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Rating agencies in the face of regulation
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Cited by
The Economics of Structured Finance
Coval, J., Jurek, J., & Stafford, E. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.3 · Cited by 742
Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies
White, L. J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.211 · Cited by 603
Good disclosure, bad disclosure
Goldstein, I., & Yang, L. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.004 · Cited by 338
Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing
BAGHAI, R. P., SERVAES, H., & TAMAYO, A. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12153 · Cited by 289
Impact of the Dodd-Frank act on credit ratings
Dimitrov, V., Palia, D., & Tang, L. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.012 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Opp, C. C., Opp, M. M., & Harris, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-04
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 46-61
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121626945
- Cited by
- 382
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 58.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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