Cited by 184Embodied and Extended CognitionVirtual Reality Applications and ImpactsPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment

Carruthers, Glenn·2008·Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract

The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia--the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one's body--suggests the existence of 'online' and 'offline' representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly "plugged into" current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb--the feeling that an amputated limb is still present--phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.001

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  • Body ownership seems to be modulated by off-line body representations, specifying which sensory cues can or cannot be attributed to the body, depending on perceptual (coded in right inferior parietal cortex) and structural (coded in the left parietal cortex) constraints.

    “In addition, body ownership seems to be modulated by off-line body representations (Carruthers, 2008), specifying which sensory cues can or cannot be attributed to the body, depending on perceptual (coded in right inferior parietal cortex) and structural (coded in the left parietal cortex) constraints.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Carruthers, 2008

  • The discussion about relative influence of bottom-up and top-down factors has continued with the introduction of ideas of offline and online representations [30], where offline refers to what our body is normally like and online refers to the temporal flow of information that constructs how our body is right now [31], [32].

    “The discussion about the relative influence of bottom-up and top-down factors has continued with the introduction of the ideas of offline and online representations [30] where the former refers to what our body is normally like, and the latter refers to the temporal flow of information that constructs how our body is right now [31], [32].”

    From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [30]

  • [30] refers to self recognition, which may not be the same as body ownership.

    “However, [30] refers to self recognition, which may not be the same as body ownership.”

    From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [30]

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Authors
Carruthers, G.
Affiliations
The University of Adelaide (AU)
Corresponding author
Carruthers, Glenn
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-12
Volume
17
Issue
4
Pages
1302-1316
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2064218901
Cited by
184
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 11
FWCI
4.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
representation of the body, sense of embodiment, anosognosia for hemiplegia, phantom limb, self-recognition, body schema, body image
MeSH terms
Agnosia, Attention, Awareness, Body Image, Culture, Emotions, Hemiplegia, Humans, Functional Laterality, Phantom Limb, Psychomotor Performance, Self Concept, Touch, Visual Perception

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