The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dynamic psychological games
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Cites
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Cited by
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
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Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
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Self-citationWhat you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
Dana, J., Cain, D. M., & Dawes, R. M. (2006) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001 · Cited by 674
A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition
Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.469 · Cited by 673
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.990 · Cited by 607
Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.909 · Cited by 586
The framing of games and the psychology of play
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Self-citationKimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12152 · Cited by 373
4. Other-Regarding Preferences A Selective Survey of Experimental Results
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Preferences and beliefs in ingroup favoritism
Everett, J. A. C., Faber, N. S., & Crockett, M. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00015 · Cited by 282
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Triangulating the Neural, Psychological, and Economic Bases of Guilt Aversion
Chang, L. J., Smith, A., Dufwenberg, M., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.056 · Cited by 260
Self-citationReading people’s minds from emotion expressions in interdependent decision making.
de Melo, C. M., Carnevale, P. J., Read, S. J., & Gratch, J. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0034251 · Cited by 260
“More recent decision-theoretic frameworks, however, relax this strict assumption and highlight the rationality of basing decisions on evidence concerning the beliefs and intentions of the other party (e.g., Battiggalli & Dufwenberg, 2009), including “cheap” talk.”
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Salvato, C., Reuer, J. J., & Battigalli, P. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2014.0001 · Cited by 86
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 144
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-35
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121141973
- Cited by
- 535
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 49.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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