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Dynamic psychological games
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Metadata
- Authors
- Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 144
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-35
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121141973
- Cited by
- 535
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 49.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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