CoChat

Autonomous morals: Inferences of mind predict acceptance of AI behavior in sacrificial moral dilemmas

Young, April D., Monroe, Andrew E. · 2019 · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Cited by 88

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Abstract Three studies compared people's judgments of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and humans faced with a moral dilemma. Study 1 showed that, for identical decisions, AVs were judged as more blameworthy, less moral, and less trustworthy compared to humans. However, perceiving AVs as having a human-like mind reduced this difference. Study 2 extended this finding by manipulating AV mindedness. Describing AVs' decision-making capacity in mentalistic terms (relative to mechanistic terms) reduced blame and anger and fostered greater trust and perceptions of morality. Study 3, replicated these findings, and demonstrated that perceived mindedness predicted judgments of trust, morality, and willingness to purchase or ride in an AV. These findings suggest that people's moral reservations about AVs may derive from doubting that AVs have the mental capacities necessary for moral judgment, and that one route for improving trust in AVs is to design them with a veneer of human-like mental qualities.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103870

Cites

10 of 10 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 10 references

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Young, A. D., & Monroe, A. E.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-11
Volume
85
Pages
103870
ISSN
0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2964515402
Cited by
88
References
10
FWCI
3.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.