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Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
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Self-citation
Cited by
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?
Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H., & Nekhili, M. (2018) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.010 · Cited by 553
Distracted Shareholders and Corporate Actions
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Board diversity, corporate governance, corporate performance, and executive pay
Sarhan, A. A., Ntim, C. G., & Al‐Najjar, B. (2019) · International Journal of Finance & Economics · doi:10.1002/ijfe.1690 · Cited by 326
CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling
Sauerwald, S., & Su, W. (2019) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12279 · Cited by 260
Metadata
- Authors
- Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-09
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 404-426
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3126084607
- Cited by
- 373
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 54.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.