The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
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Independent boards and innovation
Balsmeier, B., Fleming, L., & Manso, G. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.12.005 · Cited by 797
The Governance Effect of the Media's News Dissemination Role: Evidence from Insider Trading
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Amiram, D., Bozanic, Z., Cox, J. D., Dupont, Q., Karpoff, J. M., & Sloan, R. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9435-x · Cited by 422
Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting
Jiang, W., Wan, H., & Zhao, S. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv125 · Cited by 324
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits
BOURVEAU, T., LOU, Y., & WANG, R. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12191 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Brochet, F., & Srinivasan, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 430-449
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121402916
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 50.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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