Contact tracing apps and values dilemmas: A privacy paradox in a neo-liberal world

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The French government plays on the privacy paradox and downplays long-term concerns.

“French government plays on the paradox and downplays long term concerns.”

• Also stated in: § Implications for research and practice · hedged

  “Our interpretation is that, consciously or not, the government plays on the immediate benefits and downplays long-term risks in the equation considered by the privacy paradox while inducing self-discipline.”

May combine two claims.

In crisis situations, contact tracing apps contribute to self-disciplining, acting as a technology of the self in a neo-liberal world.

“In crisis situations, contact tracing apps contribute to self-disciplining.”

• Also stated in: § A technology of the self in a neo-liberal world · plain

  “By making the choice of voluntary rather than compulsory adoption of the app the government reinforces self-discipline in the population.”

• Also stated in: § A technology of the self in a neo-liberal world · plain

  “we argue that this contact tracing app can be interpreted as a technology of the self in a neo-liberal thinking, included in governmentality (Foucault, 1993; Lemke, 2001), a biopower self-disciplining our bodily behavior and reinforcing self-discipline in a”

• cites Foucault, 1993 sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites Lemke, 2001 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2014 sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Such smartphone tracing apps would inevitably reinforce the ubiquitous use of smartphones in the population who is not educated to the complexity of the dark side of IT, pushing them to carry them permanently on the body.

“Second, such smartphones tracing apps would inevitably reinforce the ubiquitous use of smartphones in the population who is not educated to the complexity of the dark side of IT (D’Arcy, Gupta, Tarafdar, & Turel, 2014), pushing them to carry them permanently on the body.”

• cites D’Arcy, Gupta, Tarafdar, & Turel, 2014Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The haste to develop contact tracing apps evokes pure technological solutionism that runs completely against all socio-technical lessons from IS and other socio-technical disciplines.

“First, the haste to develop contact tracing apps evokes pure technological solutionism that runs completely against all socio-technical lessons from IS and other socio-technical disciplines.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Contact tracing apps may become an emblematic case for digital transformation and value changes in the western world.

“Contact tracing apps may become an emblematic case for digital transformation and value changes in the western world.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Not only is privacy endangered and we move towards a surveillance society, but long-term health risks are also significant if the app is widely accepted.

“Not only is privacy endangered and we move towards a surveillance society, but long term health risk are also significant if the app is widely accepted.”

May combine two claims.

Stop-covid effectiveness is very uncertain due to too low predicted app and smartphone use and too low data quality related to false positives and false negatives.

“The main argument is that we can very cautiously agree to limit our freedoms ONLY when there are strong proven benefits, which is not currently the case and will not be, because, as we explained above, stop-covid effectiveness is very uncertain essentially due to a) too low predicted app and smartphone use2 and b) too low data quality related to false positives (i.e. being informed that someone we”

• cites La Quadrature du Net, 2020aNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

What is activated through self-discipline are the opening of Bluetooth and the consent to be tested and to self-quarantine if the person crossed someone infected.

“What is activated through self-discipline are the opening of Bluetooth and the consent to be tested and to self-quarantine if the person crossed someone infected.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

For some people, privacy is long gone with digital and e-commerce; they enjoy knowing that their friends and whoever else knows what they do.

“Maybe for some this will be a real tradeoff while for others privacy is long gone with the digital and e-commerce (Spiekermann, Grossklags, & Berendt, 2001); they enjoy knowing that their friends and whoever else knows what they do.”

• cites Spiekermann, Grossklags, & Berendt, 2001Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

In France, Germany, the UK, Belgium and most western countries, privacy issues related to the design of the stop-covid app have seemingly been addressed both at technical and institutional level.

“In France, in Germany, in the UK, in Belgium and in most western countries privacy issues related to the design of these « stop-covid » app have seemingly been addressed both at technical level and at institutional level.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Data minimisation is not met for multiple reasons: multiple false positives/negatives (relevance), scope of data collection too large and loosely defined (purpose), analysis and future use of biometric data not properly addressed (adequation).

“However, given our previous remark, we would argue that data minimisation is not met for multiple reasons: there will be multiple false positive/negative (relevance), the scope of data collection is too large and too loosely defined (purpose)3 , the analysis and future use of biometric data are not properly addressed (adequation)4 .”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The stop-covid app may prove counter-effective either with people feeling safe when they are not and stopping cautious behavior, or with people hiding their symptoms in fear of discrimination.

“With regards to health safety LQdN adds that the stop-covid app may even prove counter-effective either with people feeling safe when they are not and stop behaving cautiously5 or with people hiding their symptoms in fear that they be discriminated.”

• cites La Quadrature du Net, 2020aNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Bluetooth technology is notoriously fraught with data breaches, and data breach vulnerability is considered a risk to data privacy.

“In fact, bluetooth technology is notoriously fraught with data breaches, and data breach vulnerability considered a risk to data privacy (Culnan & Williams, 2009).”

• cites Culnan & Williams, 2009Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The two sides of the dilemma do not weigh equally.

“However, even if taking account stakeholders’ interest we may still at this stage conclude that the two sides of the dilemma do not weigh equally.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

These apps are more dangerous than they seem and the values dilemmas persist.

“My own opinion and that of many other digital specialists in France is that, while the “stop-covid” app has been released in France like many other apps in the world pursuing the same contact tracing goal, and whatever the design choices they embed – centralized as in France and the UK or decentralized as in Germany, independent from Apple and Google as in the UK and in France or not, using GPS or”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

People could be discriminated if the app was compulsory or if social pressure towards adoption becomes too high; a particular case is access to blood testing conditioned by its adoption.

“-People could be discriminated if the app was to be compulsory or if social pressure towards adoption becomes too high; a particular case of discrimination being access to blood testing being conditioned by its adoption”

• cites La Quadrature du Net, 2020aNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

From a public policy viewpoint, the value of positive externalities grows exponentially only when a very large share of the population has adopted the app.

“However from a public policy viewpoint the value of positive externalities grows exponentially only when a very large share of the population has adopted the app”

May combine two claims.

The covid crisis may be an illustration of the privacy paradox, which states that we generally value privacy, but when we have an opportunity we are ready to trade it for something else.

“Otherwise put the covid crisis may be a nice illustration of the privacy paradox which states that we generally value privacy, but when we have an opportunity we are ready to trade it for something else (Kokolakis, 2017).”

• cites Kokolakis, 2017 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Adolescents are unaware about privacy issues and such apps reinforce the message that personal data do not belong to you, that tracking trips is not problematic and legitimizes that this can be done by any government.

“More importantly adolescents are unaware about privacy issues and such apps reinforce the message that personal data do not belong to you, that tracking trips is not problematic and legitimizes that this can be done by any government.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Adolescents are unaware about privacy issues.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Here the dilemma is not at the level of an executive, an organization or a profession, but at the level of all countries who are launching such apps and potentially the world.

“and because here the dilemma is not at the level of an executive, an organization or a profession, but at the level of all countries who are launching such apps and potentially to the world!”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Habituation to security policies that curtail freedoms and social acceptability of digital surveillance based on blind belief of technology as solutions to social problems is a risk.

“-Habituation to security policies that curtail our freedoms and social acceptability of digital surveillance based on the blind belief of technology as solutions to social problems.”

• cites La Quadrature du Net, 2020aNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In the face of human suffering and losses due to health, the French government and people may opt for the immediate benefits of the app: freedom to move and not having to feel morally responsible.

“The French government and people value privacy, but in the face of human suffering and losses due to health, they may opt for the immediate benefits of the app: freedom to move and not having to feel morally responsible and looking guilty of as politicians rejecting a technique that could save lives.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The French government and people value privacy.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

In this context no active personal information disclosure is used, contrary to the vast majority of the privacy paradox literature; only metadata about our location and having been in contact or not with an infected person is monitored.

“In such context no active personal information disclosure is used contrary to the vast majority of the privacy paradox literature; only metadata about our location and having been in contact or not with an infected person is monitored.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Increased surveillance will be facilitated if the app is adopted by a large share of the population; anonymity is impossible as it runs counter to the objective of informing targeted persons; pseudonyms cannot be very effective against malevolent action and individual surveillance.

“-Increased surveillance will be facilitated if the app is adopted by a large share of the population; and anonymity is simply impossible as it runs counter to the very objective of the app which is to inform targeted persons. Hence the need for pseudonyms which can not be very effective against malevolent action (Bonnetain et al., 2020) and individual surveillance.”

• cites La Quadrature du Net, 2020aNot checked yet

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• cites Bonnetain et al., 2020Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Like cell phones, the tracing app offers both positive externalities and negative externalities.

“Like cell phones, the tracing app offers both positive externalities (any individual is better protected from a health viewpoint when others also have it if they keep their phones with them) and negative externalities (the more others activate Bluetooth in high population density areas such as malls or public transportation, the greater the risk of malevolent action for those who have bad”

May combine two claims.

Contrary to what Dr Véran and Mr O claimed, the conclusions from Ferretti et al. neither meant that without the app lockdown would continue, nor that other preventative measures should be dropped, but that an app similar to the Oxford team's would help control the disease.

“Contrary to what Dr Véran and Mr O claimed, the conclusions from one of the most advanced epidemiological study taking into account the benefit of a contact tracing smartphone app (Ferretti et al., 2020) neither meant that, without the app, lock-down would continue, nor that other preventative measures should be dropped but that an app similar to what was proposed by the Oxford team would help”

• cites Ferretti et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

People do not always carry their smartphones with them, which makes the traditional method of contact tracing still necessary.

“Thus, people do not always carry their smartphones with them and this makes the traditional method of contact tracing still necessary.”

May combine two claims.

France and many other European countries are very sensitive to privacy issues and privacy is protected by law.

“Turning to institutional level, France and many other European countries are very sensitive to privacy issues (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014) and privacy is protected by law.”

• cites Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Even if the app is not massively adopted, the announcement sends the signal that to combat risks the government and society must be digitally oriented, and this exerts pressure towards adoption and use.

“Why inevitably? Even if the app is not massively adopted, this announcement sends the signal that in order to combat risks the government and society must be digitally oriented and this exerts pressure towards adoption and use.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The app does not come without short-term and long-term risks of privacy and surveillance.

“Being more cost efficient and, if effective, of interest as a complementary means for isolating contagious people and increasing individual and public health, the app does not come without short-term and long-term risks of privacy and surveillance.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

It is voluntary and at all stages citizens are made responsible for their health and public safety; if the stop-covid preventative method is not effective, government won't be to blame, people will be responsible.

“However it is voluntary and at all the stages of the process citizens are made responsible for their health and public safety, an important issue in governmentality: if this stop-covid preventative method for avoiding to spread the disease is not effective government won’t be to blame, people will be responsible.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The app is voluntary.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

For the mobile app contact tracing method to be effective, correct information qualifying individuals as infected and contagious requires that the population be tested and that tests are not error-prone.

“1)Correct information qualifying individuals as infected and contagious requires that population be tested and that tests are not error-prone,”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: France did not have testing capacity before mid-May; testing capacity was below one million per week.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: A large share of infected individuals are asymptomatic and ignore it.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

By making the choice of voluntary rather than compulsory adoption of the app, the government reinforces self-discipline in the population.

“By making the choice of voluntary rather than compulsory adoption of the app the government reinforces self-discipline in the population.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The app is voluntary.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

For the mobile app contact tracing method to be effective, there must be a high likelihood that when a contagious person meets or crosses another person, both parties have a smartphone.

“2)High likelihood that when a contagious person meets or crosses another person an infected person both parties have a smartphone,”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

For the mobile app contact tracing method to be effective, a very high proportion of smartphone users must download the app.

“3)A very high proportion of smartphone users download the app.”

May combine two claims.

The app potentially offers advantages over traditional contact tracing: lower tracing cost and faster, more comprehensive identification of infected contacts when both parties carry smartphones with the app.

“The app potentially offers several advantages over the traditional method for contact tracing. The latter rests on traditional snowballing interviews with infected people to identify who they interacted with in the past days. Specifically, tracing cost is much lower if individuals are automatically detected as prospective cases. Most importantly, an app can help identify more quickly and more com”

• cites Ferretti et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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