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School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds
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Self-citation
Cited by
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., & Milgrom, P. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.2.585 · Cited by 303
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ehlers, L., Hafalir, I. E., Yenmez, M. B., & Yildirim, M. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-09
- Volume
- 153
- Pages
- 648-683
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116188555
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 14.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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