Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds
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Metadata
- Authors
- Davis, G. F., & Kim, E. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-08
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 552-570
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034409650
- Cited by
- 542
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 47.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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