Autonomous morals: Inferences of mind predict acceptance of AI behavior in sacrificial moral dilemmas
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Abstract Three studies compared people's judgments of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and humans faced with a moral dilemma. Study 1 showed that, for identical decisions, AVs were judged as more blameworthy, less moral, and less trustworthy compared to humans. However, perceiving AVs as having a human-like mind reduced this difference. Study 2 extended this finding by manipulating AV mindedness. Describing AVs' decision-making capacity in mentalistic terms (relative to mechanistic terms) reduced blame and anger and fostered greater trust and perceptions of morality. Study 3, replicated these findings, and demonstrated that perceived mindedness predicted judgments of trust, morality, and willingness to purchase or ride in an AV. These findings suggest that people's moral reservations about AVs may derive from doubting that AVs have the mental capacities necessary for moral judgment, and that one route for improving trust in AVs is to design them with a veneer of human-like mental qualities.
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Citations
Cites
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Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
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Self-citationInference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000165 · Cited by 317
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Sacrifice One For the Good of Many?: People Apply Different Moral Norms to Human and Robot Agents
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Rethinking people’s conceptions of mental life
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Self-citation
Cited by
Algorithmic discrimination causes less moral outrage than human discrimination
Bigman, Y. E., Wilson, D., Arnestad, M. N., Waytz, A., & Gray, K. (2023) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0001250 · Cited by 198
Artificial Intelligence and Declined Guilt: Retailing Morality Comparison Between Human and AI
Giroux, M., Kim, J., Lee, J. C., & Park, J. (2022) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-022-05056-7 · Cited by 194
“Finally, participants’ humanlike perception of the checkout agent was measured with three items of 7-point scales that were used in Young and Monroe (2019) (1 = mindless/unthinking/unconscious , 7 = mindful/thinking/conscious , α = 0.910).”
MethodInfluentialGuingrich, R. E., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1322781 · Cited by 87
Claudy, M. C., Aquino, K., & Graso, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.898027 · Cited by 34
Guingrich, R. E., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2025) · Oxford Intersections: AI in Society · doi:10.1093/9780198945215.003.0011 · Cited by 28
“Viewing an AI agent as having a more sophisticated mind increases people’s trust in the agent and intent to use it, for example (Young & Monroe, 2019).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, A. D., & Monroe, A. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-11
- Volume
- 85
- Pages
- 103870
- ISSN
- 0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2964515402
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 3.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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