthew Broderick, and Broderick over Tom Cruise, then he almost always also preferred Affleck over Cruise (i.e. A>B and B>C, therefore A>C). By contrast, patients with ventral MPFC damage showed much more inconsistent preferences”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fellows & Farah 2007
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental statesThese data support the view that understanding one's own preferences draws on the ventral MPFC, and may rely on projective simulations of one's potential experience.
“Although they do not directly address the question of how exactly individuals come to an understanding of their own preferences, these data support the view that doing so draws on the ventral MPFC, and may rely on projective simulations of one's potential experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental statesWhen considering another person's internal workings, the human mind must possess some mechanism for keeping track of which mental states belong to whom.
“When engaged in consideration of the internal workings of another person, the human mind must possess some mechanism for keeping track of which mental states ‘belong’ to whom.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Confusion between one's own and others' mental states is the exception rather than the rule.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental statesTo use ourselves as a proxy for others' mental states, we must be able to imagine ourselves as another person and simulate richly enough to provoke a concomitant set of feelings and thoughts.
“To use ourselves as a proxy for others' mental states, we must not only be able to imagine ourselves as another person but also be able to simulate richly enough to provoke in us a concomitant set of feelings and thoughts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. Predictions about one's own mental statesAlthough we almost certainly make occasional use of memory and rule-based inferences for predicting our own mental states, we must also possess a system for predicting our mental states in truly novel situations.
“Although we almost certainly make occasional use of both memory and some kind of rule-based inferences for predicting our own mental states, we must also possess a system for predicting our mental states in truly novel situations, where we cannot avail ourselves of memory for our past experiences or global rules about people in general.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 6. ConclusionsThese regions (MPFC, medial parietal cortex, TPJ) have also been linked to tasks that require projection of oneself away from the here and now and into times or places other than the one currently being inhabited (e.g., episodic memory, prospection, spatial navigation).
“Critically, these regions have also been linked to tasks that require projection of oneself away from the here and now and into times or places other than the one currently being inhabited (as during episodic memory, prospection about the future, or spatial navigation).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5. Suppressing one's own mental statesThis kind of process may be particularly important in situations in which one's own mental states are incompatible with a simulated representation of the mind of another person.
“This kind of process may be particularly important in those situations in which one's own mental states are incompatible with a simulated representation of the mind of another person.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Overlapping activation of the same brain regions across tasks indicates that the tasks draw on a common set of cognitive processes.
“The fact that prospection, episodic memory, spatial navigation and mentalizing each draws on the same set of brain regions suggests that each likewise draws on a common set of cognitive processes.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Involvement of the MPFC can serve as a benchmark for whether self-projection has been deployed.
“Using the involvement of the MPFC as one benchmark for whether one has deployed self-projection as a basis for mental state inference”
The paper relies on this without support.
Mental states are not directly observable and must be inferred from other sources.
“mental states remain safely sequestered inside one's own head, invisible to direct inspection by others.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Individuals tend to make decisions that maximize present happiness at the expense of future enjoyment.
“Research in behavioural economics has repeatedly demonstrated that individuals make decisions that maximize happiness in the present at the expense of one's future enjoyment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Confusion between one's own and others' mental states is the exception rather than the rule.
“Nevertheless, despite the richness of our projections into the mental shoes of other people, such confusion between one's own and others' mental states is the exception rather than the rule.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The ventral MPFC subserves simulations of the concrete details involved in future activities.
“To the extent both that the ventral MPFC subserves these kinds of simulations and that simulating the distant future will be more difficult than thinking about the here and now, we might expect to observe less activation in this area when perceivers report their preferences for the future compared with the present.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Simulating the distant future is more difficult than thinking about the here and now.
“To the extent both that the ventral MPFC subserves these kinds of simulations and that simulating the distant future will be more difficult than thinking about the here and now, we might expect to observe less activation in this area when perceivers report their preferences for the future compared with the present.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Considerable brain imaging research on empathy has highlighted the functional importance of medial PFC, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and posterior superior temporal sulcus.
“Indeed, considerable brain imaging research on empathy, largely related to the imitation of others’ emotions using stimuli such as emotional faces, images of others in pain or crying sounds (Fan et al., 2011), has highlighted the functional importance of medial PFC, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitche”
From The maternal brain and its plasticity in humans (2016) · cites this paper as Mitchell, 2009
A brain network consistently activated during tasks that require mentalizing has emerged, including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS).
“In support of this, a brain network consistently activated during tasks that require mentalizing has emerged, including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) (Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009).”
From Approaching the biology of human parental attachment: Brain imaging, oxytocin and coordinated assessments of mothers and fathers (2014) · cites this paper as Mitchell, 2009
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The role of anterior insular cortex in social emotions
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The Neural Basis of Personal Goal Processing When Envisioning Future Events
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- Authors
- Mitchell, J. P.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Mitchell, Jason P.
- ORCID
- Mitchell, Jason P.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2009-05-12
- Volume
- 364
- Issue
- 1521
- Pages
- 1309-1316
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- PMC
- PMC2666715
- OpenAlex
- W2006103025
- Semantic Scholar
- eff2aaeb55c69ebb8001ce03d75a8ce667441c7d
- Cited by
- 387
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 38 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 5.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute on Aging (R01AG032780)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- theory of mind, social cognition, self-projection, medial prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, mental simulation, memory, imagination, spatial visualization, mentalization
- MeSH terms
- Awareness, Brain, Humans, Imagination, Interpersonal Relations, Memory, Psychology, Social, Socialization, Comprehension
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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