The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1421-1435
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124155427
- Cited by
- 338
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 33.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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