The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 196 of the 196 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Strategy of Economic Development
Linder, S. B., & Hirschman, A. O. (1959) · Ekonomisk Tidskrift · doi:10.2307/3438684 · Cited by 6,249
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Krueger, A. O. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8 · Cited by 5,272 · cited 1×
“Mineral-induced rent-seeking often involves allocating resources (effort, funds, etc.) on political lobbying to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating any added value to the economy (the term ‘rent-seeking’ was coined by Krueger, 1974).”
BackgroundThe curse of natural resources
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00125-8 · Cited by 4,142
Ross, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409 · cited 6×
“…of authoritarian rulers may also suppress democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010; Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy,…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe economic development of Latin America and its principal problems
Prebisch, R. (1950) · DIGITAL REPOSITORY Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations) · Cited by 3,299
Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy
Corden, W. M., & Neary, J. P. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232670 · Cited by 3,298 · cited 1×
“In their basic Dutch Disease model, Corden and Neary (1982) separate the Dutch Disease mechanism into two effects (see also Corden, 1984).”
BackgroundInstitutions and the Resource Curse
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x · Cited by 2,864 · cited 3×
“Mehlum et al. (2006) also develop theoretical and empirical models to show how ‘grabber-friendly’ institutions that encourage corruption constrain growth in a mineral-rich environment.”
BackgroundOn economic causes of civil war
Collier, P. (1998) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/50.4.563 · Cited by 2,483 · cited 2×
“revenues, which correspondingly reduces public demand for democratic accountability (McFerson, 2010; Ross, 2001, 2009; see also the book by Jill Crystal (1990) on oil politics in Kuwait and Qatar).”
BackgroundThe Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Krueger, A., & Rostow, W. W. (1960) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2281618 · Cited by 2,380
Natural resources, education, and economic development
Gylfason, T. (2001) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00127-1 · Cited by 2,074 · cited 4×
“Gylfason and Zoega (2006) also provide evidence of a negative link between resource dependence and the rate of national savings in GDP as well as the maturity of the financial system (hampering hence a more efficient allocation of capital”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Political Economy of the Resource Curse
Ross, M. L. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100008200 · Cited by 1,991 · cited 1×
“One of the earliest reviews of the literature (focusing primarily on political economy explanations of the resource curse) is the one conducted by Ross (1999).”
BackgroundLewis, W. A. (1955) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,948
BOOMING SECTOR AND DUTCH DISEASE ECONOMICS: SURVEY AND CONSOLIDATION *
CORDEN, W. M. (1984) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041643 · Cited by 1,848 · cited 1×
“In their basic Dutch Disease model, Corden and Neary (1982) separate the Dutch Disease mechanism into two effects (see also Corden, 1984).”
BackgroundThe Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries
Singer, H. W. (1975) · The Strategy of International Development · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-04228-9_3 · Cited by 1,833 · cited 2×
“Suzanne Sawyer’s book (2004), for example, chronicles the emergence of indigenous movements in Ecuador in a stand against multinational oil companies and the Ecuadorian state (see also Bebbington et al.”
BackgroundPolitical foundations of the resource curse
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008 · Cited by 1,706
Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1997) · Journal of African Economies · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020932 · Cited by 1,580 · cited 1×
“Earlier studies often failed to look separately at the differentiated effects of the two types of resources (e.g. see Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997; Gylfason et al., 1999; Kronenberg, 2004).”
BackgroundAgricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic growth
Matsuyama, K. (1992) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(92)90057-o · Cited by 1,504 · cited 2×
“subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the stronger learning-by-doing externalities of the sector (Aizenman and Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis, 2011).”
BackgroundTornell, A., & Lane, P. R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.22 · Cited by 1,448
The paradox of plenty: oil booms and petro-states
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-3431 · Cited by 1,445 · cited 1×
“…al., 2013), governments adopt short-sighted policies given the volatility of prices and revenues and there are limited controls that encourage transparency and rule of law, limit expropriation and guarantee an efficient bureaucracy (Karl, 1997; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).”
BackgroundSustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis
Auty, R. M. (1993) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,445
The big push, natural resource booms and growth
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00005-x · Cited by 1,345
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306 · cited 1×
“The presence of mineral resources is not only associated with the onset of conflict but also with its duration (Ballantine, 2003; Buhaug et al., 2009; Lujala et al., 2005; Fearon, 2004 for the case of secessionist wars) and severity (e.g. extent of casualties per initial population).”
BackgroundTHE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Adler, J. H. (1959) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1959.tb01824.x · Cited by 1,301
Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms
Humphreys, M. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277545 · Cited by 1,221 · cited 1×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundAddressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria
Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2013) · Journal of African Economies · doi:10.1093/jae/ejs033 · Cited by 1,204
The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher
Krugman, P. (1987) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(87)90005-8 · Cited by 1,172 · cited 1×
“Much of the literature has focused on the potential contraction of the manufacturing sector and subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the stronger learning-by-doing externalities of the sector (Aizenman and Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis, 2011).”
BackgroundWhat Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
Ross, M. L. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 · Cited by 1,146
Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse
HABER, S., & MENALDO, V. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000584 · Cited by 1,128 · cited 1×
“…that it is the extent of mineral wealth that matters for democratic accountability rather than any shorter term changes in mineral affluence (e.g. a short-term income windfall induced by price fluctuations; see Haber and Menaldo, 2010; Wacziarg, 2012; Wright et al., 2015; Andersen and Ross, 2014).”
BackgroundThe resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings
Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004 · Cited by 1,121
Oil windfalls: blessing or curse?
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-6365 · Cited by 1,046
Isham, J. (2005) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhi010 · Cited by 962
Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare
Torvik, R. (2002) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00195-x · Cited by 907 · cited 3×
“A resource boom increases the incentive to lobby/rent-seek and hence diverts attention and resources from productive activities (e.g. see the papers by Baland and Francois, 2000; Boschini et al., 2007; Lane and Tornell, 1999; Torvik, 2002).”
BackgroundBeyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Rohner, D. (2008) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpn029 · Cited by 879
Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth
Leite, C. A., & Weidmann, J. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.259928 · Cited by 851 · cited 3×
“by breeding corruption and rent-seeking (Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et al., 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Torvik, 2002).”
BackgroundResource Rents, Governance, and Conflict
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277551 · Cited by 825 · cited 2×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundThe resource curse hypothesis and its transmission channels
Papyrakis, E., & Gerlagh, R. (2004) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.11.002 · Cited by 821 · cited 2×
“…in GDP or school enrolment rates) have been found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance (Gylfason, 2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries are often less human capital intensive; see also Birdsall et al., 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Shao and Yang, 2014).”
BackgroundSelf-citationResource intensity, institutions, and development
Bulte, E. H., Damania, R., & Deacon, R. T. (2005) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.04.004 · Cited by 788 · cited 1×
“by breeding corruption and rent-seeking (Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et al., 2005; Leite and Weidman, 2002; Torvik, 2002).”
BackgroundA Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War
Ross, M. (2006) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.081304.161338 · Cited by 759 · cited 3×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundResource Abundance and Economic Development
Bevan, D. L. (2003) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(02)00113-x · Cited by 753
Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis
van der Linde, C. (1994) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/0301-4207(94)90044-2 · Cited by 741
Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*
Boschini, A. D., Pettersson, J., & Roine, J. (2007) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00509.x · Cited by 716 · cited 1×
“Rather than trying to explain any variability in institutions as a result of mineral abundance, it instead emphasises the mediating role of good institutions in preventing the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007; Kolstad, 2009; Mehlum et al., 2006b; Sarmidi et al., 2014).”
BackgroundCursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Brunnschweiler, C. N. (2008) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.03.004 · Cited by 710 · cited 2×
“…2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property rights protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Brunnschweiler, 2008, for transparency see Williams, 2011).”
BackgroundROSS, M. L. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055408080040 · Cited by 674 · cited 1×
“Ross (2007) finds that oil dependence correlates with gender inequality (in the domain of labour force participation and political representation), while Daniele (2011) and de Soysa and Gizelis (2013) claim that mineral rich countries underperform in health indicators (e.g. proxied by child…”
BackgroundThe Natural Resource Curse: A Survey
Frankel, J. (2010) · doi:10.3386/w15836 · Cited by 655
A MIXED BLESSING: Natural Resources and Economic Growth
Gylfason, T., Herbertsson, T. T., & Zoega, G. (1999) · Macroeconomic Dynamics · doi:10.1017/s1365100599011049 · Cited by 652
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1759 · Cited by 646
Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment
Gylfason, T., & Zoega, G. (2006) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00807.x · Cited by 636 · cited 1×
“Gylfason and Zoega (2006) also provide evidence of a negative link between resource dependence and the rate of national savings in GDP as well as the maturity of the financial system (hampering hence a more efficient allocation of capital across sectors and firms).”
BackgroundA Staple Theory of Economic Growth
Watkins, M. H. (1963) · Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science · doi:10.2307/139461 · Cited by 628 · cited 1×
“Some earlier development economists in the 50s and 60s (e.g. see the writings by Lewis, 1955; Innis, 1956; Rostow, 1960; Watkins, 1963) suggested that resource endowments could potentially alleviate credit constraints and result in economic expansion.”
BackgroundBebbington, A., Humphreys Bebbington, D., Bury, J., Lingan, J., Muñoz, J. P., & Scurrah, M. (2008) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.016 · Cited by 624
Volatility and the natural resource curse
van der Ploeg, F., & Poelhekke, S. (2009) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpp027 · Cited by 613
Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis
Atkinson, G., & Hamilton, K. (2003) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.05.001 · Cited by 605 · cited 1×
“…have also linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustainable development indicators (such as the genuine savings and genuine income measurements that calculate net savings and income taking into account the rate of mineral depletion; see Atkinson, 2003; Dietz et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2004).”
BackgroundNatural resource abundance and economic growth revisited
Stijns, J.-P. C. (2005) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2005.05.001 · Cited by 576 · cited 1×
“Studies often found that the resource curse evidence disappears when one uses indices of resource value in per capita (land) terms rather than as a share of overall economic activity (e.g. see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Cavalcanti et al., 2011; Stijns, 2005, 2006).”
BackgroundWhy Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546 · cited 1×
“…democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010; Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy, 2009; Egorov et al., 2009; Williams, 2011).”
BackgroundResource abundance and economic growth in the United States
Papyrakis, E., & Gerlagh, R. (2007) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.04.001 · Cited by 542 · cited 2×
“Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), for example, verified that resource-rich US states lagged behind in long-term growth (as a result of reduced investment, lower educational attainments and trade openness and higher corruption; James and Aadland (2011) find similar evidence at the more disaggregated…”
BackgroundSelf-citationEthnicity and Conflict: An Empirical Study
Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., & Ray, D. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1310 · Cited by 533 · cited 1×
“Countries that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).”
BackgroundResource Impact: Curse or Blessing? A Literature Survey
Stevens, P. (2003) · Discovery Research Portal (University of Dundee) · Cited by 530
Learning by doing and the Dutch disease
Torvik, R. (2001) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00071-9 · Cited by 529 · cited 1×
“The overall impact of a Dutch Disease on economic growth will depend on the relative learning-by-doing and spillover effects across sectors (see Torvik, 2001).”
BackgroundCursed by Resources or Institutions?
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00808.x · Cited by 516 · cited 3×
“Mehlum et al. (2006) also develop theoretical and empirical models to show how ‘grabber-friendly’ institutions that encourage corruption constrain growth in a mineral-rich environment.”
BackgroundThe spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources
Lujala, P. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343309350015 · Cited by 510 · cited 3×
“Some of them have looked at particular types of resources; e.g. see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al. (2005), Olsson (2006, 2007) and Ross (2006) for alluvial diamonds and Lujala et al. (2007) and Lujala (2010) for oil.”
BackgroundIndustrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries: The resource curse thesis
Auty, R. M. (1994) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(94)90165-1 · Cited by 509 · cited 1×
“…volatility effect is also likely to be further accentuated by the lack of diversification in the economy, both as a result of the aforementioned Dutch Disease effect, as well as a lack of far-sighted industrial competitive policies (see Auty, 1994; Auty and Pontara, 2008; Murshed and Serino, 2011).”
BackgroundThe curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries
Hodler, R. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.05.004 · Cited by 505 · cited 1×
“Countries that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).”
BackgroundThe political economy of the resource curse : a literature survey
Rosser, A. (2006) · Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) · Cited by 504
A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource
Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P., & Gilmore, E. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277548 · Cited by 476
The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
Spulber, N., & Rostow, W. W. (1960) · The Slavic and East European Journal · doi:10.2307/304210 · Cited by 473
Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance
(2002) · International Monetary Fund eBooks · doi:10.5089/9781589061163.071 · Cited by 466
More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries
Tsui, K. K. (2011) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02327.x · Cited by 439 · cited 1×
“Yuxiang and Chen (2011) further showed that mineral rich regions in China suffer from a slower pace of financial development.”
BackgroundGeography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict
Buhaug, H., Gates, S., & Lujala, P. (2009) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002709336457 · Cited by 425
Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia
Angrist, J. D., & Kugler, A. D. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.2.191 · Cited by 424 · cited 4×
“Angrist and Kugler (2008) find that dependence on coca production and associated rent-seeking explains differences in the extent of civil conflict across Colombian”
BackgroundInfluentialGervasoni, C. (2010) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887110000067 · Cited by 412 · cited 1×
“Subnational studies have shown that oil rents assist elected officials to prolong their stay in power through generous redistribution (irrespective of the quality of the services they provide; see Goldberg et al., 2008, for the US and Gervasoni, 2010a, 2010b for Argentina).”
BackgroundThe Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States
Cooper, R. N., & Karl, T. L. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048806 · Cited by 412
Crude chronicles: indigenous politics, multinational oil, and neoliberalism in Ecuador
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4812 · Cited by 408
Rent-seeking and resource booms
Baland, J.-M., & Francois, P. (2000) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00067-5 · Cited by 405 · cited 1×
“A resource boom increases the incentive to lobby/rent-seek and hence diverts attention and resources from productive activities (e.g. see the papers by Baland and Francois, 2000; Boschini et al., 2007; Lane and Tornell, 1999; Torvik, 2002).”
BackgroundResource Curse or Debt Overhang?
Manzano, O., & Rigobon, R. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8390 · Cited by 395
Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation
Stijns, J.-P. (2006) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.005 · Cited by 368
Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation
Benson, P., & Kirsch, S. (2010) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/653091 · Cited by 368 · cited 1×
“Anthropologists Benson and Kirsch, for example, argue that a rhetoric of ‘sustainability’ is employed to benefit the corporate sector over and above local communities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010; also Kirsch, 2010; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008).”
BackgroundThe Political economy of armed conflict: beyond greed and grievance
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-2293 · Cited by 358
Aggravating the Resource Curse: Decentralisation, Mining and Conflict in Peru
Arellano-Yanguas, J. (2011) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220381003706478 · Cited by 356 · cited 1×
“Golub’s work highlights the political processes entwined in resource extraction at the local level and, in so doing, underlines the forces of inequality, social dislocation and conflict that can form the basis of a resource curse (see also Watts, 2001; Banks, 2009; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011).”
BackgroundNatural resources, capital accumulation and the resource curse
Auty, R. M. (2006) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.09.006 · Cited by 352
The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis: Four Centuries of Evidence
Harvey, D. I., Kellard, N. M., Madsen, J. B., & Wohar, M. E. (2010) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.2010.12184 · Cited by 350 · cited 1×
“…rich developing countries and the rest of the world (although the trend has been reversed in recent years as a result of the mineral commodities boom; see also the paper by Harvey et al., 2010 that provides evidence in support of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis over a period of four centuries).”
ResultDoes oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa
Vicente, P. C. (2010) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.005 · Cited by 346
Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar.
Wilson, R., & Crystal, J. (1991) · The Economic History Review · doi:10.2307/2598316 · Cited by 333
Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars
Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2009) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpp024 · Cited by 331 · cited 1×
“Countries that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).”
BackgroundThe pungent smell of “red herrings”: Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse
van der Ploeg, F., & Poelhekke, S. (2010) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2010.03.003 · Cited by 321 · cited 1×
“The volatile swings of world resource prices are also likely to result in a macroeconomic see-saw effect for mineral rich economies, as well as create uncertainty for domestic and foreign investors (see van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010).”
BackgroundOil and Autocratic Regime Survival
Wright, J., Frantz, E., & Geddes, B. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000252 · Cited by 320 · cited 1×
“…that it is the extent of mineral wealth that matters for democratic accountability rather than any shorter term changes in mineral affluence (e.g. a short-term income windfall induced by price fluctuations; see Haber and Menaldo, 2010; Wacziarg, 2012; Wright et al., 2015; Andersen and Ross, 2014).”
BackgroundInstitutional challenges for mining and sustainability in Peru
Bebbington, A. J., & Bury, J. T. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0906057106 · Cited by 319 · cited 1×
“…rarely translates into interdisciplinary research (for exceptions see Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2010; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington and Bury, 2009 and Berdeguéa et al., 2015 – these are some of the few attempts to provide a more holistic picture of the resource curse…”
BackgroundAddressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria
Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2008) · Economic Policy Options for a Prosperous Nigeria · doi:10.1057/9780230583191_4 · Cited by 306
The curse of natural resources: An empirical investigation of U.S. counties
James, A., & Aadland, D. (2011) · Resource and Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2010.05.006 · Cited by 304 · cited 1×
“…Gerlagh (2007), for example, verified that resource-rich US states lagged behind in long-term growth (as a result of reduced investment, lower educational attainments and trade openness and higher corruption; James and Aadland (2011) find similar evidence at the more disaggregated county level).”
BackgroundRegional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
Østby, G., Nordås, R., & Rød, J. K. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00535.x · Cited by 302 · cited 1×
“Onshore oil is more conducive to civil conflict (Lujala, 2010), as is oil extraction in regions with much lower income per capita than the national average (Østby et al., 2009).”
BackgroundRobinson, J. A., & Torvik, R. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.004 · Cited by 301
Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset
Lujala, P., Ketil Rod, J., & Thieme, N. (2007) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1080/07388940701468526 · Cited by 299 · cited 1×
“Some of them have looked at particular types of resources; e.g. see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al. (2005), Olsson (2006, 2007) and Ross (2006) for alluvial diamonds and Lujala et al. (2007) and Lujala (2010) for oil.”
BackgroundAn Andean Avatar: Post-Neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the Unobtainable
Bebbington, A., & Humphreys Bebbington, D. (2011) · New Political Economy · doi:10.1080/13563461003789803 · Cited by 292 · cited 1×
“…with the impact of extractives rarely translates into interdisciplinary research (for exceptions see Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2010; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington and Bury, 2009 and Berdeguéa et al., 2015 – these are some of the few attempts to provide a more…”
BackgroundExplaining the resource curse, with special reference to mineral-exporting countries
Mikesell, R. F. (1997) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/s0301-4207(97)00036-6 · Cited by 288 · cited 1×
“Several country studies have provided support to the Dutch Disease hypothesis (Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Auty and Evia, 2001 for Bolivia, Mikesell, 1997 for Venezuela and Peru; Pegg, 2010 for Botswana; Kutan and Wyzan, 2005 and Egert and Leonard, 2008 for Kazakhstan).”
BackgroundShao, S., & Yang, L. (2014) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.07.007 · Cited by 287 · cited 1×
“…in GDP or school enrolment rates) have been found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance (Gylfason, 2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries are often less human capital intensive; see also Birdsall et al., 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Shao and Yang, 2014).”
BackgroundDiamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars
Le Billon, P. (2008) · Annals of the Association of American Geographers · doi:10.1080/00045600801922422 · Cited by 277 · cited 2×
“see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al.”
BackgroundDemocracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries
Vergne, C. (2009) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003 · Cited by 275 · cited 1×
“Politicians may themselves willingly redistribute mineral rents in the form of direct transfers, subsidies or public goods in exchange for electoral support (see Robinson and Torvik, 2005; Vergne, 2009).”
BackgroundOil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions
Arezki, R., & Brückner, M. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.03.004 · Cited by 272
Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?
Aslaksen, S. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310368348 · Cited by 264 · cited 1×
“Cross-country statistical analysis has verified the link between mineral resources and limited government democratic accountability (Andersen and Ross, 2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011).”
BackgroundDiamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order
Snyder, R., & Bhavnani, R. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277796 · Cited by 263
Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability
Dunning, T. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277521 · Cited by 263 · cited 2×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundCorruption, the resource curse and genuine saving
Dietz, S., Neumayer, E., & de Soysa, I. (2007) · Environment and Development Economics · doi:10.1017/s1355770x06003378 · Cited by 261 · cited 2×
“…have also linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustainable development indicators (such as the genuine savings and genuine income measurements that calculate net savings and income taking into account the rate of mineral depletion; see Atkinson, 2003; Dietz et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2004).”
BackgroundGrowth, development and natural resources: New evidence using a heterogeneous panel analysis
Cavalcanti, T. V. D. V., Mohaddes, K., & Raissi, M. (2011) · The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.qref.2011.07.007 · Cited by 255
Gilberthorpe, E., & Banks, G. (2012) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2011.09.005 · Cited by 254 · cited 3×
“Anthropologists Benson and Kirsch, for example, argue that a rhetoric of ‘sustainability’ is employed to benefit the corporate sector over and above local communities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010; also Kirsch, 2010; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008).”
BackgroundSelf-citationGylfason, T. (2001) · Scottish Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1111/1467-9485.00215 · Cited by 237 · cited 2×
“…as the share of public expenditure in GDP or school enrolment rates) have been found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance (Gylfason, 2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries are often less human capital intensive; see also Birdsall et al., 2001; Papyrakis…”
BackgroundPALER, L. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000415 · Cited by 237
Libya since Independence: Oil and State-building
Vandewalle, D. (1998) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 225
Reverse anthropology: indigenous analysis of social and environmental relations in New Guinea
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-6314 · Cited by 225
The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources
Busse, M., & Gröning, S. (2013) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9804-0 · Cited by 224
The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis
Andersen, J. J., & Ross, M. L. (2014) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414013488557 · Cited by 216 · cited 2×
“Cross-country statistical analysis has verified the link between mineral resources and limited government democratic accountability (Andersen and Ross, 2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011).”
BackgroundRents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia
Khan, M. (2009) · Cited by 212
What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings
Dixon, J. (2009) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00892.x · Cited by 210 · cited 2×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies*
Kronenberg, T. (2004) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00187.x · Cited by 205
Williams, A. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.08.015 · Cited by 193 · cited 4×
“…2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property rights protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Brunnschweiler, 2008, for transparency see Williams, 2011).”
BackgroundInfluentialNatural Resource Dependence and Economic Performance in the 1970–2000 Period
Mavrotas, G., Murshed, S. M., & Torres, S. (2011) · Review of Development Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00597.x · Cited by 191
Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward
Stevens, P., & Dietsche, E. (2008) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.003 · Cited by 190
Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?
Arezki, R., & van der Ploeg, F. (2011) · Review of Development Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00623.x · Cited by 189 · cited 1×
“Some other cross-country econometric studies linked mineral resources with the observed variation in income (GDP per capita) levels rather than growth patterns (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2008, 2011; Carmignani and Chowdhury, 2012).”
BackgroundThe political economy of natural resource extraction: a new model or extractive imperialism?
Veltmeyer, H. (2013) · Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d études du développement · doi:10.1080/02255189.2013.764850 · Cited by 188 · cited 1×
“…the existence of positive spillovers from mineral extraction to the rest of the economy, suggesting that these are likely to be very localised, particularly in the presence of foreign multinationals (Hirschman, 1958; Baldwin, 1966; for some more recent evidence and discussion see Veltmeyer, 2013).”
BackgroundRule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity
Norman, C. S. (2009) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-008-9231-y · Cited by 178 · cited 1×
“…several institutional variables (e.g. for corruption, see Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Leite and Weidmann, 2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property…”
BackgroundIt's the rents, stupid! The political economy of the resource curse
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2009) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.055 · Cited by 178 · cited 1×
“…al., 2013), governments adopt short-sighted policies given the volatility of prices and revenues and there are limited controls that encourage transparency and rule of law, limit expropriation and guarantee an efficient bureaucracy (Karl, 1997; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).”
BackgroundResource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions
Sarmidi, T., Law, S. H., & Jafari, Y. (2013) · International Economic Journal · doi:10.1080/10168737.2013.787110 · Cited by 178 · cited 2×
“Rather than trying to explain any variability in institutions as a result of mineral abundance, it instead emphasises the mediating role of good institutions in preventing the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007; Kolstad, 2009; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sarmidi et al., 2014).”
BackgroundOut of the mainstream: water rights, politics and identity
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.48-0995 · Cited by 177
Resource abundance and financial development: Evidence from China
Yuxiang, K., & Chen, Z. (2011) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2010.05.002 · Cited by 177 · cited 1×
“Yuxiang and Chen (2011) further showed that mineral rich regions in China suffer from a slower pace of financial development.”
BackgroundDutch disease and policy adjustments to the oil boom: A comparative study of Indonesia and Mexico
Usui, N. (1997) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/s0301-4207(97)00023-8 · Cited by 177 · cited 1×
“Usui (1997) case study on two oil-rich countries (Indonesia and Mexico) provides evidence on how such ‘‘boom-based borrowing’’ often results in debt crises (in 1975 and 1982 in Indonesia and Mexico respectively).”
Background‘Once a miner, always a miner’: Poverty and livelihood diversification in Akwatia, Ghana
Hilson, G. (2010) · Journal of Rural Studies · doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2010.01.002 · Cited by 176 · cited 1×
“For example, why is poverty exacerbated in mineral contexts (e.g. Hilson, 2010, 2012)?”
BackgroundDoes the “Resource Curse” hold for Growth in Genuine Income as Well?
Neumayer, E. (2004) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.05.005 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“…have also linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustainable development indicators (such as the genuine savings and genuine income measurements that calculate net savings and income taking into account the rate of mineral depletion; see Atkinson, 2003; Dietz et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2004).”
BackgroundIn Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility
Rajak, D. (2011) · Cited by 170
Andersen, J. J., & Aslaksen, S. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.008 · Cited by 169 · cited 1×
“Mineral rents are often misused by authoritarian rulers for the purpose of prolonging their stay in power (see Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013; Cuaresma et al., 2010).”
BackgroundLessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States
Goldberg, E., Wibbels, E., & Mvukiyehe, E. (2008) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007313123 · Cited by 169
Kirsch, S. (2010) · Dialectical Anthropology · doi:10.1007/s10624-009-9113-x · Cited by 167
Oil and the duration of dictatorships
Cuaresma, J. C., Oberhofer, H., & Raschky, P. A. (2010) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9671-0 · Cited by 166 · cited 1×
“Mineral rents are often misused by authoritarian rulers for the purpose of prolonging their stay in power (see Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013; Cuaresma et al., 2010).”
Natural Resources, Human Capital, and Growth
Birdsall, N., Pinckney, T. C., & Sabot, R. H. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199275785.003.0004 · Cited by 163 · cited 1×
“…in GDP or school enrolment rates) have been found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance (Gylfason, 2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries are often less human capital intensive; see also Birdsall et al., 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Shao and Yang, 2014).”
BackgroundCrude domination: an anthropology of oil
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-5152 · Cited by 162 · cited 1×
“This opposition can generate tensions between the state/corporate sector and indigenous communities, and can lead to violent and non-violent conflict (see examples in Watts, 2008; Behrends et al., 2011; Thorp et al., 2012).”
BackgroundThe First Law of Petropolitics
Wacziarg, R. (2012) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2011.00902.x · Cited by 160 · cited 1×
“…that it is the extent of mineral wealth that matters for democratic accountability rather than any shorter term changes in mineral affluence (e.g. a short-term income windfall induced by price fluctuations; see Haber and Menaldo, 2010; Wacziarg, 2012; Wright et al., 2015; Andersen and Ross, 2014).”
BackgroundGervasoni, C. (2010) · Journal of Politics in Latin America · doi:10.1177/1866802x1000200202 · Cited by 156 · cited 1×
“Subnational studies have shown that oil rents assist elected officials to prolong their stay in power through generous redistribution (irrespective of the quality of the services they provide; see Goldberg et al., 2008, for the US and Gervasoni, 2010a, 2010b for Argentina).”
BackgroundContesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse
Wick, K., & Bulte, E. (2006) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-005-9010-z · Cited by 155 · cited 1×
“Of course the extent of rent-seeking depends on other opportunity costs in the economy (e.g. the return from other economic activities) and the appropriability of the mineral rents (e.g. their geographic concentration, number of contestants, etc.; see Wick and Bulte, 2006; Dejardin, 2011).”
BackgroundIs there a Dutch disease in Botswana?
Pegg, S. (2009) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2009.07.003 · Cited by 151
In Search Of The Missing Resource Curse
Lederman, D., & Maloney, W. F. (2008) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-4766 · Cited by 150
The pattern of specialization and economic growth: The resource curse hypothesis revisited
Murshed, S. M., & Serino, L. (2011) · Structural Change and Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2010.12.004 · Cited by 145
The value of fiscal discipline for oil-exporting countries
Pieschacón, A. (2012) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.03.001 · Cited by 141
Sustainability and the primary extraction industries: theories and practice
Cowell, S. J., Wehrmeyer, W., Argust, P. W., & Robertson, J. G. S. (1999) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/s0301-4207(00)00003-9 · Cited by 133
"Culture" and Culture: Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Rights
da Cunha, M. C. (2009) · Cited by 128
Ponce, A. F., & McClintock, C. (2014) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00243.x · Cited by 128
Natural Resources and the ‘Quality’ of Economic Development
Daniele, V. (2011) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388.2010.506915 · Cited by 123 · cited 2×
“…(2007) finds that oil dependence correlates with gender inequality (in the domain of labour force participation and political representation), while Daniele (2011) and de Soysa and Gizelis (2013) claim that mineral rich countries underperform in health indicators (e.g. proxied by child mortality…”
BackgroundIn Search of the Missing Resource Curse
Lederman, D., & Maloney, W. F. (2009) · Economía · doi:10.1353/eco.0.0012 · Cited by 122
Cursed resources, or articulations of economic theory in the Gulf of Guinea
Weszkalnys, G. (2011) · Economy and Society · doi:10.1080/03085147.2011.580177 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“…as nuanced factors such as local accounts of the impacts of extractive industries, diverse processes of extraction, and the nature of the mineral itself have been found to be severely limiting in the social sciences (see especially Weszkalnys, 2011; also LahiriDutt, 2006; Reyna and Behrends, 2008).”
BackgroundEssays in Canadian Economic History
Winter, E. (1957) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2606888 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“Some earlier development economists in the 50s and 60s (e.g. see the writings by Lewis, 1955; Innis, 1956; Rostow, 1960; Watkins, 1963) suggested that resource endowments could potentially alleviate credit constraints and result in economic expansion.”
BackgroundEssays in Canadian Economic History.
Rich, E. E., Innes, H. A., & Innis, M. Q. (1959) · The Economic History Review · doi:10.2307/2591127 · Cited by 120
Economic incentives, natural resources and conflict in Africa
Herbst, J. (2000) · Journal of African Economies · doi:10.1093/jae/9.3.270 · Cited by 117 · cited 1×
“Countries that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).”
BackgroundBerdegué, J. A., Bebbington, A., & Escobal, J. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.015 · Cited by 116
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict
Nillesen, E., & Bulte, E. (2014) · Annual Review of Resource Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151910 · Cited by 115
Poverty traps in small-scale mining communities: the case of sub-Saharan Africa
Hilson, G. M. (2012) · Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d études du développement · doi:10.1080/02255189.2012.687352 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“For example, why is poverty exacerbated in mineral contexts (e.g. Hilson, 2010, 2012)?”
BackgroundBerdegué, J. A., Escobal, J., & Bebbington, A. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.018 · Cited by 111
Dutch Disease Scare in Kazakhstan: Is it real?
Égert, B., & Leonard, C. S. (2007) · Open Economies Review · doi:10.1007/s11079-007-9051-7 · Cited by 105 · cited 1×
“Several country studies have provided support to the Dutch Disease hypothesis (Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Auty and Evia, 2001 for Bolivia, Mikesell, 1997 for Venezuela and Peru; Pegg, 2010 for Botswana; Kutan and Wyzan, 2005 and Egert and Leonard, 2008 for Kazakhstan).”
BackgroundResource Abundance and Economic Development Improving the Performance of Resource-Rich CountriesPreprint
Auty, R. M., & Auty, R. M. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.295339 · Cited by 105
Resource abundance and regional development in China1
Zhang, X., Li, X., Fan, S., & Luo, X. (2007) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00318.x · Cited by 105 · cited 1×
“Zhang et al. (2008) find similar differences in consumption per capita growth across Chinese provinces that partly explain the disparities in living standards observed between coastal and inland regions (see also Shao and Qi, 2009, for a similar analysis on income per capita growth).”
Kutan, A. M., & Wyzan, M. L. (2005) · Economic Systems · doi:10.1016/j.ecosys.2005.03.009 · Cited by 101
Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend
Olsson, O. (2006) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00809.x · Cited by 98 · cited 1×
“Some of them have looked at particular types of resources; e.g. see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al. (2005), Olsson (2006, 2007) and Ross (2006) for alluvial diamonds and Lujala et al. (2007) and Lujala (2010) for oil.”
BackgroundResource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in Nigeria: the Niger Delta question
Orogun, P. (2009) · GeoJournal · doi:10.1007/s10708-009-9320-7 · Cited by 96
Resource windfalls, investment, and long-term income
Papyrakis, E., & Gerlagh, R. (2006) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2006.09.002 · Cited by 94 · cited 1×
“For example, it has been shown that mineral resource abundance is associated with reduced savings and investment rates, given that capital accumulation becomes less important for sustaining future income levels (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe resource curse: which institutions matter?
Kolstad, I. (2008) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/17446540802167339 · Cited by 93 · cited 2×
“Rather than trying to explain any variability in institutions as a result of mineral abundance, it instead emphasises the mediating role of good institutions in preventing the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007; Kolstad, 2009; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sarmidi et al., 2014).”
BackgroundNatural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?
Libman, A. (2013) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2013.02.003 · Cited by 92 · cited 1×
“Libman (2013) finds that mineral rents encourage economic growth in Russian regions with efficient and transparent bureaucracies (although not necessarily with democratic political systems).”
BackgroundDeaton, B. J., & Niman, E. (2011) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2010.505558 · Cited by 90 · cited 1×
“Deaton and Niman (2012) make use of county data from the Appalachian region to show how mineral dependence increases poverty rates in the longer term (although it tends to have the opposite effect in the short term).”
BackgroundAn Empirical Analysis of a Regional Dutch Disease: The Case of Canada
Papyrakis, E., & Raveh, O. (2013) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-013-9698-z · Cited by 89 · cited 2×
“Several country studies have provided support to the Dutch Disease hypothesis (Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Auty and Evia, 2001 for Bolivia, Mikesell, 1997 for Venezuela and Peru; Pegg, 2010 for Botswana; Kutan and Wyzan, 2005 and Egert and Leonard, 2008 for Kazakhstan).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPoverty in the Midst of Plenty: Aboriginal People, the ‘Resource Curse’ and Australia’s Mining Boom
Langton, M., & Mazel, O. (2008) · Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law · doi:10.1080/02646811.2008.11435177 · Cited by 84 · cited 1×
“…to the resource curse; be this in a so-called ‘developing’ country, such as Papua New Guinea (e.g. Golub, 2014; Gilberthorpe, 2007) or in what are more often termed ‘developed states’ (see for example Trigger, 1997, and Langton and Mazel, 2008 for Australia; Gilberthorpe et al., 2014 for Qatar).”
BackgroundWiig, A., & Kolstad, I. (2011) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.041 · Cited by 84 · cited 2×
“…on primary exports was already well documented since the late 70s (Eden, 1979; Kubursi, 1984) – this tendency largely persists today with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Tunisia, Chile, United Arab Emirates; for a discussion see Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2014; Gelb, 2010; Wiig and Kolstad, 2012).”
BackgroundShao, S., & Zhong-ying, Q. (2009) · Frontiers of Economics in China · doi:10.1007/s11459-009-0008-1 · Cited by 84 · cited 2×
“living standards observed between coastal and inland regions (see also Shao and Qi, 2009, for a similar analysis on income per capita growth). Yuxiang and Chen (2011) further showed that mineral rich regions in China suffer from a slower pace of financial”
BackgroundNatural resources and fiscal performance: Does good governance matter?
Anshasy, A. A. E., & Katsaiti, M. (2013) · Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.05.006 · Cited by 81 · cited 1×
“El Ansashy and Katsaiti (2013) find that low corruption and better governance improve windfall management leading to higher growth rates.”
BackgroundThe Developmental Challenges of Mining and Oil: Lessons from Africa and Latin America
Thorp, R., Battistelli, S., Guichaoua, Y., et al. (2012) · UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) · Cited by 80
Welsch, H. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.01.004 · Cited by 80 · cited 2×
“Several papers have verified a positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008).”
BackgroundThe Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Press Freedom
Dutta, N., & Roy, S. (2009) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2009.00434.x · Cited by 79 · cited 2×
“Mineral rents concentrated in the hands of authoritarian rulers may also suppress democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010 and Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free informati…”
BackgroundDilemmas of Development: The Social and Economic Impact of the Porgera Gold Mine, 1989-1994
Townsend, P. K. (2001) · Pacific Affairs · doi:10.2307/2672521 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“Anthropologists, for example, have argued that market transactions are, by their very nature, incompatible with locally embedded systems dominated by principles of delayed reciprocity and obligation (e.g. Filer, 1990, 1998; Biersack, 1999; Crook, 2007; Golub, 2007; Bainton, 2008).”
BackgroundThe natural resource curse and the spread of HIV/AIDS, 1990–2008
de Soysa, I., & Gizelis, T. (2012) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.11.010 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“…dependence correlates with gender inequality (in the domain of labour force participation and political representation), while Daniele (2011) and de Soysa and Gizelis (2013) claim that mineral rich countries underperform in health indicators (e.g. proxied by child mortality and HIV infection…”
BackgroundOil and Gas: A Blessing for the Few. Hydrocarbons and Inequality within Regions in Russia
Buccellato, T., & Mickiewicz, T. M. (2009) · Europe Asia Studies · doi:10.1080/09668130902753275 · Cited by 74
REAL EXCHANGE RATE, MERCANTILISM AND THE LEARNING BY DOING EXTERNALITY
Aizenman, J., & Lee, J. W. (2010) · Pacific Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0106.2010.00505.x · Cited by 73 · cited 2×
“subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the stronger learning-by-doing externalities of the sector (Aizenman and Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis, 2011).”
BackgroundThe crazy curse and crude domination
Reyna, S. P., & Behrends, A. (2008) · Focaal · doi:10.3167/fcl.2008.520101 · Cited by 71 · cited 2×
“…as nuanced factors such as local accounts of the impacts of extractive industries, diverse processes of extraction, and the nature of the mineral itself have been found to be severely limiting in the social sciences (see especially Weszkalnys, 2011; also LahiriDutt, 2006; Reyna and Behrends, 2008).”
BackgroundOlsson, O. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.07.004 · Cited by 71
Gilberthorpe, E. (2007) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2007.109.1.101 · Cited by 69 · cited 4×
“The complexities and dynamics of social organization and interaction at all levels contribute to the resource curse; be this in a so-called ‘developing’ country, such as Papua New Guinea (e.g. Golub, 2014; Gilberthorpe, 2007) or in what are more often termed ‘developed states’ (see for example Trigger 1997, and Langto…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationMining, Landscape and the Culture of Development Ideology in Australia
Trigger, D. S. (1997) · Cultural Geographies · doi:10.1177/147447409700400203 · Cited by 66 · cited 1×
“…to the resource curse; be this in a so-called ‘developing’ country, such as Papua New Guinea (e.g. Golub, 2014; Gilberthorpe, 2007) or in what are more often termed ‘developed states’ (see for example Trigger, 1997, and Langton and Mazel, 2008 for Australia; Gilberthorpe et al., 2014 for Qatar).”
BackgroundEconomic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960
Robinson, A. J., & Baldwin, R. (1967) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055654 · Cited by 65
Lahiri‐Dutt, K. (2006) · Development · doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100268 · Cited by 60
Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the “Resource Curse” be Exorcised?
McFerson, H. M. (2010) · International Studies Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00410.x · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“For example, authoritarian regimes in mineral-rich states can rely much more on mineral rents than tax revenues, which correspondingly reduces public demand for democratic accountability (McFerson, 2010; Ross, 2001, 2009; see also the book by Jill Crystal (1990) on oil politics in Kuwait and Qatar).”
BackgroundRent seeking and regime stability in rentier states
Bjorvatn, K., & Naghavi, A. J. (2011) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.05.007 · Cited by 57 · cited 1×
“Countries that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006).”
BackgroundETHNIC DIVERSITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Baggio, J. A., & Papyrakis, E. (2010) · The Developing Economies · doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.2010.00116.x · Cited by 55 · cited 3×
“…2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property rights protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Brunnschweiler, 2008, for transparency see Williams, 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Real Exchange Rate, Mercantilism and the Learning by Doing Externality
Aizenman, J., & Lee, J. W. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13853 · Cited by 46
RESOURCE CURSE, POLITICAL ENTRY, AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS
Tsui, K. K. (2010) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00373.x · Cited by 45 · cited 1×
“…democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010; Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy, 2009; Egorov et al., 2009; Williams, 2011).”
BackgroundResource Windfalls and Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Spreads: The Role of Political Institutions
Arezki, R., & Brüeckner, M. (2011) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhr015 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“For example, Arezki and Brückner (2010, 2012) find that mineral price booms lead to excessive government spending and sovereign bond spreads (a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty) in the presence of autocratic rulers.”
BackgroundFederating and Defending: Water, Territory and Extraction in the Andes
Bebbington, A., Bebbington, D. H., & Bury, J. T. (2011) · Cited by 43
Banks, G. (2013) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.03.003 · Cited by 42 · cited 1×
“Perhaps a solution (that could become more institutionalised) would be for environmental and social impact assessments to become a standard norm and also incorporate an analysis on the social dimensions of impacts to local communities (see Banks, 2013).”
BackgroundGolub, A. (2007) · Human Organization · doi:10.17730/humo.66.1.157563342241q348 · Cited by 41 · cited 2×
“principles of delayed reciprocity and obligation (e.g. Filer, 1990, 1998; Biersack, 1999; Crook, 2007; Golub, 2007; Bainton, 2008).”
BackgroundHandbook of Research on Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Cantner, U., & Guerzoni, M. (2011) · Cited by 36
Resource rents; when to spend and how to save
Venables, A. J. (2010) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1007/s10797-010-9137-9 · Cited by 31 · cited 2×
“shortage of physical capital and the economy is far below its full employment level (Venables, 2010).”
BackgroundInternational Commodity Price Shocks, Democracy, and External DebtPreprint
Arezki, R., & Brückner, M. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1565227 · Cited by 29
In the shadow of industry: a study of culturization in P apua N ew G uinea
Gilberthorpe, E. (2013) · Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute · doi:10.1111/1467-9655.12032 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“…activity and development (especially social development) reproduces a culture of dependency and power in which the indigenous ‘impacted communities’ remain powerless players on the periphery of capitalist discourse and contemporary notions of market discipline (also Gilberthorpe, 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources
Carmignani, F., & Chowdhury, A. (2012) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-011-9539-x · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“Some other cross-country econometric studies linked mineral resources with the observed variation in income (GDP per capita) levels rather than growth patterns (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2008, 2011; Carmignani and Chowdhury, 2012).”
BackgroundPolitical liberalization and democratization in the Arab world
Ehteshami, A. (1996) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2624216 · Cited by 24
Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior
Dejardin, M. (2011) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781849807760.00009 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“Of course the extent of rent-seeking depends on other opportunity costs in the economy (e.g. the return from other economic activities) and the appropriability of the mineral rents (e.g. their geographic concentration, number of contestants, etc.; see Wick and Bulte, 2006; Dejardin, 2011).”
BackgroundResource windfalls, innovation, and growth
Papyrakis, E. (2011) · Journal of Economic Policy Reform · doi:10.1080/17487870.2011.595570 · Cited by 12 · cited 2×
“subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the stronger learning-by-doing externalities of the sector (Aizenman and Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis, 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey
Badeeb, R. A., Lean, H. H., & Clark, J. (2017) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.10.015 · Cited by 793
Jacka, J. K. (2018) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-102317-050156 · Cited by 192
“At macro levels, there is strong support for this argument, but much more work is needed at regional and local scales (Gilberthorpe & Papyrakis 2015).”
BackgroundThe effects of natural resources on human capital accumulation: A literature survey
Mousavi, A., & Clark, J. (2021) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12441 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Gilberthorpe, E., & Papyrakis, E.
- Venue
- The Extractive Industries and Society
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-04
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 381-390
- ISSN
- 2214-790X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2063389362
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 196
- FWCI
- 38.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.