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Constrained school choice
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Citations
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Cited by
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954 · Cited by 500
What Parents Want: School Preferences and School Choice
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Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Pathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.80 · Cited by 312
Effective affirmative action in school choice
Hafalir, I. E., Yenmez, M. B., & Yildirim, M. A. (2013) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1135 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Haeringer, G., & Klijn, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-09
- Volume
- 144
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1921-1947
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1977766010
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 31.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.