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A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., & Normann, H. T.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 321-338
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122520600
- Cited by
- 636
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 176.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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