Cited by 39Social and Intergroup PsychologyEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Parochial altruism: What it is and why it varies

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Pisor, Anne C., Ross, Cody T.·2024·Evolution and Human Behavior

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Abstract

Parochial altruism (PA), or in-group favoritism paired with out-group hostility, is sometimes treated as a synonym for human intergroup relations. However, empirical data suggest that PA is highly variable—across individuals, across situations, and across groups. Here, we review theory and data on PA to explore the candidate sources for this variability. Along the way, we unpack assumptions (e.g., what constitutes a group?), identify precursors to PA behavior (e.g., context and internal states), and review evidence for the pairing of in-group favoritism with out-group hostility. We discuss phenomena with measurable impact on downstream behavior, including resource access and cultural institutions, but also flag how researcher expectations and methodological design impact reported variability in PA. We close by making recommendations for how researchers can reduce noise in the study of PA by checking assumptions and being deliberate in research design; this is key, as the PA literature is part of sensitive public discourse.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.06.005

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  • The same argument might hold for varying intensities of parochial altruism across different groups, which is an additional expression of the moral ambivalence of human sociality.

    “The same argument might hold with respect to varying intensities of parochial altruism across different groups (Pisor & Ross, 2024), which is, in the end, an additional expression of the moral ambivalence of human sociality.”

    From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Pisor & Ross, 2024

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Authors
Pisor, A. C., & Ross, C. T.
Affiliations
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (DE)
Corresponding author
Pisor, Anne C.
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2024-01
Volume
45
Issue
1
Pages
2-12
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4383368494
Cited by
38
References
164
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1
FWCI
14.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Max-Planck-Institut für Evolutionäre Anthropologie
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
parochial altruism, in-group favoritism, outgroup hostility, intergroup relations, group identity, access to resources, cultural institutions, researcher expectations, methodological design

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